Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email by Masone, Christopher P
Dartmouth College 
Dartmouth Digital Commons 
Dartmouth College Ph.D Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
8-1-2008 
Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email 
Christopher P. Masone 
Dartmouth College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dissertations 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Masone, Christopher P., "Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email" (2008). Dartmouth College Ph.D 
Dissertations. 26. 
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dissertations/26 
This Thesis (Ph.D.) is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Dartmouth Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dartmouth College Ph.D Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of Dartmouth Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
dartmouthdigitalcommons@groups.dartmouth.edu. 
Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty











(chair) Sean W. Smith, Ph.D.
David F. Kotz, Ph.D.
Christopher J. Bailey-Kellogg, Ph.D.
Denise L. Anthony, Ph.D.
M. Angela Sasse, Ph.D.
Charles K. Barlowe, PhD
Dean of Graduate Studies

Abstract
A secure system that cannot be used by real users to secure real-world processes is not really
secure at all. While many believe that usability and security are diametrically opposed,
a growing body of research from the field of Human-Computer Interaction and Security
(HCISEC) refutes this assumption. All researchers in this field agree that focusing on
aligning usability and security goals can enable the design of systems that will be more
secure under actual usage.
We bring to bear tools from the social sciences (economics, sociology, psychology, etc.)
not only to help us better understand why deployed systems fail, but also to enable us to
accurately characterize the problems that we must solve in order to build systems that will
be secure in the real world. Trust, a critically important facet of any socio-technical secure
system, is ripe for analysis using the tools provided for us by the social sciences.
There are a variety of scopes in which issues of trust in secure systems can be stud-
ied. We have chosen to focus on how humans decide to trust new correspondents. Current
secure email systems—such as S/MIME and PGP/MIME—are not expressive enough to
capture the real ways that trust flows in these sorts of scenarios. To solve this problem,
we begin by applying concepts from social science research to a variety of such cases
from interesting application domains; primarily, crisis management in the North American
power grid. We have examined transcripts of telephone calls made between grid manage-
ment personnel during the August 2003 North American blackout and extracted several
different classes of trust flows from these real-world scenarios. Combining this knowl-
edge with some design patterns from HCISEC, we develop criteria for a system that will
enable humans apply these same methods of trust-building in the digital world. We then
present Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email (ABUSE) and not only show that it meets
our criteria, but also provide empirical evidence that real users are helped by the system.
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“The goal of security is not to build systems that are theoretically securable, but to build
systems that are actually secure” when real people use them in real-world scenarios. [119]
In other words, systems need to be not only secure, but also need to be usably secure.
While many believe that usability and security are diametrically opposed, a growing body
of research from the field of Human-Computer Interaction and Security (HCISEC) refutes
this assumption. All researchers in this field agree that focusing on aligning usability and
security goals can enable the design of systems that will be more secure under actual usage.
Security software is always deployed within some social context. [47] As it is not al-
ways feasible or desirable to excise humans from security tasks, secure systems are socio-
technical in nature; humans and technology work together to achieve some production task
while also keeping the system secure. [11] Realizing this and bringing to bear tools from
the social sciences (economics, sociology, psychology, etc.) can not only help us better
understand why deployed systems fail but also enable us to accurately characterize the
problems that we must solve in order to build systems that will be secure in the real world.
Trust, a critically important facet of any socio-technical secure system, is ripe for analysis
using the tools provided for us by the social sciences.
There are a variety of scopes in which issues of trust in secure systems can be studied.
We have chosen to focus on how humans decide to trust new correspondents. Current
secure email systems—such as S/MIME and PGP/MIME—are not expressive enough to
capture the real ways that trust flows in these sorts of scenarios. We agree with Ackerman;
“human activity is highly flexible, nuanced, and contextualized and...computational entities
such as information transfer, roles, and policies need to be similarly flexible, nuanced, and
contextualized.” [1] To solve this problem, we begin by applying concepts from social
science research to a variety of such cases from interesting application domains; primarily,
crisis management in the North American power grid. We have examined transcripts of
1
telephone calls made between grid management personnel during the August 2003 North
American blackout and extracted several different classes of trust flows from these real-
world scenarios. Combining this knowledge with some design patterns from HCISEC, we
develop criteria for a system that will enable humans apply these same methods in the
digital world. We then present Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email (ABUSE) and not
only show that it meets our criteria, but also provide evidence that real users are helped by
the system.
As public key cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) are critical enabling
technologies for existing trustworthy communication systems—and also for ABUSE—we
discuss them in the next section of this introduction. Then, since “trust” is a heavily over-
loaded term across several fields, Section 1.3 will present and explicate the meaning we
intend to use in this work. In Section 1.4, we motivate our work by presenting a set of
requirements for trustworthy communication and explain how current paradigms fail to
meet these criteria. We then present an overview of ABUSE, our solution to the problem
of trustworthy communication between individuals who share no prior trust relationship.
Finally, we provide an outline for this document and enumerate the contributions made by
this thesis.
1.1 Enabling technologies
1.1.1 Public key cryptography: a building block
Public key cryptography [110] enables the secure exchange of information between multi-
ple parties without requiring them to share any secrets a priori. If Alice wishes to enable
other parties to communicate with her in secret, she first generates a pair of specially-related
cryptographic keys (called a key pair). One of these becomes her private key and must be
kept secret; otherwise, the system breaks down. The other key becomes Alice’s public key,
and can be distributed as widely as Alice desires. Any information enciphered with Alice’s
public key can only be deciphered with the associated private key. Thus, anyone wishing to
communicate with Alice in secret must only encrypt their information with Alice’s public
key and send it to her. Provided that she has been diligent about maintaining the secrecy of
her private key, only Alice will be able to read this information.
Public key cryptography can also work in the other direction; information that can be
deciphered with Alice’s public key can only have been enciphered with her private key.
Thus, if Alice has been diligent about maintaining the secrecy of her private key, she can






















Figure 1.1: Assume that the only way Bob can learn Alice’s public key is to trust her to provide
it along with her signed messages. If Carlo blocks Alice’s message and forwards a message of his
own purporting to be from Alice, but signed with his key...Bob has no way of knowing this has
happened!
These digital signatures [109] are often used to provide the basis of trustworthy messaging
systems as they provide a number of important features. A valid digital signature over a
message provides
• integrity: the data cannot have been changed since it was signed;
• non-repudiability: the signer cannot later assert that she did not send the message1;
and
• a binding between the message and the signer’s key pair.
These are very useful features, but we have glossed over an important detail: a signature
cannot be verified without knowing which public key to use. In a trustworthy messag-
ing context, the verifier cannot trust the sender to provide both the signature and the (un-
vouched-for) public key; attackers could simply replace messages wholesale, signed with
valid-but-meaningless signatures, as shown in Figure 1.1. This is an instance of the prob-
lem known as key distribution. Even if this problem is solved, allowing the verifier to get
1unless she can prove that his private key was leaked before the signature was generated
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the real sender’s public key and thus determine that the signed data is appropriately bound
to it, this is still not enough to enable many real-world applications. To make meaningful
trust decisions about signed data, the signature verifier needs
• to know that the sender’s public key is bound to some real-world information, and
• this information to tell her “what she needs to know” to come to a conclusion.
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) were created to address these two issues, though it is
perhaps more accurate to say that PKIs were created to address the first issue by binding a
key to an identity, with the tacit belief that this solved the second issue as well. We show
that identity does not always tell the verifier “what she needs to know” in Section 1.2.1, and
then begin exploring what humans do need to know in order to establish trust in Section 1.3.
First, though, we discuss PKIs.
1.1.2 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
For a thorough discussion of PKI, see [115]. Here, we merely hit the high points. PKIs are
commonly concerned with binding key pairs to identities. Every kind of PKI rests on some
underlying trust assumptions; as long as Bob believes these assumption to be true, he can
rely on the infrastructure to provide him with a binding between Alice and her key pair. So,
we can say that, as long as Bob buys into the trust assumption that underpins his PKI, he can
trust it to reliably provide him with Alice’s public key when he needs to verify signatures
on the messages that she sends. Strictly speaking, a verifiable digital signature over some
message shows only that the holder of the private key Ks associated with a public key K p
signed the message. PKI is necessary to provide a mapping from “holder of the private
key Ks” to “Alice”. Thus, digital signatures plus a PKI have provided meaningful message
integrity and non-repudiation. The introduction of a PKI has also provided a way to move
from a binding between a message and a key pair to a binding between a message and the
sender’s identity. (It is true that providing a meaningful identifier for the identity “Alice”
is a thorny one. [37] For the purposes of this discussion, which is about email systems, we
consider an email address as a proxy for identity.)
There are two different models of identity mapping used by the predominant PKIs:
the hierarchical X.509 model [19] and the PGP web-of-trust model [48] (SDSI/SPKI, not







1. "I trust this CA to say truthful things about key pairs..." 
2. "...and it says that key pair KA belongs to Alice..."
3. "...so I will believe that actions taken by KA were 
done by Alice."
Figure 1.2: In a simple X.509 PKI, relying parties believe certificates issued by the CA they have
designated as their trust root. Adapted with permission from [115, p. 251].
Hierarchical X.509 identity PKIs
The underlying trust assumption in X.509 is that there exist trust roots, trusted third par-
ties who can speak authoritatively about entities in the system. In the most basic X.509
PKI, there is a single trust root, a Certification Authority (CA) that issues digitally signed
statements—called certificates—binding a public key to an email address for some period
of time (Figure 1.2). The CA asserts, for example, a binding between the public key K p
and the email address “alice@foo.com”, and guarantees this to be true from January 1,
2008 to January 1, 2009. Perhaps Alice did not receive the key until January 1, 2008, or
perhaps “foo.com” did not wish to officially associate with Alice until that date. Perhaps
her appointment at foo.com ends on January 1, 2009, or the company wishes to require her
to get a new key pair before that day. Either way, the CA will not guarantee that the entity
generating signatures verifiable with K p is “alice@foo.com” outside of this validity period.
There is a concept of a Registration Authority in X.509, whose job it is to verify for the CA
that the entity asking that its key pair be bound to “alice@foo.com” is really an entity for
whom the CA should be willing to perform that binding. Here at Dartmouth, for example,
when we are issued our high-assurance X.509 certificates, we must appear in person at a
Registration Authority and present our Dartmouth ID card.
In this simple model, Bob gets a signed message from Alice, acquires her certificate,
checks that it is appropriately signed by the CA he trusts, checks that it is currently valid,
and then uses her public key to verify her signature. As in Figure 1.3, Alice can even be
the one who provides her certificate to Bob; she cannot fake it, as she does not have access
to the CA’s private key.
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Alice The signature checks out!







Figure 1.3: Alice signs mail to Bob with the key bound to her by her CA. Bob trusts Alice’s CA,
so he knows that the key she provides (in her certificate) is ok to use for signature verification.
Real life is, of course, not this simple. First, there is the fact that we have many CAs
in the world, and users need to decide which ones to trust. Generally, some organization
(perhaps the one Bob works for, or the one from whom he downloaded his email software)
has decided for Bob which CAs are trustworthy, and he (perhaps unknowingly) chooses to
believe key bindings based on signed assertions from these authorities. The trust placed
by Bob in his X.509 PKI is generally all institutional2. Bob could also develop a process-
based3 trust relationship over time with a new CA, deciding to add it to his list of trust roots
after many positive experiences with certificates issued by that authority. Any trust that Bob
extends to users subordinate to this new root would still be institutional, however, as he is
relying on the formal certification process of the CA in order to define the authority-to-user
relationship.
In addition to the issue of multiple trust roots, there is also the issue of multi-level hi-
erarchies, summarized in Figure 1.5. Perhaps Alice’s company, Foo.com, has gone multi-
national and wishes to manage certificates for American employees and Canadian employ-
ees separately. It could set up two CAs, but then any software that uses foo.com certificates
would need to be configured to use both as possible trust roots. Instead, it can have a single
root CA issue certificates to two subordinate CAs, one for America and one for Canada.
These CAs use the key pairs certified by the foo.com parent CA to issue credentials to end
users. When Alice signs up with the Foo.com American CA, she gets back not just her
certificate, but also the certificate of the CA itself. This certificate chain connects Alice
all the way back up to the original trust root. Bob, who has only the top-level Foo.com
CA installed as a trust root in his client, can still validate Alice’s certificate as long as she
provides him with the whole chain she got back from the Foo.com American CA.
2We discuss institutional trust in Section 1.3.

















...but...I don't trust 
this "Evil CA"...
Figure 1.4: Carlo blocks Alice’s mail, as in Figure 1.1. When he sends his mail to Bob, he tries
again to fool Bob into happily verifying his signature with the provided key. With PKI in place,
Bob sees that the key is not signed off on by the CA he trusts—Alice’s CA—and so he ignores the
message.
Multi-level hierarchies work well for distributing CA responsibilities inside a single
organization. However, there exist cases in which many organizations wish to be able to
leverage each other’s certificates, but are not willing to subordinate themselves to some
higher-level CA. They may choose, in this case, to create a bridged PKI. In this hub-
and-spoke model, explained in Figure 1.6, all parties can accept each other’s certificates
without having to tell their users to trust any CA besides their own. Some existing bridges
include the Federal Bridge Certification Authority [39]; the CertiPath bridge [14] that links
aerospace PKIs; SAFE [102], the bridge for the pharmaceutical industry; and the Higher
Education Bridge CA (HEBCA) here at Dartmouth.
We have not yet addressed the issue of what happens when a CA wishes to break a
binding between a key pair and an identity. This is called revocation and it is rife with
problems. [37, 53, 115] There are a bevy of approaches to the issue [19, 43, 81], each with
their own tradeoffs. As the revocation problem is orthogonal to our work, we do not ex-
plore this any further. We do discuss, however, the impact of revocation on ABUSE in
Section 5.5.1.
These are the issues surrounding the hierarchical X.509 model of a PKI that are ger-
mane to the rest of this research. There are many other interesting issues in this space that








1. "I trust this CA to say truthful things about 
key pairs..." 
2. "...and it says that Foo.com's American 
CA will speak truthfully about Foo.com's 
American namespace..."
4. "...so I will believe that actions 







3. "...and the American CA says that 
key pair KA belongs to Alice..."
Figure 1.5: In a multi-level X.509 PKI, Bob believes certificates that chain back to the CA he has
designated as his trust root. So, even though Alice’s key pair is certified by the Foo.com Amer-
ican CA, Bob will still believe the binding between Alice and her key. Adapted with permission
















Figure 1.6: In a bridged X.509 PKI, trust roots at different organizations cross-certify with a go-
between bridge CA. Foo.com’s root issues a certificate to the Bridge CA, and vice versa. The
Bar.com CA does the same. This enables Alice at Foo.com to present certificate chains to Bob that
he can accept—without having to trust any CA other than his own.
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The PGP web-of-trust
PGP [48] is a PKI that does not rely upon CAs. Instead, PGP requires users to publish
their keys and then build a “web of trust” by signing off on keys they know to be good.
For example, assume Alice feels sure that the key she has for Bob really does belong to
Bob. So, Alice signs Bob’s key. Cindy trusts the binding she has for Alice’s key, and
wishes to know if she can trust Bob’s key. Because Alice has signed Bob’s key, Cindy
decides that she too can trust (at least somewhat) the accuracy of the binding of Bob to
his key. This is the underlying trust assumption of PGP: that Cindy can make reasonable
assumptions about the correctness of the binding between Bob and his key based on what
Alice says. This provides more flexibility and user control than X.509, but also requires the
user to perform more key management tasks, something that many users are not very good
at. [125] Also, it is worth noting that the consistency of PGP’s web-of-trust model has been
called into serious question. [66]
1.2 Motivation
1.2.1 When identity is not enough
As we have seen, PKIs work to establish a binding between identity and a key pair. In a
small organization, most users probably know each other and this will be enough to es-
tablish trust. In these settings, identity-focused technologies such as S/MIME [95, 96] or
PGP/MIME [35] (both discussed in Chapter 4) would likely serve well enough as trust-
worthy email systems4. In large organizations, though, it becomes less likely that a sender
and recipient knew each other prior to contact. Thus, assurance of only the sender’s name
and/or email address would not be enough to help the recipient make a good decision. Sys-
tems that focus only on identity are not expressive enough to allow users to specify the
right properties for conclusions in human trust settings. 5
The first class of issues arises when users expect that a name, verified by the commu-
nication system, equates to a person. In Dartmouth’s Computer Science department, for
instance, our grant manager shares a name with many other people in our Name Directory.
They are distinguishable only by middle initial (not helpful) and department (since she is
listed in a generic administrative unit, also not helpful). We don’t care that mail is from
4If the reader is protesting that S/MIME, when used properly, may also provide users with some notion of
each other’s organizational affiliations, we are aware of this and will address it in Section 4.1.1.
5The authors, along with another colleague, previously explored expressiveness problems in trustworthy
email systems in [117]. The following paragraphs are adapted from that report and material presented first in
my thesis proposal.
9
“Joan B. Wilson”6, we care that mail is from “the Joan Wilson who manages grants for
Computer Science at Dartmouth.”
A second class of issues arises when a name, verified by the communication system,
does not tell the user what he needs to know. A senior colleague has preached the need for
academic PKI to prevent a repeat of an incident at Yale in which someone forged mail from
the Dean, canceling classes. Here at Dartmouth, we often receive “mail from the Dean” that
is not from the Dean at all, but from one of the Dean’s administrative assistants. Focusing
on identity doesn’t help at all in this case, because a signature from “John Wilson” doesn’t
help unless the recipients know that “John Wilson” is the new assistant to the Dean, and is
allowed to speak for her on such matters.
The final class of expressiveness issues shows up when the same property does not
mean the same thing in different contexts. Take the case of a colleague who moved to
another university, and was asked for an extension by a student who had an athletic event
in which he needed to participate. Our colleague, used to Dartmouth where coaches are
faculty or staff, gave permission—pending an email from the student’s coach (whom he
assumed was a responsible adult) confirming the event. “John Wilson”, who really was the
coach, sent mail to confirm. “John Wilson” was also a student, happy to help his friend get
out of work.
1.2.2 Using scenarios from the power grid
In working on this thesis, we became involved with the Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure
for the Power Grid (TCIP)7 project. Through this involvement, we were introduced to
specifics of the North American blackout of August 2003 and were able to draw a number
of interesting trust scenarios from these events. They all fall into the second class of issues,
in which “names are not enough.”
Even within the same power company, operational decision makers sit in centralized
control facilities that are geographically separated from the power generation and transmis-
sion stations. Furthermore, many different companies and management organizations need
to collaborate in the event of a crisis. Thus, there is nearly always a requirement for some
kind of technologically mediated communication, and a reduced likelihood that the people
who run the actual equipment are personally familiar with all the people authorized to re-
quest operational changes. Additionally, we have seen these centralized control facilities,
and observed their control panels annotated here and there with handwritten notes indicat-
6All names have been changed to some variant of “John Wilson” for anonymity, in reference to Carl
Ellison’s anecdote explaining why globally unique names are not usable [116]
7http://www.iti.uiuc.edu/tcip/index.html
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ing the myriad of small ways in which standard procedure needs to be worked around in the
cases of various facilities and pieces of equipment. Operators may need to take the central
controllers at their word in situations that involve these exceptions. Moreover, deregulation
has created a greater number of organizational boundaries within the industry than ever
before [62], even further decreasing the probability that communicants share pre-existing
trust relationships. Currently, this communication is primarily done via telephone. As was
observed during the 2003 blackout, relying on control room phones for communication
during emergencies can be problematic; a given individual can only be handling one call at
a time, and a lack of available phones can cause a bottleneck. Migrating communication in
the grid to some form of digital messaging system could alleviate the bottleneck issue, but
current technologies do not provide support for the kinds of trust building we saw during
the blackout.8
As an example, a simple case involved Alice at Company A calling Bob at Company B
asking him to modify an erroneous request for an action that she had submitted. Alice and
Bob shared no prior relationship, and Alice’s name was unknown to Bob. However, Bob
used to work with Carlo, who is now also at Company A. Once Alice can show that Carlo
is on board with her request, Bob is willing to make the change for her [88, pp. 56–58].
This situation and several others are analyzed further in Chapter 2.
1.2.3 Current coping strategies are not good enough
According to informal surveys we have conducted, problems of this nature are currently
worked around by phone calls, searching the institution’s website, checking a company
directory, or just assuming that everything is fine. Even in sensitive applications, such as
in the power grid, we see users fall back to making phone calls to people that they know
when they are in questionable trust scenarios [88, pp.56–58]. We also understand from our
contacts in that industry that technicians in the grid frequently accept “talking the talk” and
knowing the right contact information as proof of authorization. [30] The “unmotivated
user” property of security [125], which states that users will give up on behaving securely
if it is too difficult or annoying, leads us to believe that the last case is the most likely.
Therefore, relying upon people to check up on every potentially sensitive email is not a
winning strategy. Given this, it becomes clear that a system which addresses the kinds
problems detailed above as a part of the normal workflow is required for trustworthy email.
8We are aware of Trust Management and Automated Trust Negotiation technologies. We discuss them,
and why they are inappropriate for these scenarios, in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2.
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1.3 Humans and their trust
In this section, we create a definition of trust that borrows from both sociological literature
and and technical literature. We use this definition to analyze how trust is built in human
scenarios throughout this work, so that we can apply what we learn to the design of a system
that can better facilitate these kinds of use cases. We believe this analysis to be novel.
1.3.1 Our notion of trust
For the purposes of this work, we consider trust to be the willingness of an entity to un-
dertake a potentially dangerous action at the behest of a second entity as a result of a set of
shared expectations between the two (we built this definition from [135] and [17]). There
are two components to this set of expectations:
• Background expectations, the assumptions defined by a “world known in com-
mon” [111], and
• Constitutive expectations, the parameters of the particular situation. [45]
This kind of trust, based on building a shared context, is called calculus-based trust [101]
in the parlance of the social sciences. According to [135], there are three main ways to cre-
ate this context between two parties:
• Process: using reputation and prior experience.
• Characteristic: using innate attributes, e.g. family background, gender or ethnicity.
• Institutional: using formal social structures, like certifications or membership in a
professional organization.
We do not speak simply of one individual trusting another. When we talk about trust, we
refer to one individual trusting another for the purposes of a given transaction. Alice does
not simply “trust” Bob. When Bob asks Alice to do something at his behest, Alice attempts
to build a shared context between the two of them respective to the action she has been
asked to take. If Alice believes that her expectations have aligned with Bob’s, she will trust
him. If not, she won’t. It is important to note that Alice’s belief is what matters. This is
how attacks can happen; Alice is tricked into believing that she has built a shared set of
expectations with the sender. We discuss this further in Section 1.4.1.
It may seem that this action-centric model may leave out cases that involve Bob provid-
ing to Alice some information that may be of doubtful veracity. However, in these cases, we
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can say that Bob is tacitly asking Alice to take the potentially dangerous action of believing
his information.9
1.3.2 Reliance
Over time, as process-based trust builds between Alice and Bob, their relationship becomes
governed more by reliance than trust. Alice becomes less cognizant that she is making
herself vulnerable when performing actions on Bob’s behalf, because she expects him to
behave in a trustworthy manner. [41] This sense of reliance becomes a part of her back-
ground expectations. Moreover, “Bob” does not have to be an individual, he can be an
organization. Alice can develop reliance in Dartmouth College, for example. Alice may
also develop reliance on entities that share some sort of attributes. Perhaps a string of pos-
itive experiences with PhD students in the Dartmouth Computer Science Department has
led Alice to add to her background expectations a sense of reliance on people who possess
a degree from that program.
1.3.3 Signals
We mentioned above that, when Alice is deciding whether or not to trust Bob, she “attempts
to build a shared context” between herself and Bob. She certainly takes some information
from the world around her and the situation at hand, but she must also get some sense of
Bob, what properties he has, his state of being, his understanding of the situation, etc. We
say that Bob signals this information to Alice. [98] In a standard trustworthy communi-
cation system, all the signals that Bob sends to Alice are focused on assuring her of his
identity. We have demonstrated that it is necessary to signal a richer set of properties in
order to support the kinds of use cases we see in the real world. The onus is upon us to
ensure that we choose good signaling mechanisms, ones that are “cheap and easy to emit
for trustworthy actors and costly or difficult for” attackers. [98]
1.3.4 Using this framework
Applying this framework to the myriad of methods in which humans interact through the
Internet could be interesting. However, we believe it will be more instructive and useful
to investigate to some concrete examples from a single application domain—email, since
it has become the primary means of communication between humans in Internet settings.
It is worthwhile to note, however, that the results here can generalize to any method of
9Portions of this section adapted from my thesis proposal.
13
digitally mediated person-to-person communication. Instant messaging, for instance, could
be considered similarly to email. While it could be possible to extend our results to cases
that involve users developing trust in non-human entities (web sites or other online services,
for example), we do not consider those situations in this work.10
1.4 Requirements for a trustworthy email system
For the purposes of this work, we consider a trustworthy email to be a message that has the
following properties11:
1. integrity: the message has not been undetectably tampered with in transit.
2. sender authenticity: the recipient can reliably determine that the purported sender
of the message actually sent it.
3. context: the recipient can glean enough information from the message to build a
shared set of expectations with the sender, as discussed in Section 1.3.
Standard email technologies, such as plain text and Multipurpose Internet Mail Exten-
sions (MIME), provide none of these things, as the entire message can be forged. Nothing
prevents an attacker from undetectably creating arbitrary header information (sender ad-
dress, date, subject, etc.), attaching it to message of his choosing and sending it to any valid
email address on the Internet. “Man in the Middle” attacks are also possible, in which an
adversary can modify the content of a legitimate email while the message is in transit. In-
tegrity can be achieved through the appropriate application of digital signatures, discussed
in Section 1.1.1. By combining these signatures with some form of PKI, it is also possible
to achieve sender authenticity. At this point, the message recipient knows the message has
not been faked; Alice knows that she has received a message from some sender, and it has
not been altered or replaced in transit. In the case where Alice and the sender already share
a trust relationship, context and sender authenticity become conflated and boil down to a
question of identity. If Alice knows Bob the sender, and what she trusts him to ask, then
proving to Alice that a message came from Bob is enough context to bring their pre-existing
process-based trust into play. In this case, the combination of digital signatures and PKI
have bound Bob’s public key to a piece of real-world information—his identity—and that is
10Portions of this section adapted from my thesis proposal.
11Issues of message secrecy and privacy are undeniably interesting, and could feasibly be included in a
definition of trustworthy email. However, we consider these topics orthogonal to the issue of deciding trust























Bob?  I see 
what he's 
asking, but... 
Who's Bob?  





Figure 1.7: In (a), Bob and Alice share a trust relationship a priori. Assurance that this message
is from Bob is enough context to allow Alice to determine that her background and constitutive
expectations are in alignment with those of the sender. In (b), Alice and Bob share no relationship.
She knows the message isn’t fake, so she can establish some shared constitutive expectations with
Bob, but she cannot determine whether the rest of their expectations are in alignment or not. No
trust can be established in this case.
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what Alice “needs to know” in order to make an appropriate trust decision12 (Figure 1.7a).
However, in cases where Alice and Bob do not share a process-based trust relationship a
priori, such as the ones detailed in Section 1.2.1, identity ceases to be enough and context
is more difficult to provide (Figure 1.7b). In these cases, the digital signature/PKI combi-
nation has once again bound Bob’s key to a piece of real-world information, but it is not
what Alice needs to know in order to draw the appropriate trust conclusion.
1.4.1 Attacks in a trustworthy email system
As we endeavor to enable users to trust each other in the kinds of cases discussed in the
previous section, we must be careful not to concomitantly make users more vulnerable to
attack. In terms of our trust framework, we can say that an attack is an attempt to convince
the recipient of a message that a set of shared expectations has been established when, in
fact, none exists. The attacker attempts to send false signals that ape those that might be
sent by some trustworthy party. Consider the case of a simple password phishing email.
Let’s say Alice works at Dartmouth, which has a webmail system. Alice and Dartmouth
share the background expectation that, from time to time, email will be sent out to inform
users of technical issues at the College. Alice also has some background expectation that it
is reasonable for Dartmouth’s technical staff to ask for her login credentials; whether or not
the real Dartmouth technical staff share this belief with Alice is immaterial. The attacker,
obviously, wishes to prey upon this expectation. So, he sends an email that purports to
be from some variant of “Dartmouth Computing Services” asking Alice to reply with her
username and password so that some service can be provided for her webmail account—
maintenance, for example.13 The message expresses several things:
1. the sender shares Alice’s background expectation that she should give up her pass-
word to Dartmouth’s technical staff under some circumstances,
2. the sender represents Dartmouth’s technical staff, and
3. the sender has a constitutive expectation that one of those circumstances has arisen.
Once Alice comes to believe that the sender does represent Dartmouth’s technical staff, she
is lost. There are many signals an attacker can send in order to convince her of this, most of
12provided, of course, that Alice was not confused (or tricked!) by any of the myriad of usability issues
that inflict PKI-based systems. We address usability in Section 1.4.2.
13This example is based on a group of several phishing emails received by the Dartmouth community
from March 2008 through June 2008. The first several times this occurred, enough users fell for the scam
that technical staff chose to send out campus-wide warnings about the messages, in addition to taking the
appropriate corrective actions. Even as recently as early June, a user’s account was compromised in this way
and used to send out spam.
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which involve institutional trust. The attacker my include Dartmouth-specific iconography
and terminology, or perhaps insert “Verified by Verisign” or “TRUSTe” badges. These
signals are very cheap for attackers to emit, and so should not be relied upon, but have
unfortunately been known to trick users in the past. [32] Alternatively, he can attempt to
leverage process-based trust that Alice may share with Dartmouth’s technical people by
including the names of specific individuals in positions of influence. Our experiences in
penetration testing and discussions with a security consulting firm [6] have shown that a lot
of organizational information (especially about educational institutions) is accessible via
the Internet. Thus, even outside attackers can falsely signal that they have a relationship
with some trusted insider. Regardless, once Alice trusts that the sender speaks for the
technical staff, the attacker has won. Her background expectations come into alignment
with those of the attacker, and so she is willing to accept his assertion that it is time to send
out her password. At that point, her constitutive expectations align with the attacker’s and
she is willing to reply with her password at his behest.
We have already discussed the need to provide the appropriate context for Alice as she
attempts to make trust decisions. It is imperative that we choose good signals to carry this
context, lest we provide attackers with another avenue by which to trick message recipients.
1.4.2 Usability: the last criterion
Many software engineers and system designers assert that security and usability are inher-
ently at odds. The HCISEC community fundamentally disagrees with this point of view,
believing that we cannot build systems that are actually secure when used by average users
without aligning these two design goals. As Garfinkel puts it, “a system that is secure but
not usable will not be used, while a system that is usable but not secure will eventually be
hacked and rendered unusable” [47, p. 13].
This line of reasoning obviously applies to secure and trustworthy email systems. In
fact, the piece of research that in many ways led to the evolution of HCISEC as a field
of study unto itself was a usability evaluation of a PGP/MIME email client. [125, 127]
Others have looked at usability issues in S/MIME [47, 54] and found it wanting as well.
Many have gone on to propose and build academic prototypes that address these usability
concerns, which we will discuss in Section 4.4, but they continue to focus on providing
assurance of the identity of message senders. It is clear, however, that as we develop a
more expressive system that is capable of handling the problems we have laid out thus far,
we cannot lose sight of usability.
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1.4.3 The Problem
Taking all this together, the problem becomes clear: build an email system that is suf-
ficiently expressive to encompass the nuances of human trust decisions, without making
users more vulnerable to attack or significantly negatively impacting usability. To summa-
rize from the above, it must provide the following:
• message integrity: messages cannot be undetectably tampered with in transit.
• sender authenticity: the system provides assurance that the purported sender of a
message actually sent it.
• context: the recipient can glean enough information from a message to build a shared
set of expectations with the sender.
• good signals: the new signals used by the new system must be easy for trustworthy
actors to emit and difficult or costly for attackers.
• usability: the system cannot introduce new usability challenges beyond those already
present in existing trustworthy email systems.
1.5 ABUSE Overview
For the dual purposes of demonstrating my design philosophy and helping users manage
trust in secure email, we introduce the Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email (ABUSE)
system. The design, architecture and implementation of this system are discussed in Chap-
ter 5 and Chapter 6. Rather than attempt to automatically make trust decisions for users,
ABUSE is designed to help them make more well-informed trust decisions about email
that they receive. The initial system is meant for deployment within a single logical do-
main that already has an identity PKI. The power grid, though many organizations operate
and manage it, is managed collectively enough that ABUSE can still apply in that space.
For example, NERC provides guidelines that specify names for and duties of roles at the
different organizations that interact during crises. [83] (We provide thoughts about how
to make ABUSE work across domain boundaries in Section 10.1.2) By building on top
of a pre-existing secure email technology (we have chosen S/MIME) and leveraging this
identity PKI, we get message integrity and sender authenticity almost for free. We focus,
then, on providing recipients with the context they need to make trust decisions, without











Figure 1.8: The architecture of the ABUSE system. Users make assertions about other people
and leave them in the central attribute store to be picked up later. They can bind them to outgoing
messages, and users with ABUSE-savvy clients will see these attributes along with the messages to
which they are bound. Users without ABUSE-savvy clients see no extra information.
Instead of attempting to predetermine what kinds of context information users will need
to build trust with each other, ABUSE allows users to collectively build up a set of non-
repudiable assertions about each other. When Bob wishes to send a message to Alice, then,
he selects some of his attributes, the ones that he believes will lead her to honor his request,
and binds them to the message he signs and sends. On Alice’s end, the system presents
Bob’s attributes to her along with his message, and she decides whether or not a shared set
of expectations has been established that lead her to act on Bob’s request.
In order for ABUSE to work, there must be a body of attributes for users to bind to their
messages. As stated above, users create these assertions themselves. While it is true that
there would need to be some bootstrapping of the attribute space at the organizational level,
the strength of ABUSE is that users can use any attribute they already possess to sign off
on an assertion about someone else. Properly, then, a single attribute is actually a chain of
digitally signed assertions rooted at the trust root of the identity PKI that the organization
already has in place.
For example, say Alice’s organization has issued her an attribute stating that she is
a Full-Time Employee. It is a chain of assertions with length one. Alice can take this
assertion use it to sign off on some statement about Bob, perhaps saying that he is her
intern. Bob winds up the subject of an attribute that is a chain of two assertions:
Organization → Alice (Full-Time Employee),
Alice (Full-Time Employee) → Bob (is my intern).
Alice creates this attribute in conjunction with a central attribute store via a protocol that
we define in Chapter 5. Bob can then download his attributes from this store whenever he
wishes and bind them to his outgoing messages.
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This architecture is shown in Figure 1.8.
1.6 Contributions
In this work, we examine how to enable humans to build trust in third parties they do not
know over digitally mediated communication channels. We are moving to a world where
email and instant messaging are becoming widely used in professional settings. This has
some advantages, like allowing people to handle multiple threads of conversation at the
same time and providing superior auditing capabilities for organizations that require it.
One drawback here is that it is much easier to impersonate a trusted individual in systems
like these than in real life or over the phone. Traditional security measures are aimed at
preventing these kinds of attacks. However, it is rare that the only way a human will take
a risky action is on the say-so of one, particular individual. There are a variety of perfectly
valid ways in which trust can flow from an authorizer with whom a user is familiar to
a requester that she does not know. The first contribution we make is a discussion of a
selection of these scenarios, and a characterization of what kinds of trust flows must be
enabled by a system designed to enable a usefully secure communication system. The
approach we take to building a usefully secure email system involves a standard identity
PKI for key management with a user-managed, decentralized, non-hierarchical PKI grafted
on to enable users to express their trust relationships with one another. ABUSE is the
realization of this approach. The system and its various user interfaces are the second
contribution, which we evaluated experimentally with user studies as well as analytically
by applying Cranor’s Humans-in-the-Loop framework [21] for examining secure systems
that leverage users. In short, our contributions are these:
• an exploration of what it will take to build a system that allows human calculus-based
trust to be migrated into the digital world,
• a set of criteria for a system that can facilitate this migration,
• ABUSE, a prototype of a system which meets these criteria,
• a discussion of ABUSE within an established framework for evaluating secure sys-
tems with humans in the loop [21],
• an experiment that uses the power grid setting to evaluate the ability of ABUSE to
assist humans in building trust over digitally mediated communication channels, and
• a second experiment that qualitatively evaluates the expressive capabilities of ABUSE.
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1.7 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, we examine cases from academia and the power grid in which people had
to extend trust to unfamiliar third parties. By looking at how trust flowed among the in-
dividuals in these different real-world scenarios, we extract several different classes of
“trust flows.” These form the basis for some of the experiments we performed to evaluate
ABUSE. Chapter 3 explores the required characteristics of a solution to the problem of
trustworthy email. We move on to discuss work that has been done touching on this area
in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 detail the architecture of the system we have built
and the design of the user-facing portions of ABUSE. In Chapter 7 we analyze ABUSE ac-
cording to Cranor’s Human-in-the-loop framework [21] as a systematic way of discussing
how it addresses the myriad of pitfalls that face secure systems which build humans in.
After describing our experiments in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9, we provide concluding re-
marks and interesting directions for future work in Chapter 10. Detailed material about the
experiments is available in Appendix A and Appendix B.
21
Chapter 2
Patterns of trust flow
In order to develop a system capable of helping users manage their trust in unfamiliar
people with whom they communicate over the Internet, a system designer must first study
how users build this trust in real-life scenarios. As discussed in Section 1.3, we began this
process by defining trust as the willingness to undertake a dangerous action on the behalf
of another party due to a set of shared expectations, and by coming to understand how
humans build this context. Armed with this understanding, we sought real-life examples
that we could examine to discover patterns in how sets of shared expectations are developed
and aligned between people who do not already know each other.
We already had evidence of cases in the academic space [117] that required humans
to trust unfamiliar people, but wanted to look beyond that to find situations that involved
greater risk on the part of the relying parties. As a part of our work with the Trustworthy
Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid (TCIP1) project, we discovered anecdotal evidence
that operators in the power grid frequently exhibit the kind of behavior during emergencies.
Furthermore, we were able to get access to transcripts of telephone calls made by power
grid personnel during the August 2003 North American blackout [88] so that we could
actually see this trust-building in action. From these transcripts and our academic scenarios,
we were able to identify some patterns in the trust flows we saw and group the different
situations accordingly. We do not argue that the groups we identify cover the set of all
possible reasonable scenarios, but we do argue that, by identifying such patterns, we can
identify whole classes of trust decisions that can be aided by ABUSE.
Before enumerating the grouping scheme we have created, we first introduce our notion
of a trust flow, which will be helpful in our discussion. We believe classifying these sorts




Referring back to our definition of trust from Section 1.3, we note that there are two prin-
cipal participants involved in the decision to extend trust: the entity making a potentially
dangerous request, and the entity deciding whether or not to act. We refer to these two as
the requester and the relying party, respectively. In all the cases we discuss, we assume that
the requester and the relying party are from the same domain, such as “power grid opera-
tors” or “academics”. Thus, they share at least some basic set of background expectations;
academics and people who work with them all know what a “professor” is, for instance.
We also assume that the requester and the relying party share no pre-existing trust relation-
ship. In all the considered cases, there is always some trust source, an individual or entity
with whom the relying party has a pre-existing relationship. In social science terms, we
say the relying party has developed reliance on the trust source. The trust shared by these
two is not all-or-nothing; a set of shared expectations governs that relationship as well. The
relying party trusts the source for only a certain set of actions. Bob trusts Dartmouth to
identify members of the College community, but not to designate people to check his email
for him. Alice trusts Professor Smith to indicate which students are good to work with, but
not which ones are funny.
In a given flow, communication from one or more trust sources begins a process that
enables the relying party to develop a set of shared constitutive expectations with the even-
tual trust sink, the requester. This process may involve some intermediaries. Regardless,
in a valid flow of trust, the expectations eventually shared by the relying party and the trust
sink cannot expand beyond the expectations originally shared by the relying party and the
trust source(s). Alice cannot validly wind up trusting that a person is funny based solely
on expectations that flow from her relationship with Professor Smith, because her shared
context with him does not lead her to believe that he is a good arbiter of humor. If she
does, that would indicate that Alice has chosen to trust the sink for some purpose that she
does not believe the source has the ability to speak about. Multiple trust sources only come
into play when more than one source is necessary for trust to flow; consider the “two-man
rule”, used to authenticate the launch of a nuclear weapon. [87] Both sources are needed
to authorize the launch, so this is properly a multi-source flow—distinct from multiple
single-source flows. In an email scenario, the requester might request multiple actions in a
given message, and so multiple flows drawing from multiple sources might have to come
into play for a single message to be completely trusted. Remember, though, that each flow
applies only to the decision to trust the requester for a particular action.




I trust Alice for X and Y!
(a) Rita the relying party has developed reliance on Alice, the trust source.
RitaBob
Alice
You can trust Bob for Y.
I trust Alice for X and Y!
(b) In some way, Alice communicates to Rita that she can trust Bob for Y.
RitaBob
Alice I trust Alice for X and Y!
And now I trust Bob for Y.
(c) Rita trusts Bob for Y, because Alice says it’s ok. Rita’s trust has flowed from Alice to Bob.
Figure 2.1: A very basic trust flow.
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quently place trust in requesters that they should not. Sometimes, the relying party is
simply mistaken; she believes that some expectation of hers is shared by the source when
it is not. In attack scenarios, the relying party is being tricked into believing some shared
expectations exist that do not. We discussed how this might happen back in Section 1.4.1
and don’t consider it further in this chapter.
Given all of this, we can say that a valid trust flow exists between a source and a sink
when communication initiated by the source helps the relying party to develop a set of
shared constitutive expectations with the sink, leading to trust. A very basic trust flow is
diagrammed in Figure 2.1.
2.2 Power Grid Background
As mentioned earlier, we found a number of motivating scenarios for our work through our
involvement in the TCIP project. The power grid is a large, interconnected system, with
pieces of the infrastructure owned by many different companies. Even under normal opera-
tion, “the system must be able to meet the continually changing load demand...Unlike other
types of energy, electricity cannot be conveniently stored in sufficient quantities.” [68, p. 8]
Load (i.e. usage of electricity) is constantly in flux, and prone to unpredictable changes.
Since there is no convenient way to store large quantities of excess electricity, generation
assets must be available on short notice, and adequate transmission capacity must be avail-
able to get the energy where it needs to go. Companies often purchase generation and/or
transmission capacity from each other to fill needs as demand shifts—especially during
crises that knock out equipment in unanticipated ways. This necessitates constant coor-
dination among the various parties involved in the grid, and emergency situations add a
time-sensitive element to the process. Equipment can often handle operating outside of its
rating for short periods of time when the grid is in a state of emergency, but leaving things
in this state for too long can cause the grid to become in extremis, at which point cascading
outages will occur and large portions of the grid may shut down. [68, p. 11] This is exactly
what occurred during the August 2003 North American blackout.
2.2.1 The blackout
On August 14th, 2003, some high-voltage transmission lines in northern Ohio sagged too
close to some ill-trimmed trees, arced, and shut down. This event led to an outage that
cascaded through the state, into Michigan, crossed the border into Canada, and eventually
brought down much of New York as well. The events of this day, the preconditions that set
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the stage for the blackout, and the factors that contributed to the continuing escalation of
the problems are detailed in a 238 page report put out by the U.S.-Canada Power System
Outage Task Force. [121] A detailed exploration of these events would be irrelevant to our
discussion, but it is worth noting that the task force lamented a lack of “effective internal
communications procedures” and a lack of “joint procedures...on when and how to coor-
dinate” the mitigation of a particular kind of infrastructure failure. [121, p. 19] It is also
worth noting that much of the cross-organizational coordination during the blackout took
place over the phone, much of which was recorded at Midwest ISO (MISO). We discuss
the organizational structure of the grid in the next section, but suffice to say that MISO’s
function is to mediate among many companies that run power generation and transmission
infrastructure. So, they were a central point of contact during this crisis. In all, conversa-
tions from seven different phones at MISO were recorded, resulting in over 550 pages of
transcripts that were eventually submitted as evidence during a congressional hearing on
the blackout. [88]
Having heard from our partners on the TCIP project that these transcripts contained
evidence of grid technicians and operators leveraging informal trust connections in order
to try to stave off outages, we began culling through the calls to try to reconstruct the
particular scenarios. In order to understand what we were reading, it was first necessary to
develop an understanding of the different entities involved in grid management, the roles
of people within those entities, and the relationships among them. Also, knowing the kinds
of risks the people in these situations might have to take, and the potential consequences to
them, would enable us to better evaluate which situations were actually potentially costly.
That understanding is detailed here.
2.2.2 Power Grid Organizations
There are two classes of management organizations in the US power infrastructure: oper-
ation companies and Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). Operation companies
own generators and/or power lines and directly control these pieces of equipment. RTOs
mediate among different operation companies; help maintain stability and reliability in the
grid; and, to serve these ends, can request that operation companies in their area take steps
they deem necessary to address problems. In dire situations, an RTO can order an opera-
tion company to take a particular action, though we noted a preference among personnel at
RTOs to avoid using this authority unless absolutely necessary. [88, pp. 150–152, 221–227]
Overseeing all of this are the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), an
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Figure 2.2: The relationships between RTOs, operation companies, NERC and FERC. NERC pro-
vides regulatory oversight, while RTOs have a more direct managerial relationship with operation
companies during crises.
dependent non-industry and non-governmental organization. Neither generally takes an
active role in crises, but instead create and enforce regulations designed to promote stabil-
ity in the grid. As NERC is an industry body, FERC provides oversight of their behavior as
well, though it also can investigate and provide regulatory guidance for RTOs and operation
companies as well. The relationships are presented in Figure 2.2.
In the examples discussed in Section 2.3, we refer to two RTOs, MISO and PJM In-
terconnect. We also refer to several operation companies, including IP&L, Cinergy, Al-
legheny, AEP, and First Energy.
2.2.3 Power Jobs
There are a wide variety of jobs that employees may possess at a power company or grid
management organization. The set that may be involved in coping with an emergency is
more limited, and is standardized (along with some other jobs/roles) by NERC. [83] For
the purposes of this discussion, there is only one RTO role that really matters, that of a
Reliability Coordinator. The Reliability Coordinator works with generation and transmis-
sion companies to mitigate local problems in addition to cooperating with other Reliability
Coordinators—at her own RTO as well as others—during wider-scale crises. There are
also several jobs at operation companies that are relevant:
• Transmission System Operator - controls her company’s power lines and other






















Figure 2.3: The relationships between relevant positions at operation companies and reliability
coordinators at RTOs.
• Generator System Operator - controls his company’s power generators, if they
have any; some companies have transmission assets only.
• Reliability Engineer - works with Generator and/or Transmission System Operators
at the company to maintain stability in the portion of the grid over which the company
has control. Interfaces with Reliability Coordinators at RTOs during wider-scale
problems.
• Controller Operator - manages Generator and Transmission System Operators at an
operation company. They are his direct-reports, whereas a reliability engineer would
work with them only during problem situations.
The relationships among these jobs is shown in Figure 2.3. Knowing now the roles of
the players, we can discuss by example the patterns of trust flow that we have identified in
power grid scenarios.
2.3 Trust flow patterns






Figure 2.4: A role-based trust flow. The relying party and the source, an institution, share a pre-
existing trust relationship. Trust flows directly to the requester.
• Simple delegation, which has some sub-classes;
• Coopetition; and
• Non-contemporaneous trust.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to codify different trust-building scenarios in
this way, according to our shared-expectations model of calculus based trust and reliance
(presented in Section 1.3). As we cover each class of trust-flows, we explicate how each
flow develops in terms of our trust model, using real-world examples. We make use of
these patterns in the experiments discussed in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.
2.3.1 Role-based trust
Role-based trust is the simplest pattern of trust flow. The requester can be anywhere in the
trust infrastructure. Trust is institutional; a trusted authority has asserted that the requester
is in a given role. In this scenario, the trusted authority is the trust source. The relying party
understands the meaning of the role; thus, background expectations are shared among the
two individuals. Constitutive expectations are set up by the message sent by the requester.
If the expectations expressed in the message align with what the relying party expects of
someone in the claimed role, trust is built and action can reasonably be taken. This pattern
of trust-flow is well-understood in both computer science [104] and human arenas. It can be
seen throughout the blackout phone transcripts. A particular instance involves individuals
at MISO and IP&L [88, p. 426]. Zach at MISO contacts Yelena, a transmission operator
at IP&L. Yelena believes Zach to be in a role at MISO that is allowed to make the stated
request, and so she satisfies it. MISO, then is the trust source, the Zach is the sink, and





Figure 2.5: A role-based delegation trust flow. The relying party and the source, an institution,
share a pre-existing trust relationship. Trust flows to the authorizer as a result of her role. The trust
continues to the requester as a result of a collective understanding of the relationship between his
role and that of the authorizer.
2.3.2 Simple delegation
In a simple delegation scenario, some individual that the relying party trusts (an authorizer)
has initiated a flow to the requester. The reason that the relying party trusts the authorizer
is irrelevant. Perhaps they share process-based or characteristic-based trust, making the
authorizer and the source the same entity. Or, there may be a role-based trust flow from
some other source to the authorizer. In any case, the authorizer is trusted by the relying
party. The authorizer expresses to the relying party the constitutive expectation that he has
transferred some permission of his to the requester. If background expectations, shared by
all the parties involved, include the concept of delegation, then the relying party’s consti-
tutive expectations align with those of the authorizer and she becomes willing to trust the
requester if he exercises that permission.
There are several slightly different styles of simple delegation, drawn from both the
power grid scenarios and academic scenarios. We enumerate them here.
Role-based delegation
In the mail-from-the-dean scenario we discussed first in [117] and mentioned in Sec-
tion 1.2.1, Bob the relying party trusts Alice the Dean because he knows that the College
has granted to Alice the “Dean” role. Bob, then, uses role-based trust to develop a shared
set of expectations with Alice the Dean. Alice has an assistant, Carlo, whose role is a de-
scendant of hers in the tree. When Carlo sends out mail on Alice’s behalf, Bob must decide
whether to take the message as though it was from the Dean herself. All three share an





Figure 2.6: A role-sourced, arbitrary delegation trust flow. The relying party and the source, an
institution, share a pre-existing trust relationship. Trust flows to the authorizer as a result of her
role. She delegates some specific subset of the actions she is trusted to authorize to the requester.
Bob has enough of a shared set of background expectations with Alice to decide to trust
Carlo. Here, the College is the source, Alice is the authorizer, Carlo is the sink and Bob is
the relying party. This is shown in the general case in Figure 2.5.
Role-sourced arbitrary delegation
In this style of delegation, the relying party again trusts the authorizer due to role-based
trust. The difference is that delegation is explicit, rather than requiring the relying party to
understand the flow of trust due to a shared understanding of inter-role relationships (Fig-
ure 2.6). Again, we adapt an example from the power space [88, pp. 236–238]. The relying
party is a generation systems operator at Cinergy, Dan. There is a controller operator, Ed,
at his company that is not physically at the same facility as Dan. A reliability coordinator,
Frank, at MISO is in contact with Ed, and they decide that they need Dan to make some
change. Frank contacts Dan, with Ed on the phone, and leverages Ed’s authority to get Dan
to make the required change. Here, Dan trusts Ed because Ed is in a superior role at the
same company. In this case, Ed sets up a constitutive expectation with Dan that Frank is al-
lowed to request this particular change. Frank’s request, then, is aligned with the collective
set of shared constitutive expectations. They already share the same background expecta-
tions about their given roles, the roles of their companies when attending to a crisis, that
it makes sense for a reliability coordinator to be collaborating with a controller operator to
figure out what to do about some stability problem, etc. So, Cinergy is the source, Ed is the
authorizer, Frank the sink and Dan is the relying party.
Friend-sourced arbitrary delegation
Here, the relying party trusts the authorizer because they share process-based trust a priori.





Figure 2.7: A friend-sourced, arbitrary delegation trust flow. The relying party and the source share
a pre-existing trust relationship. The authorizer and the source are the same person. He delegates
some specific subset of the actions she is trusted to authorize to the requester.
Delegation is, again, explicit. From the power grid, we have an example in which Gary at
MISO would not trust Hilda at Allegheny without the go-ahead of his former co-worker
Ian, also at Allegheny. Ian does not outrank Hilda, but Gary is willing to trust him due to
their pre-existing relationship [88, pp. 56–58]. Ian is both the source AND the authorizer,
Hilda is the requester, and Gary the relying party.
It is also possible for there to be trust flows that involve re-delegation, in which one or
more intermediaries stand between the authorizer and the sink. In order for this to work,
acceptance of the level of re-delegation happening must be either a part of the background
expectations shared by the people involved, or the authorizer must make it clear as a part
of the constitutive expectations that he communicates to the relying party that he allowed
for re-delegation to occur.
2.3.3 Coopetition
Coopetition is a variant of delegation in that the relying party and the requester have a
pre-existing institutional disinclination to trust each other prior to their attempt to build
a set of shared expectations. The relying party initially expects the requester to act in a
way counter to the relying party’s best interest. As such, in order for the requester and
the relying party to build trust, the background expectation of competition must be super-
seded by a constitutive expectation of cooperation. We see this in the power grid, where
two companies compete for customers but must also cooperate to keep the infrastructure
running along smoothly so that they can do business at all. One example of this involves
two operation companies with their attendant RTOs: First Energy, an operation company
overseen by MISO; and AEP, an operation company overseen by PJM Interconnect [88, pp.
150–153 , pp. 219–227].








Figure 2.8: The coopetitive scenario laid out in Section 2.3.3.
control to that of First Energy. Some have overloaded already, and the others are being
stressed by First Energy’s behavior. John escalates up the chain to a reliability coordinator
Kevin at PJM, who contacts Leanne, a reliability coordinator at MISO. Leanne then con-
tacts Michelle, a transmission operator down at First Energy, to tell her what actions John
is asking her to take. There are a number of flows occurring here, all shown in Figure 2.8.
First, John builds role-based trust with Kevin so that Kevin will accept his information.
Then, in order for Leanne to trust the information coming from John, there has to be some
form of arbitrary delegation flow in which Leanne’s trust in Kevin moves to encompass
John. It is impossible to tell from the phone transcripts whether this flow is role-sourced or
friend-sourced, unfortunately. Once Leanne has made this trust decision, she can initiate a
coopetition flow down to John. She becomes the authorizer; Michelle trusts her for role- or
process-based reasons. Keith is a re-delegatory intermediary, and John is the requester. The
re-delegation is acceptable in this flow because all the parties understand the relationships
among MISO, PJM, and the two operation companies. John’s information expresses a con-
stitutive expectation that his requested action makes things better for both an First Energy,
which has to supersede the expectation that they shared before: that their companies would
not act in each other’s best interest. Michelle’s expectations align with John’s only because
of the trust flowing down to him from Leanne.
A coopetition flow does not need to be as complex as this. A requester at a competing
entity may be the sink of some arbitrary-delegation-based trust flow, as seen in Figure 2.9.







Figure 2.9: An idealized coopetitive trust flow. The relying party and the source share a pre-existing
trust relationship. Initially, the requester is distrusted by the relying party; they share a negative trust
relationship. Trust either flows to the authorizer due to her role, though she and the source might be
the same entity. She delegates some specific subset of the actions she is trusted to authorize to the
requester. The background expectations shared among all parties indicate that trust can flow if the
constitutive expectations expressed by the authorizer indicate mutual benefit for the relying party
and the requester.
overrides the existing background expectation of competition.
2.3.4 Non-contemporaneous trust
The flows discussed thus far involve the requester being the sink of a trust flow at the
time he makes a request. However, it is also possible for a trust flow that is not currently
active to enable the relying party and the requester to align their expectations anyhow.
Consider the case of a colleague, who was still working at his old job while preparing for
his move to Dartmouth to take a professorship. [117] He needed to convince a textbook
publisher to send him answer keys for the book he would be teaching from once he began
his appointment. Both parties shared the background expectation that a professor should
get the answer key; both shared the expectation that a person who is about to enter that role
should get the answer key. The issue surrounds getting the two to share the constitutive
expectation that the requester falls into that group, that there is going to be a role-based
flow from Dartmouth to the putative professor.
Non-contemporaneous trust can also refer to cases where there used to be a trust flow
in place, and that should lead the relying party to align their expectations with those of the
requester. To take an example from the life of the author, Chris, consider the case of autho-
rizing new users of Dartmouth’s recording studio. The Music Department controls access
to this resource, and new students come to them asking to use it. The author Chris used to
manage the studio, teach classes in how to use the equipment, and keep track of who was
allowed in. During that time, there was a clear role-based flow to Chris. After resigning this
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position, the department continued to trust him to authorize new users because he retained
the relevant knowledge and expertise, and was still qualified to screen new requesters for
competency. Despite there not being a valid flow any longer, the department continued to
trust him to perform these actions.
Any of the types of flows listed in this chapter can be used in non-contemporaneous
fashion.
2.4 Conclusions
We have presented the concept of a trust flow within the shared-expectations model of trust
that we discussed in Section 1.3. We have identified a number of patterns of trust flows
that we saw repeated in several different arenas; primarily, crisis management in the power
grid. The patterns are:
• role-based trust,
• several varieties of simple delegation,
• coopetition, and
• non-contemporaneous trust.
We can now discuss the design of ABUSE and the ways in which it is built to enable these
different patterns of trust flow.
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Chapter 3
Characteristics of a Solution
Thus far, we have identified and motivated the need for a system that enables humans to
leverage their current, informal methods of building trust with unfamiliar individuals when
communicating over digitally mediated channels. Though such a system would be useful
in a variety of domains, the power grid scenarios we have discussed provide a compelling
real-world case for our work. We have chosen email as the application for which to develop
a solution, because there is good support for signed digital messaging in that space, and
current technology provides some features that provide a strong jumping-off point. So,
the problem then becomes an issue of integrating, into an email infrastructure, technology
that enables humans to appropriately extend trust to the right message senders without
making them more vulnerable to attacks. First, we consider three different approaches we
could take to this problem: algorithmic, heuristic, and user-centric. We then discuss a set
of patterns with which we should design our system in order to make it both usable and
secure. By the end of this chapter, we will show that we can solve the problem we have set
forth by creating a system with the following characteristics:
• the system must be expressive enough to provide contextual support for the classes
of trust flows enumerated in Chapter 2,
• the new signals used to carry this information must be good (as defined in Sec-
tion 1.3.3).




In Section 1.4.3, we laid out five features that the system we design must provide: message
integrity, sender authenticity, context, good signals, and usability. As we are working on an
email-based system, we can build on top of an existing technology that provides message
integrity and sender authenticity, leaving only the issue of providing context, good signals
and usability. The challenge lies in creating a system expressive enough to provide contex-
tual support for all the flows discussed in Chapter 2 without exposing the user to a greater
risk of attack or reducing the usability of his secure email client. We believe this allows
users to make accurate trust decisions without needing to waste time trying to build up the
necessary context through out-of-band channels—and decreases the likelihood that they
will simply skip that step and make an ill-informed decision (we evaluate this belief empir-
ically in Chapter 8). We identify three different directions from which we could attack this
problem:
1. automatic:
(a) algorithmic: the system tells the user which messages he can trust, and which
he should disregard.
(b) heuristic: the system estimates, according to some statistical profile of what
messages are trustworthy, which messages the user should trust.
2. user-centric: the system provides a channel for appropriate context to get to the user,
and the user decides which messages to trust.
Algorithmic and heuristic approaches are automatic, in that they attempt to make “the right
decision” for the user. From a user’s point of view, “the right decision” is “the trust decision
the I would make, if I had all the pertinent and available information.” Pertinent informa-
tion could include both information about the sender (not only name and email address,
but perhaps job title, project-team or group membership, position within organization, and
more) as well as information about the message (whether the sender is asking for infor-
mation, asking recipient to perform some action, giving recipient information, etc.). Each
of the approaches we mentioned runs into different challenges when trying to help a user
reach the right decision. We discuss each approach in turn.
3.1.1 Algorithmically deciding the email trust problem
One way to enable users to make better trust decisions about incoming email is to build
a system that makes decisions for the users. In this section, we consider systems that use
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some kind of pre-specified definition of what constitutes an allowable request, as opposed
to adaptive approaches discussed in Section 3.1.2. If such an automated system could make
the “right” decision every time, this would clearly be the best choice. However, there are
security processes that do not lend themselves to automation. Some, for instance, “rely on
human knowledge that is currently difficult for a computer to reason about or process.” [21]
We consider now whether the email trust problem we have advanced is one of these cases.
To enable an automated system to decide which messages could be trusted, a user would
have to be able to define a policy stating which kinds of senders are trusted to make which
kinds of requests. Since email messages come in as text, this system would need to be able
to reliably comprehend arbitrary text from authors it has never encountered—which is not,
currently, feasible. [22] Even if this problem could be surmounted, the user would still need
to be able to sit down and enumerate this policy. It is informative to consider the parallels
with the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P). [20]
P3P is a system designed to enable users to manage the privacy of their information on
the web. The idea is that websites specify their privacy policies in some language that a P3P
client can parse and comprehend. Users specify a priori which kinds of privacy policies
they are comfortable with, and the P3P client built into their browser tells them to which
sites they can release their private information. To specify this policy, users would need to
dictate, for every kind of private information, all the kinds of websites that are allowed to
receive it. This is analogous to the problem faced in the case of deciding email trust with
which we are concerned. In discussing the issue of P3P policy creation, Ackerman states
that “even a cursory examination shows...an ill-formed, intractable problem...users must be
able to handle essentially an infinite information space.” [1] He also points out, however,
that people decide to whom to release private information every day, in a “nuanced and
seamless manner,” despite constantly re-categorizing individuals in their mental trust model
and the consistent appearance of exceptional cases. In short, it is not that users don’t have
trust policies in their minds, merely that they are incapable of effectively enumerating them
in a machine-comprehensible format. [21]
Other researchers extend the points that Ackerman has made, asserting that this issue
is not limited to P3P. Secure systems which require the kind of flexibility made necessary
by our desire to accommodate the trust flows of Chapter 2 do not lend themselves to ap-
proaches that require users to specify complex policies. [34,41] So, for the problem we are
considering, asking users to input their own policies into a system is not a usable solution.
In an enterprise setting, one might consider domain policies, written by local admin-
istrators. System designers like us lack the specific knowledge required to craft policies




Hey, Bob. This is Alice, a reliability
coordinator at MISO. We need you guys
to bring Wheatland down by 100MW.
Thanks!
Alice




Hey, Bob. This is Alice, a reliability
coordinator at MISO. We need you guys
to bring Gorton down by 100MW.
Thanks!
Alice
(b) Another message from Alice, perhaps sent in er-
ror.
Figure 3.1: Two extremely similar messages that our system should help Bob, a reliability engineer
at Cinergy, differentiate between. Gorton is not a Cinergy facility. Can a junk filter tell these apart?
Even if Bob would never honor the second request, if the system tells him messages like this are
trustworthy, Bob will cease considering it reliable.
craft appropriate policies. The challenges are similar to those that apply to the single user
case, but now these administrators are charged with defining policies that apply to broad
classes of users, and also making sure that they take into account different sets of circum-
stances. Even if accurate policies can be generated for the organization at a given point
in time, the maintenance of these policies over time is extremely costly and challenging,
if it is even possible. [114] Moreover, even disregarding the issue of maintaining policy
correctness as an organization evolves over time, it is not clear that the correct policy for
everyday usage is still correct in crisis situations or other exceptional circumstances. Fur-
thermore, even if policy correctness can be achieved, we still run into the need to convert
email text into a format on which the policy checker could run. As we mentioned above,
for the kinds of communication with which we are concerned (between user who share no
trust relationship a priori), this is currently infeasible.
The foregoing has not stopped researchers from attempting to build policy-based sys-
tems to address trust issues in the digital space. We discuss them in Section 4.2.1.
3.1.2 Heuristically deciding the email trust problem
Given that a completely automated approach to our problem will not work, one might con-
sider a junk-filter-style heuristic approach. Generally this approach takes in (or builds) a
statistical model of “good messages” and then determines how similar to this model a new
message appears to be. We are concerned with messages from unfamiliar senders in excep-
tional situations; while a heuristic approach may be good at flagging messages that exploit
trust flows similar to ones that users have seen before, or are requests from familiar senders,
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these are the cases in which users need the least help. Furthermore, exceptional situations
(power grid emergencies, for example) necessitate the usage of trust flows different than
those used during day-to-day tasks. A heuristic system trained during normal operation
is unlikely to accurately identify messages that, in extraordinary circumstances, would be
reasonable for the user to trust.
To definitively analyze the efficacy of a heuristic approach, we would need a large
volume of email among unfamiliar communicants that exercise the kinds of trust flows
we wish to enable. We have no such data for the domains from which draw our concrete
examples. Furthermore, especially in the power grid, no such data is likely to become
available. However, looking at the example in Figure 3.1, it seems intuitively unlikely
that a junk filter would prove reliable. This fundamental characteristic of heuristic systems
creates a usability problem, and would likely lead to users ignoring or disabling the system.
3.1.3 Taking a user-centric approach
It seems clear that fully-automated approaches will not work for the problem we wish to
solve. Edwards et al. suggest that more security systems should be designed to “allow
their users to make more informed decisions about what the correct or incorrect choice
of action may be.” [34] Given Ackerman’s point about users’ ability to make decisions
about who to trust in real life, it makes sense to leverage this ability as a part of a system
that works to address the email trust issue. Thus, our goal with ABUSE becomes to allow
senders to signal trust flow information to recipients in a reliable and non-spoofable fashion
without impacting the usability of secure email. Usability challenges remain, but they are
of the variety that we can get a handle on using design principles advanced by the HCISEC
community.
3.2 Design criteria for usably secure software
We have admitted that taking a user-centric approach in ABUSE will leave us with some
usability hurdles. However, we also believe that the HCISEC community has provided us
with tools to help us through these problems as we build our system. In [47], Garfinkel
surveys the HCISEC space, collects design principles advanced by a variety of researchers,
and lays out a set of design patterns for usably secure software. Some apply across the
board, and some are more specific to issues in secure and trustworthy digital messaging. We
discuss the sources from which Garfinkel drew his inspiration in Section 4.4 and enumerate
his applicable design patterns here.
40
3.2.1 General patterns
Garfinkel provides six design patterns that he applies generally to usably secure soft-
ware. [47, pp. 320–322]
Least surprise/least astonishment [47, p. 320]
Garfinkel traces the Principle of Least Surprise to Saltzer and Schroeder’s concept of psy-
chological acceptability. [103] While the provenance of the term itself is unknown [47, p.
7], the idea is that systems should behave as the user expects them to. Or, more precisely, in
order for a system to be usable, the user’s mental model of how the system works must be
aligned with the system’s behavior. Traditionally, any mismatch here has been considered a
problem of user education; if the user doesn’t understand how the system works, train him
until he does. HCISEC takes a different tack: ensure that your system effectively commu-
nicates its behavior to the user via its user interface. This work can involve analyzing the
problem at hand using a model of human behavior, and should certainly include an iterative
software design process [85] that focuses on understanding the flaws in the current version
from the user’s point of view. [137]
Good security now [47, p. 320]
This principle embodies Voltaire’s notion that “the perfect is the enemy of the good.”
Lampson refers to the same idea as “striv[ing] to avoid disaster rather than to attain an opti-
mum.” [69] There is a bias in security circles against deploying systems that are imperfect.
The rationale is that users will assume that these systems are perfect and get into trouble
when their assumption turns out to be false. The problem with that notion is that deploying
no solution does not stop users from engaging in risky behavior. We discussed some cases
back in Section 1.2.1. Garfinkel points to the delay of systems that leverage public key
cryptography. Widespread deployment was held off until the availability of keys that were
certified by third parties could be assured. [47, Chapters 5, 6] argue that systems without
keys that are so certified can, in practice, provide security and privacy guarantees that are
very similar to the systems we wound up deploying.
Provide standardized security polices [47, p. 321]
As we explained above in Section 3.1.1 and Garfinkel discusses in [47, Section 9.4], se-
curity policy “construction kits” are not usable. This principle asserts that it is better to
provide a simple set of not-quite-perfect security policies from which users can choose
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than to provide them with an overwhelming plethora of options from which to build their
own.
Consistent meaningful vocabulary [47, p. 321]
When building a new system, designers must strive not to overload terminology. Digital
signatures for email are a case in point. Users were already familiar with “email signa-
tures,” the chunks of text their clients could append to every outgoing message. This clash
of terminology muddies any discussion of signed email with non-savvy users. Garfinkel
details a wider range of problems in [47, Section 8.2] and there is at least one book devoted
to the issue as well. [5] This principle also extends to symbols. If many other applica-
tions use an exclamation point inside a triangle as an indicator of an informational warning
message, a new application should not use a similar icon to signify anything else.
Consistent controls and placement [47, p. 322]
Similar to issues with vocabulary and symbol usage, this principle focuses on issues sur-
rounding interface elements that actually activate functionality. If the application being
designed shares some functionality with other software with which users may be familiar,
the design of this other software should be taken into account. While he acknowledges that
this is difficult in application spaces that are already populated by many competing prod-
ucts, Garfinkel points out that—fundamentally—the questions here are no different than
those faced by protocol standardization efforts.
No external burden [47, p. 322]
Frequently, new security systems (especially those designed by academic researchers) are
designed without consideration of the social context in which the technology must be de-
ployed. A system that does not interact well with existing technologies can impose a us-
ability burden not only on the user, but on those around him. In some cases, the text
of S/MIME signed messages cannot even be read by users with non-S/MIME compliant
email clients.1 Such issues can cause push-back; a user’s associates provide negative feed-
back about his use of the system, making him less likely to continue usage. For this reason,
systems like Domain-Key Identified Mail (DKIM) [3] and some of Garfinkel’s own usably
1S/MIME messages signed with opaque signatures can behave this way. Opaque signatures are robust to
SMTP servers that might reformat messages, but the text cannot be retrieved without the appropriate parsing
code.
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secure email prototypes [49, 50] (as well as ABUSE) use email headers to carry extra in-
formation; mainstream clients (Mozilla Thunderbird, Apple Mail, Microsoft Outlook and
others) simply ignore unfamiliar headers, so users never even see them. Thus, push-back
can be avoided.
3.2.2 Patterns specifically applicable to secure/trustworthy email
In his work, Garfinkel also provides several design patterns that apply to systems concerned
with identification online, and/or that leverage public key cryptography [47, pp. 331–339].
Not all of these apply to ABUSE, but we explain them here so that we can intelligently
discuss the decisions we made when choosing patterns to apply during our design phase.
Leverage existing identification [47, p. 331]
Rather than throwing out systems that already provide some guarantees in real life, build
off of them. When a system of identification re-affirms some kind of relationship that users
already understand, it is much easier for them to make reasonable judgments about partic-
ipants in the system. For example, Dartmouth’s PKI certificates re-affirm the real-world
relationship between an entity that is attached to the college. A user presented with such a
certificate (provided he can reliably determine that the certificate is really from Dartmouth)
can then make decisions based upon his understanding of this real-world association.
Email-based identification and authorization [47, p. 332]
This pattern promotes leveraging existing identification by using the ability to receive mail
at a given address to boot-strap account setup and management for other systems. This
behavior is commonly used by websites that require log-in credentials for use. Following
the “send S/MIME-signed email” pattern could help mitigate the risk of phishing.
Send S/MIME-signed email [47, p. 333]
The action recommended by this pattern is obvious. Garfinkel envisions this pattern being
adopted first by organizations sending official communications to recipients, getting them
used to seeing signed mail and distributing keys that can later be used to send encrypted
mail back to the organization. There are usability issues with S/MIME that would neg-
atively impact its utility for these purposes; we touch on some in Section 4.1. Garfinkel
discusses more in [47, Chapter 6]. The perfect is the enemy of the good, however, and
some of Garfinkel’s remaining patterns do address some of these problems.
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Create keys when needed [47, p. 334]
Cryptographic protocols that leverage public key cryptography require some method of
authenticating bindings between keys and parties to communication. Systems based on
X.509 use certification authorities, but it is also possible to pre-distribute public keys or
use the PGP web-of-trust model. In the absence of such authentication, parties can provide
their keys to each other at the point of connection establishment. If an attacker Trudy im-
poses herself between Adam and Bob when they begin communication, Trudy can provide
both men with keys of her choosing. Thus, Trudy will be able to read all of their commu-
nication without them knowing. However, if Trudy is not present at the moment of key
exchange, Adam and Bob are safe. Given that the alternative is communicating in the clear
(or not communicating at all), Garfinkel argues that creating and distributing encryption
keys whenever they are needed at least cuts out the threat of passive eavesdropping and is
thus worthwhile.
Key Continuity Management (KCM) [47, p. 335]
X.509 and PGP attempt to provide users with a notion of a concrete identity; if the PKI
glue works as intended, Bob can know that he is talking to Alice. Garfinkel advances
the notion that, often, Bob doesn’t care that he’s talking to Alice; rather, he cares that
the Alice he’s talking to now is the same Alice he has been talking to all along. The
Key Continuity Management (KCM) pattern reflects this notion, and is discussed in greater
detail in Section 4.1.
Track received keys [47, p. 336]
Along with KCM, Garfinkel recommends keeping track of how familiar a received key is.
The intuition is that keys used regularly over a longer period of time are more likely to be
legitimate than a new key. Automatically tracking key usage and enabling users to perceive
this information can help them to apply this intuition.
Track recipients [47, p. 337]
This pattern is not as aggressive as it initially sounds. Garfinkel advocates sending S/MIME
signed email in an earlier pattern, and here asserts that senders should make a best-effort
attempt to determine which recipients can appropriately handle such messages. Thus, they
can avoid sending signed email to users who will be annoyed by or, worse, unable to read
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the messages due to a deficient client. This pattern plays into the “No external burden”
pattern discussed on page 42.
Migrate and backup keys [47, p. 338]
If the “Create keys when needed” pattern is to be followed, users will often be unaware of
the existence of important key material. Thus, to avoid blind-siding users in the event of
key loss, systems must also take pains to ensure that keys are available when needed and
backed up religiously.
Distinguish internal senders [47, p. 339]
In email as it exists today, users can send mail that appears to come from one domain that is
actually sent through an email server in another domain. For example, Alice can send mail
“From” alice@dartmouth.edu, by setting the email headers appropriately, authenticating
to the SMTP server for her GMail account, and sending the mail out that way. Bob, on
the other hand might send email from bob@dartmouth.edu over a properly authenticated
connection to Dartmouth’s own mail server. Garfinkel argues that recipients would benefit
from being able to discern between these two cases.
3.2.3 Remaining, inapplicable patterns
The rest of the design patterns put forth in [47] apply more to changing overall attitudes
toward behaving securely and to the specific area of protecting user privacy by providing
usable disk sanitization tools. We have enumerated here all the patterns that we believe
might apply to the design of ABUSE, and will discuss specifics in Chapter 5. We also
apply Cranor’s framework for evaluating secure systems that build humans in [21] to our
work to determine that following the chosen patterns has indeed resulted in a system that
accounts for the usability stumbling blocks identified by the HCISEC community.
3.3 Wrap-up
In this chapter, we have motivated the choice of a user-centric approach to the problem
we have identified. While we acknowledge that usability issues exist when designing such
a system, we have laid out a set of design principles from the HCISEC field that we can
follow to alleviate these concerns. We discuss how they informed the design of ABUSE
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in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Choosing, as we have, to build atop an existing signed email
technology, we are left with the following characteristics:
• expressiveness: the system must be expressive enough to provide contextual support
for the classes of trust flows enumerated in Chapter 2.
• good signals: the new signals used to carry this information must be good (as defined
in Section 1.3.3).
• usability: the system must be designed to be usable according to guidelines from the
HCISEC community.
Having laid out these desired system characteristics, we now explore related work and




In Chapter 3, we derived the characteristics required of a system that solves the email trust
problem we have laid out:
• the system must be expressive enough to provide contextual support for the classes
of trust flows enumerated in Chapter 2.
• the new features of the system must not cause users to become more vulnerable to
attacks than non-users.
• the system must be designed to be usable according to guidelines from the HCISEC
community.
We now discuss the current state of work in secure email and relevant technologies in trust
to show how none of them meet these criteria. We move on to address work that has applied
sociological notions of trust to computer security, akin to the trust flow work in Chapter 2.
Last, we discuss work in usably secure email and mention some other tangentially related
HCISEC research, as well as providing a pointer to an excellent retrospective of the growth
of the field as a whole.
4.1 Secure/Trustworthy email technologies
Public key cryptography and the various flavors of PKI discussed in Section 1.1, paved the
way for secure and trustworthy email. Two, S/MIME [95, 96] and PGP/MIME [35] have
achieved the widest deployment over the years and become standardized. Researchers
have also advanced a few systems with interesting properties (discussed in Section 4.1.3)
that have not achieved significant deployment. Industry has even put out some proprietary
solutions (Section 4.1.4) that provide some interesting features when deployed in a “walled
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Property S/MIME PGP/MIME
Message integrity Yes Yes
Non-repudiability Yes Yes
Centralized trust root Yes No
Meaning of a Certificate Trust root attests to binding
of key to holder
Unclear [66]




Trust model Institutional Process-based
Table 4.1: The differences between S/MIME and PGP/MIME
garden”—a closed environment in which all participants are users of the system. All of
these approaches focus on providing message integrity, sender authenticity, and assurance
of sender identity. Some provide enough additional context to support some of the trust
flows presented earlier, but not all. Some focus on addressing usability problems in secure
email. We have leveraged ideas from some of these systems, and some could be interesting
to explore as a combined solution along with ABUSE.1
4.1.1 S/MIME
To address email security and privacy concerns, many organizations in the commercial,
federal and educational sectors have deployed S/MIME [95, 96], a secure email standard
that leverages an X.509 PKI [19] to provide message integrity and non-repudiation via
digital signatures. [67, 84] An S/MIME signature block contains, in addition to the actual
digital signature over the message body, the identity certificate of the sender. In this way,
the system also provides sender authenticity and assurance of sender identity—in addition
to the sender’s public key. Note that S/MIME does not cover the headers of a message,
which could leave some issues. For instance, an attacker might change the “From:” line in
an S/MIME email header. This is likely why the S/MIME standard dictates that the From
address in a message must match the email address in the credential used to sign it. Many
clients do not seem to enforce this and, indeed, there are cases where strict enforcement of
this policy leads to further problems!
Even in cases in which the sender is familiar to the recipient, usability issues exist. One
interesting problem arises from the fact that standard S/MIME clients treat all installed
trust roots as equal.2 When an S/MIME signature is deemed valid, the client will display
1Portions of this section were adapted from my thesis proposal.
2At least, all that are allowed to identify users for the purposes of signing email. Though X.509 does
technically allow a subordinate CA to be configured to only speak about certain domains, this requires much
a priori policy construction that is rarely performed in a real-world deployment.
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the same information to the user regardless of which CA issued the credentials used to sign
the message! The author leveraged this quirk, along with Thawte’s Freemail CA and Dart-
mouth’s name directory, to generate what appears at first glance to be legitimately signed
S/MIME email from the College’s president. The Freemail CA will allow a user to get a
certificate for any email address over which he can demonstrate control. Dartmouth’s name
directory allows users to choose any nickname, even one close to the actual name of the
President. Yes, the certificate used to sign this message was not from Dartmouth’s CA, but
this is only evident after some extra effort (the Director of Technical Services was report-
edly taken in by the ruse). The provenance of the signing certificate is not immediately
obvious, and the user is likely to assume that signed mail from a Dartmouth email address
uses a certificate from the Dartmouth CA. Possession of such a certificate implies a rela-
tionship with the College; obtaining a Freemail certificate for a Dartmouth email address
allows an attacker to trick a target into assuming the existence of such a relationship.
In terms of the trust model presented in Section 1.3, S/MIME can do one of two things
for the recipient, depending on whether she has experience with the sender. If she knows
the sender a priori, S/MIME can enable the recipient to leverage her trust in an institution to
assure herself of the sender’s identity and thus apply her process-based trust to the incoming
message. If she has little or no prior experience with the sender, then S/MIME allows the
recipient to extend some measure of institutionally-based trust to the sender. This is not
enough to avoid the issues discussed in Section 1.2.1, however. Membership in a subculture
is being established, e.g. the “Member of the Dartmouth Community” subculture. This
allows some kind of sphere to be defined in which the individual can be trusted. Standard
S/MIME implementations can only establish membership in a fairly large subculture. The
members of this group are not homogenous enough to clearly define an area in which all
members should be trusted. If we can build a system that allows a smaller subculture to be
defined (“Members of the PKI/Trust Lab”, or “Sean Smith’s PhD Students”), this makes it
more likely that users will be able to come to useful trust conclusions.
Despite these issues, S/MIME has provided both message integrity and sender authen-
ticity, as well as the sender’s public key—provided that the recipient trusts the sender’s CA
and that the sender’s private key has remained private. S/MIME, therefore, could be a good
starting point for a trustworthy email system, and the public key in particular could provide
a way to hook further contextual information about the sender into the message.
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4.1.2 PGP/MIME
PGP has been applied to email by combining it with the MIME standard to create
PGP/MIME. [35] Trust in PGP is all process-based. Previous interactions between two
parties create the basis for building local trust, and then that can be extended to people
with whom a party has not interacted directly. PGP provides message integrity and non-
repudiation as well as binding the sender’s public key to his signed messages, just like
S/MIME. PGP/MIME message signatures do not cover message headers, either. One dis-
advantage of PGP is that it is not widely deployed in enterprises, either commercial, federal
or academic [47, p. 168]. Another is that PGP/MIME clients have usability issues, as men-
tioned in Section 1.1.2 and explored in [125].
PGP, like S/MIME, focuses on providing message recipients with some assurance of
sender identity. PGP’s lack of widespread deployment makes it less appealing than S/MIME
as a basis for ABUSE, though the idea that message senders are presented to recipients
with some sense of how the two are connected in the “web-of-trust” informs the usage of
attribute chains in ABUSE.
4.1.3 Research approaches
Key Continuity Management (KCM)
PGP and X.509 are the only two traditional PKI systems with wide deployment. Many
computer scientists, however, use a kind of stealth-PKI every single day when they use
ssh. Secure Shell (SSH) is a remote-login program that uses public key cryptography to
provide encrypted communication between two computers. The first time Alice connects
to a machine M using ssh, the program on her local device D downloads the public
key reported by M (unless D is already pre-configured with a key for M), generally after
presenting a warning that the download is about to occur. Thereafter, D remembers M’s
key and informs Alice upon subsequent logins if M’s reported key changes. Keys are
distributed as needed, with no assurance at all that the mapping between machine and key
is valid. Alice simply makes the assumption that an attacker wasn’t providing a faulty key
for M the first time she logged in, and her machine throws up a warning if ever anything
changes. Garfinkel migrated this concept into the email space with his work on Stream [46]
and CoPilot [50], reasoning that what users wanted from their email was assurance that the
Bob they’re talking to now is the same Bob they were talking to before. The first time
Bob emails Alice, her client remembers his public key, notifying her if his signing key ever
changes. The author and some colleagues also applied this concept to interactions on the
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web. [78]
Assuring continuity of identity in Stream and CoPilot makes explicit the focus on
process-based trust in email, and still misses the use cases we are concerned about in this
work. As we mentioned in Section 3.2.1, both Stream and CoPilot use email headers to
carry around extra information. ABUSE borrows this idea in order to transmit attributes
along with messages without violating Garfinkel’s “no external burden” design pattern.
Role-Based Messaging
To my knowledge, only Role-Based Messaging [16,133] has attempted to address the same
portion of the problem space as ABUSE.
Role Based Messaging (RBM) is a system that creates role-based mail accounts. Users
who have appropriate credentials (where “appropriate” is defined by policy on a per-role
basis) can log into those accounts to read mail sent to that role and also to send signed and
encrypted mail from that role. Mail may be encrypted to a role, not simply to a specific user.
Role membership is controlled by a PERMIS [15] back end, in which X.509 ACs are used
to store role membership information. Policies can be added to messages to further control
what recipients can do with them. A policy governs who can assign roles to users, though
the system could be set up to allow any user to grant roles to others. Also, while these “role
managers” can create new roles within their organization, they will not be recognized by
the system. [131] Thus, they will not have mail accounts created for them and it is not clear
what utility these ad-hoc roles would have in the system, if any.
Later RBM work introduced Policy Based Management (PBM), which adds infrastruc-
ture to allow organizations to advertise what kinds of policy languages they support. [134]
PBM also allows third parties to sign off on particular implementations of particular policy
languages and enforcement models, so that an enterprise can prevent (again, via policy)
users from sending secure messages to an external organization whose mail system may
not respect message permissions set by the sender.
In addition to several other issues, RBM offers a solution for part of the email trust
problem. Users could all be granted roles, and then choose the appropriate role from which
to send a message that needs to be trusted. It does not appear that users could claim multiple
roles at the same time, but new, combined roles could feasibly be created to handle that. As
mentioned above, these new roles could not be usefully created on the fly, however. Most
importantly, RBM handles only role-based trust flows. While these may be common, they
are far from the only class of useful flow. Furthermore, while the authors mention “user
friendliness” as a design goal in one of their early papers, correspondence indicates that
usability has been very much a second tier goal in their work thus far. [132] It is also not
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clear how RBM would handle many people needing to be in the same role at the same time;
all of MISO’s reliability coordinators may have to share the same role-based email account
when communicating with people who do not know them beforehand. According to the
authors, they have so far implemented an RBM policy decision engine and a distributed
RSA algorithm that they plan to use to avoid having a single point of compromise in their
system architecture. They plan to use Mozilla Thunderbird as a client platform for RBM,
but did not say much about the RBM user experience beyond that.3
RBM handles role-based trust flows, provided that all roles can be enumerated during
system set up. Presumably, new role-based accounts could be added to the system, but
only by those with the authority to reconfigure the infrastructure. This approach has all the
problems we presented in Section 3.1.1, and also does not concern itself with usability.
Attribute-Based Messaging
Unlike ABUSE and RBM, Attribute-Based Messaging (ABM) [9] does not work on the be-
half of message recipients. Instead, it focuses on allowing sender to address messages using
attributes instead of identities. One could address a message to all Computer Science ma-
jors who are also seniors, for example. There is an assumed pre-defined set of attributes in
some set of organizational databases, and policies are defined that restrict which attributes
can be used by which senders. Message recipients do not see the attributes of senders;
indeed, ABM is not concerned with characteristics of the sender once it has decided which
attributes he is allowed to use in address construction. The problems considered in ABM
are orthogonal to this work.
4.1.4 Commercial approaches
Both Lotus Notes [136] and Groove Virtual Office [80] provide some measure of context
for their users. Meant to be deployed in an enterprise setting, the systems provide signed
messaging with an interface that reliably indicates when the sender of a message is inter-
nal to the company. They also allow for companies to establish trust relationships at the
organizational level, so that a user at Company A can tell when a sender is certified as an
employee of Company B. Essentially, these systems provide a more-usable S/MIME-style
experience. Users are insulated from many of the issues that a multiplicity of trust roots
bring to X.509-based secure email, but at the expense of being able to interoperate with
users who aren’t “inside the garden”.
3This discussion was adapted from my thesis proposal and one of my previous papers. [79]
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Garfinkel provides a lengthier discussion of these systems, and some others, in [47,
chapter 5]. However, none focus on the problem of providing for users adequate context
for deciding whether to trust unfamiliar correspondents.
4.2 Technological approaches to trust
In this section, we look at software that has taken a technological approach to the problem
of helping users decide which entities they can trust.
4.2.1 Trust-Management-Based Technologies
Trust Management (TM) deals with automatically deciding a form of trust based on at-
tributes and policies. Essentially, Bob makes a request of Alice, bundling with his request
some set of credentials that assert somethings about him. The allowable requests, allowable
assertions, and allowable relationships between entities in the system are all predefined in
TM systems; they must be, in order to allow for an algorithmic decision about the request
to be reached. Alice’s computer puts Bob’s request, his credentials (in some cases, there are
credential repositories that hold statements about Bob beyond those that he provided), and
Alice’s policy into some decision module and then determines whether the policy indicates
that the credentials authorize the request. TM could be used as a part of an algorithmic
email trust system of the form discussed in Section 3.1.1, but we have already discussed
why such a thing would be unlikely to work in practice.
TM systems use many different methods of representing credentials. Some use state-
ments in a logical programming language like Datalog, some use an XML format, some
use s-expressions, and some create their own format. Delegation Logic (DL) [71], the
Role-based Trust-management (RT) framework [72–74], and SD3 [64] all use some vari-
ant of logical programming statements to encode credentials. These are text strings, and
actually fairly human readable, so it would be possible to use them to carry the assertions
we want to build into ABUSE. However, each of these systems has its own grammar that
defines “legal credentials”, and we would need to develop or find code to handle the chosen
format. Trust Policy Language (TPL) [58] is an XML-based TM language that can be re-
duced to Prolog, another logical programming language. Libraries that deal with XML are
readily available, but libraries to deal specifically with TPL are less so. KeyNote [8] and
PolicyMaker [7] both define their own credential formats, and the availability of libraries
to handle these formats is unknown. REFEREE [17] defines a simple policy language
based on s-expressions. [99] Some also consider SDSI/SPKI, discussed below, a TM sys-
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tem based on s-expressions. The credential representation here is compact, though still
not very human-readable. At least one C library is available for manipulating SDSI/SPKI
credentials, but one would likely need to develop code to handle REFEREE.
TM systems, with their focus on deciding trust based on policies, would dictate an algo-
rithmic approach to the email trust problem we have laid out. To summarize the arguments
from Section 3.1.1 against such an approach:
1. it would require the comprehension of arbitrary text from arbitrary senders,
2. users are incapable of effectively enumerating their personal trust policies in a ma-
chine comprehensible format,
3. administrator-defined domain policies are difficult (and expensive) to get right,
4. domain policies are even harder and more expensive to maintain over time, and
5. it is unclear that domain policies useful for the average case are still applicable in
exceptional circumstances.
The potential for using a TM system credential format to carry ABUSE signed assertions
is discussed in Section 4.2.5.
4.2.2 Automated trust negotiation
Following the introduction of Trust Management, researchers noted that, in some cases, the
credentials themselves might be sensitive information. This led to the field of automated
trust negotiation, in which access to both credentials AND resources are controlled by
policies. Per Lee et al:
In trust negotiation, access control decisions are made based on the attributes
of the entity requesting access to a particular resource, rather than his or her
identity. To determine whether an entity should be granted access to a resource,
the entity and resource provider conduct a bilateral and iterative exchange of
policies and credentials (used to certify attributes) to incrementally establish
trust in one another. [70]
This approach to the issue of managing trust shares the same usability issues in human sce-
narios as TM. The arguments reviewed at the end of Section 4.2.1 apply here as well. Both
technologies could be useful at a organizational level, for managing shared access to net-
work resources or similar. For example, the GridStat4 project has begun using automated
4http://www.gridstat.net
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trust negotiation to control distribution of sensor information in the context of monitoring
the power grid. [55] However, humans would be unlikely to be able to use an approach like
these to manage trust in other people with whom they communicate over email.
4.2.3 SDSI/SPKI
Around Dartmouth’s PKI-Trust lab, we sometimes refer to SDSI/SPKI [18, 36, 100] as
“the Libertarian Party of the PKI world: intellectually seductive, but one cannot shake the
nagging feeling that it will not work in real life.” Users are globally identified only by their
public key; all other naming is local. Alice can assert a binding between “Bob” and the key
she believes to belong to him. Carlo, with Alice’s assertion in hand, can then issue his own
assertions referring to “Alice’s Bob”. In this way, assertions can be chained to allow people
who have never even heard of Bob to make statements about him. SDSI/SPKI certificates
also support tags, arbitrary text meant to signify individual permissions. Howell provides
some formal semantics for both naming and the use of tags in SDSI/SPKI [60], which could
be useful in an algorithmic-style system. As discussed in the sections on TM and ATN, we
eschew the algorithmic approach for the reasons discussed in Section 3.1.1.
Like PGP, trust is all process-based in SDSI/SPKI. Unlike PGP, in which users only
assert some level of confidence in a binding between an identity and a key, SDSI/SPKI
users can assert whatever they want about each other. This is interesting, in that it moves
the focus of building trust off of identity and onto arbitrary properties that are bound to
truly globally unique identifiers. So, SDSI/SPKI-style arbitrary signed assertions could be
useful in terms of enabling a trustworthy messaging system to communicate context from
senders to recipients along with messages. The tradeoffs of using the specific certificate
format from SDSI/SPKI for ABUSE assertions are discussed in Section 4.2.5.
4.2.4 Non-identity X.509 PKI
In recent years, a pair of X.509-based PKI technologies have arisen that focus not on bind-
ing identities to key pairs, but on binding other kinds of properties instead. Both X.509
Attribute Certificates (ACs) [38] and X.509 Proxy Certificates (PCs) [120, 123] are ex-
pressed in ASN.1, a binary format, just like regular X.509 ID certificates. So, while the
format is very compact, it is not human readable, and parsing can be difficult. Both ACs
and PCs allow for arbitrary assertions to be built into X.509 certificates, and signed by
users. Attribute Certificates are designed to, as the name suggests, use a hierarchy of At-
tribute Authorities (analogous to Certificate Authorities) to issue X.509 credentials binding
arbitrary attributes to identities. AC PKIs use the same kind of revocation strategies as
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X.509 identity PKIs, though the designers state that a system using short-lived ACs could
likely do without revocation. There is a small set of pre-defined attributes that are meant
to have global meaning. Other attributes can be defined by the deployers of an AC system
for whatever local purposes they desire. Trust would be institutional in such a deployment;
users trust that attributes are granted to individuals based on some policy implemented by
the issuing organization, and so they are willing to believe the bindings provided.
As opposed to ACs, which can be either long-lived or short-lived, Proxy Certificates are
all meant to be short-lived, and thus no revocation infrastructure is mandated by the RFC.
PCs are designed to be issued by users who wish to delegate a subset of their permissions to
processes running on their behalf in grid computing environments. As PCs are not meant
for human consumption, it does not make sense to apply our model of human trust to a
system that deploys them.
Both ACs and PCs rely on an X.509 identity PKI already being in place. ACs need it
to enable applications to go from a public key to an identity to the attributes bound to that
identity. Users of PCs issue them directly using the key pair they got by participating in the
identity PKI. Neither technology can solve the problem we have laid out on its own, but
either could be used to carry signed assertions as a part of a larger system. We discuss the
tradeoffs in the next section.
4.2.5 Choosing the right technology for signed assertions
ABUSE requires signed assertions. As there are a plethora of formats available for this,
many of which are discussed in the preceding sections, it seems unnecessary to define our
own. Software tools at varying levels of maturity exist for manipulating a number of these
formats, and choosing the most well-supported will both simplify the software engineering
tasks before us and make the behavior of the system more likely to be correct.
Trust Management systems use a wide variety of credential formats. We could use any
of them for ABUSE assertions, but without the need to put these credentials into a policy
decision engine, the primary benefit of using such a format becomes irrelevant. Since none
of the formats mentioned in Section 4.2.1 are well-supported in commodity software, we
decided against using them.
SDSI/SPKI has not seen much use outside of academic prototypes, though there is a C
library for manipulating SDSI/SPKI certificates. Prior experience [52] has shown us that
trying to shoehorn SDSI/SPKI into an X.509-centric world can be frustrating, however.
This leaves us with ACs and PCs. OpenSSL [90], a widely used cryptographic library,
and NSS [86], the Mozilla cryptography infrastructure, support X.509 well. OpenSSL
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supports PCs off the shelf. AC support, on the other hand, requires some extra code to be
patched into OpenSSL. Thus, Proxy Certificates are our signed assertion format of choice.
They have the best support among commodity tools, and the special features provided by
other formats are not useful in our system.
4.3 Approaching trust from the human side
Broader concepts of “trust” have been thoroughly studied over the years by researchers
in sociology, psychology and economics. Ideas drawn from these areas have, relatively
recently, been applied to HCISEC.
4.3.1 Security as a socio-technical system
Security systems cannot be considered as solely technological entities. They exist in a
social context that governs their patterns of usage, their deployment, and their design.
Thus, secure systems are actually socio-technical entities. For example, Whitten and Ty-
gar advanced the idea that security software faced the unique problem of the “unmotivated
user”, saying that behaving securely is not something users are innately motivated to care
about. [125] Adams and Sasse challenged this notion, pointing out that users can be moti-
vated to behave securely—and not simply by punishing them when they make mistakes. [2]
By creating an environment in an organization that creates positive social incentives for
acting securely, one can build a secure socio-technical system. Sasse and others went on
to posit design processes informed by sociological understandings of “the whole socio-
technical system that is security” [105] and realized Appropriate and Effective Guidance
for Information Security (AEGIS) in [40, 42]. AEGIS is targeted at the design of an appli-
cation for a specific purpose; while our design process is informed by this work, directives
such as “gather important stakeholders” cannot really be applied to ABUSE, as it is not an
application, but a building block technology.
4.3.2 Sociological trust models applied to system design
Our work is concerned with a very specific corner of the trust problem: how a user decides
whether to honor a request they have received from a person they do not know. Some
often-studied aspects of trust that we do not consider include
1. issues that arise as two humans build trust over time,
2. issues surrounding the establishment of mutual trust, or
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3. cases where the sender of a message has promised some action in return for the
satisfaction of his request.
This is not to say that ABUSE could not be useful in addressing the above, merely that
we did not analyze cases like this with our trust model during our design process and thus
cannot speak authoritatively about how these kinds of situations fit into the ABUSE model.
In [98], Riegelsberger et al. provide a broader definition of trust than we do, defining it
as “an attitude of positive expectation that one’s vulnerabilities will not be exploited.” [98]
Our definition of trust is closer to what those authors refer to as reliability. Working from
their definition, Riegelsberger et al. develop a model that can be applied to a variety of
kinds of “computer-mediated communication”, including voice and video chat, interac-
tions with web sites, email, eCommerce, online auctions, telephone calls and more. Their
model has two actors, the trustor and the trustee, who are participating in some transac-
tion that requires them to trust one another. Consider a person buying an item from an
online merchant. The merchant is the trustee, asking the buyer (the trustor) to transfer
some money with the expectation that the goods will follow. When the items appear in the
mail, the trustee has provided fulfillment of this expectation. The kinds of questions that
we consider do not have a fulfillment step; Bob the trustee is recommending to Alice the
trustor a course of action and intimating that she will perceive some kind of gain by pursu-
ing it. Including fulfillment as it does, the Riegelsberger et al. model is in some ways more
complicated than we need. As an example, issues surrounding incentives for the trustee to
provide fulfillment are not relevant to our work.
The authors do, however, provide a discussion of an abstract trust interaction that is
applicable to our work. When first communicating, the trustor and trustee exchange signals
that bilaterally communicate both contextual properties and intrinsic properties, in order
to initiate a trust relationship. Intrinsic properties are innate characteristics of the actors:
how willing they are to take risks, how much they have internalized social norms that
bias humans towards behaving honestly, how benevolent they are and so on. Contextual
properties are more in line with the kinds of attributes we have considered, but also include
things like prior experience shared among the two parties, concern over decreasing the
potential for future interactions, and reputation within a community. These properties are
broken into three categories:
1. those that express temporal embeddedness,
2. those that express social embeddedness, and
3. those that express institutional embeddedness.
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Temporal embeddedness collectively embodies expectations relating to interactions other
than the one currently taking place. These may be expectations drawn from prior expe-
rience or intentions of future transactions. In our work, we are not concerned with these
kinds of properties, unless they arrive as sort of testimonials from other people. In that case,
they would be evidence of social embeddedness—essentially, reputation. Institutional em-
beddedness maps conveniently onto the notion of institutional trust that we discussed in
Section 1.3.
The model presented by Riegelsberger et al. could certainly be a useful tool for ana-
lyzing the kinds of transactions that we consider. However, the shared-expectations model
that we have advanced suits our needs and does not include extra complexity. The model
presented in [98] is used in [41] to devise some design principals for entire socio-technical
systems that go beyond software to include business processes and organizational structure.
4.4 Usable Security
Garfinkel provides a thorough discussion of work in usability and security in [47, Chapter 2],
combining his own work with design principles from Karat [65]; Zurko and Simon [137];
Whitten [126]; Yee [130]; Perrig and Song [93]; and Balfanz, Durfree and Smetters [4] to
come up with a set of design patterns to use when building secure software for real humans
to use. We discussed his relevant patterns in Section 3.2; we relate how we followed them
in Chapter 5.
4.4.1 Secure email usability
Both Garfinkel and Whitten have developed clients for secure email that focus on usabil-
ity. [47, 126] Whitten’s “Lim” system was designed to help users understand the key certi-
fication portion of a PGP/MIME email system. There are also several systems that insert a
transparent proxy between the user and his email server [12, 47, 49, 92] which handles all
encryption and signing duties. The details are, thus, abstracted away from the user. They
each have their strengths and weaknesses, and none focus on providing more context for
users to make trust decisions. None focused on the problem of providing more context for
users trying to make trust decisions regarding incoming messages.
Groove Virtual Office and Lotus Notes, discussed earlier, provide some usability ben-
efits by making a system administrator responsible for key and certificate management.
HushMail [61] is a web-based email system that uses PGP in a similar fashion; users do
not have to deal with issues of key generation and certification, as the HushMail team han-
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dles it all behind the scenes. In all three cases, these benefits only apply if communicating
parties are inside the same “walled garden”.
4.4.2 Providing extra context for the Web
Users of the Web also face trust decisions; they must decide whether to provide poten-
tially sensitive information to websites to which they navigate. Both TrustBar [57] and Net
Trust [51] seek to provide these users with more context for these trust decisions. Websites
that use SSL to protect communication with users all have X.509 certificates that contain
some extra pieces of information about the site; TrustBar moves this information to the
forefront of the user experience. Net Trust allows users to join a social network of users
that rate websites for trustworthiness, and then displays the appropriate ratings when a
given site is visited. These approaches both seek to contextualize trust decisions in unfa-
miliar entities like ABUSE, but neither is as flexible or as expressive as our work—and
they apply to websites as opposed to other humans.
4.4.3 Anti-phishing
If users came to expect signed mail containing ABUSE attributes as a matter of course,
they would be less likely to believe phishing email. In this sense, ABUSE can be an anti-
phishing technology, though this is not its specific goal. In addition to spam-filtering and
forged-link-detection that is common in email clients like Apple Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird
and Microsoft Outlook, there are also some approaches that do attempt to use a sense
of sender context as an anti-phishing strategy. DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [3],
Sender ID [76], and Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [128] all attempt to provide assurance
that an email came from a legitimate account within the sender’s claimed domain of origin.
If Alice receives mail from “bob@foo.com”, these technologies allow Alice’s email client
to, at least, determine that the message was originally forwarded by servers belonging to
foo.com. Thus, she can be sure that some zombie did not send this email and forge the
source address. Again, this is far from as expressive or flexible as ABUSE, and supports
none of the trust flows we enumerated in Chapter 2.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown that other systems lack the flexibility and usability required
to enable users to leverage over email the kinds of trust flows we enumerated in Chap-
ter 2. We have, however, identified some useful technologies upon which we can build
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ABUSE: S/MIME and X.509 Proxy Certificates. In the next chapter, we discuss how these
technologies play into the system architecture we have designed.
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Chapter 5
Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email
(ABUSE)
In this chapter, we present Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email, our solution to the
email trust problems we have enumerated thus far. Back in Chapter 3, we enumerated three
high-level characteristics that our system must possess:
• expressiveness: the system must be expressive enough to provide contextual support
for the classes of trust flows enumerated in Chapter 2.
• good signals: the new signals used to carry this information must be cheap/easy for
trustworthy actors to emit, and costly/difficult for attackers.
• usability: the system must be designed to be usable according to guidelines from the
HCISEC community.
These three characteristics lead to a number of design goals that affect both the system
architecture and GUI design. First we examine the architectural goals that fall out and
discuss the system we developed to fulfill them. Next, we enumerate the user interface
design goals dictated by the above and present the GUIs we developed in response. We do
not explore in this chapter the process by which we came to our GUI design; we put these
issues off until Chapter 6 in order to avoid bogging down this chapter.
5.1 Architectural design goals
As we mentioned in Section 1.5 and justified in Section 3.1, we have chosen to build
ABUSE as a user-centric system that helps people make better informed trust decisions
about incoming email. Just from this, we can enumerate some simple goals:
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• enable senders to bind assertions about themselves to their outgoing email, and
• reliably convey this context information to recipients, so that it may inform their
judgment.
By reliably convey, we mean that the ABUSE architecture must guard against the mali-
cious fabrication of attributes, and detect when attackers interfere with attributes bound to
messages. These are vague goals, but we will refine them by stepping through the three
characteristics provided above. First, we consider refinements stemming from our expres-
siveness requirement.
5.1.1 Goals dictated by the need for expressiveness
The trust flows enumerated in Chapter 2 encompass a broad range of cases. Even just
naively looking at these flows and the examples that generated the, we can see that ABUSE
needs to be able to express any organizational role, any permission, the delegation of a job
function or single permission, re-delegation, and also handle temporal issues. It may also
be useful to enable the signaling of process-based trust, in the manner of a testimonial. If
Alice has experienced a satisfactory transaction with Bob in some domain, she can provide
Bob with this piece of signed feedback. When, in the future, he explores transactions with
Alice’s colleagues he could include this testimonial to signal to them that Alice considers
him at least somewhat trustworthy.
Given this range of possibly useful statements it seems unlikely that we could pre-
enumerate everything users would want to assert within ABUSE. Furthermore, given that
simply trying to maintain an accurate list of roles in a single enterprise can be very expen-
sive and challenging in the real world [114], we can assume that maintaining an accurate
directory of an even larger set of assertions about users would be even less tractable. Thus,
we can put forth the following two design goals:
• avoid limiting the space of possible assertions, and
• avoid the need for an organization-wide “Assertion Administrator”.
It is fine if we include some centralized infrastructure for the storage and distribution of
these assertions, but we should not require there to be a single person or group whose
job it is to certify every single statement that users wish to make about each other. Take
the coopetition scenario in Section 2.3.3, for example. Getting each delegation and re-
delegation in that trust flow authorized by some centralized authority would have been
extremely onerous, and thus probably worked around by the users. That said, we do not
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wish to impose a heavy burden on end-users either. So, we can add the following goal to
our list:
• minimize the administrative burden on users throughout the system.
Adding these three design goals for ABUSE should enable us to build a system expres-
sive enough to handle the kinds of trust flows enumerated in Chapter 2. We empirically
evaluate this belief in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.
5.1.2 Goals that lead to good signals
In order to enable the building of a shared set of expectations, senders must be able to signal
some of their characteristics to message recipients. We wish to design good signals that are
also readily comprehensible to users. The issue of comprehensibility is one of usability
and properly dealt with in the next section; here we discuss designing the signals so that
they are cheap and easy for trustworthy actors to emit while remaining costly or difficult
for attackers.
The first step we can take is requiring the assertions used in ABUSE to be covered by
a valid digital signature. This requirement makes it at least a bit more challenging for an
attacker to completely fabricate an assertion. The next issue, then is the provenance of
the signing key. As we stated above, we do not want to require a centralized signatory
authority for all attributes. However, avoiding the involvement of a central authority all
together would, essentially, introduce into ABUSE all the problems faced by PGP. Fur-
thermore, we have already expressed that ABUSE is meant to be deployed inside some
logical organization, a setting in which an X.509 identity PKI and S/MIME can get a lot of
traction on enabling trustworthy messaging between users familiar with one another. So, it
makes sense for us to leverage this existing infrastructure—indeed, Garfinkel’s “leverage
existing identification” pattern (p. 43) recommends this course of action. We take a hybrid
approach, in which some relatively small set of “top-level” assertions are made about end
users directly by the organization. This set would include characteristics that are unlikely
to change rapidly, such as being a “student” or an “employee” of a university. There is al-
ready a set of common attributes that should be included in institutional directories across
academia [33]; this would be an ideal starting point in that space. We then enable users
to chain new signed statements off of these assertions. We refer to one of these chains as
an ABUSE attribute. In this way, we make it difficult for an attacker to cryptographically
mimic a legitimate attribute; he cannot forge top-level attributes, and he must subvert or
or collude with other participants in the system in order to generate a longer chain. This
does not exclude the possibility of the attacker using non-cryptographic methods to mimic
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the signaling of an ABUSE attribute; he could still try to manipulate the GUI of the recip-
ient’s messaging client in order to send false signals. However, dealing with this class of
problems is a GUI usability issue; we address these in Section 5.3.
From this discussion, we can derive a modification of one of our earlier design goals
and craft one additional goal as well:
• enable senders to bind their digitally signed attributes to their outgoing email, and
• allow users to chain new assertions (about other people) off of attributes they already
possess.
5.1.3 Architectural usability goals
Usability is a theme that has run throughout this entire work. The whole approach that we
have used to identify and explore the problem at hand is informed by HCISEC research and
principles from that community. We will point out the influence of Garfinkel’s applicable
patterns during the appropriate portions of this chapter.
Garfinkel’s first three patterns, “Least surprise/least astonishment,” “Good security now,”
and “Provide standard security policies” (pp. 41, 41, and 41) are guiding principles of our
work. By studying how trust flows in real-life scenarios, we can design ABUSE so that
it enables the same kinds of behaviors and does not “surprise” the user by forcing him to
behave in ways that are unnatural. We acknowledge that taking a user-centric approach
deprives us of the ability to create a system that is provably secure, but we believe that it
will enable us to build something that can be used securely in the real world. ABUSE is not
perfect, but it is “good security now.” As we explain in our discussion of algorithmic ap-
proaches to trust in email (Section 3.1.1), the “policy kit” approach is not usable. Garfinkel
proposes that a small set of good-but-not-perfect policies be provided for users. ABUSE
essentially provides one policy: if the user decides a request is reasonable, based on the
accompanying attributes, the user should act. If something goes awry, the organization can
audit the offending employee’s email and investigate what informed their trust decision.
There are also a pair of design patterns that ABUSE meets by its very nature: the secure-
messaging-specific “distinguish internal senders” and “send S/MIME email” patterns (p.
45 and 43). Anyone with attributes is operating within the same trust infrastructure as the
recipient, so internal senders are easily identified: they have attributes. Senders outside the
infrastructure do not. Given that ABUSE is built on top of S/MIME, it should be obvious
how we have applied that pattern.
The “no external burden” pattern (p. 42) is the only one that has specific consequences
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for the architecture of ABUSE. Applying this pattern, we can add one final design goal to
our list:
• avoid push-back from users without ABUSE-savvy clients.
5.1.4 Collecting our architectural design goals
In this section we have refined a set of design goals for the ABUSE architecture from the
high-level characteristics we enumerated in Chapter 3. They are:
1. enable senders to bind their digitally signed attributes to their outgoing email,
2. reliably convey this context information to recipients, so that it may inform their
judgment,
3. allow users to chain new assertions (about other people) off of attributes they already
possess,
4. avoid limiting the space of possible assertions,
5. avoid the need for an organization-wide “Attribute Administrator”,
6. minimize the administrative burden on users throughout the system, and
7. avoid push-back from users without ABUSE-savvy clients.
We now discuss the architecture of the system and the ways in which it meets these
goals.
5.2 The ABUSE architecture
ABUSE is designed to rely upon two pieces of existing infrastructure: an email system and
an X.509 identity PKI. In addition to these, ABUSE requires two component pieces:
• an ABUSE-savvy email client, and
• a centralized ABUSE attribute store.
The ABUSE client participates in a number of different facets of the system: attribute
presentation, issuance, distribution and validation. Attribute presentation, obviously, is
a GUI question and will be discussed in Section 5.4.1. There is a GUI involved with

















Figure 5.1: A chain of signed assertions, making up an attribute. We use X.509 Proxy Certificates
as our assertion format. “D” represents a signature by Dartmouth’s trust root. The ordering of
the elements of this chain is unambiguously determined by the signatures on the certificates. Note
the use of public keys in the place of human names; we rely on the organizational identity PKI to
connect public keys to individuals, as shown in Figure 5.2.
interactions between the client and the attribute store that we will discuss here. Distribution
is primarily an architectural issue, though users do choose which attributes get bound to and
sent out with their messages. The UI for this selection process is shown in Section 5.4.2.
The attribute store participates in issuance, distribution and, obviously attribute storage.
Before discussing any of these processes, we first explain the structure of an attribute.
5.2.1 ABUSE attributes
As we discussed earlier in Section 1.5 and Section 5.1, an ABUSE attribute is a chain of
digitally signed assertions, rooted at the CA of the organization’s identity PKI (Figure 5.1).
We go through a concrete example of an attribute and its component assertions in Sec-
tion 5.4.1. Each assertion is an X.509 Proxy Certificate (PC), the canonical structure and
usage of which are discussed in Section 4.2.4. The two aspects of the PC specification that
we bend relate to naming and certificate validity period. Recall from Section 1.1.2 that
a certificate is a digitally signed statement made by an issuer, binding a public key to a
subject for some period of time (a validity period). In normal X.509 schemes, the subject
and issuer of a certificate are identified by distinguished names, which are supposed to be
globally unique. There are a plethora of issues with distinguished names [37], which led
some to promote the usage of the public keys themselves as identifiers. [18, 36, 100] We
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ABUSE Attribute Identity certificates
Figure 5.2: In the attribute shown on the left, subjects are identified by the public keys tied to their
names by the organizational identity PKI.
use both; the identity PKI on which we rely uses distinguished names to bind human users
to public keys (which is how real-world deployments work, for good or ill), and we use
the public keys from this PKI to identify issuers and subjects within ABUSE (Figure 5.2).
This is the first way in which we depart from the PC specification [120], which calls for
distinguished names to be used as identifiers.
The PC specification also calls for certificates to have a validity period on the same scale
as the running time of a computational process. Usually, this would be measured in minutes
or hours, though it could be on the order of days. These short recommended validity
periods are how the PC specification mitigates the risk of designing a system that does
not have a revocation strategy. There is no maximum validity period, however. ABUSE,
similarly, does not mandate any maximum. We expect that assertions in ABUSE will have
validity periods ranging from hours to months, though we cannot know for certain without
seeing the system deployed in real-life scenarios. We acknowledge that choosing to eschew
revocation and relying upon expiration in ABUSE creates a tradeoff. Avoiding revocation
allows us to reduce the administrative burden across the board, which helps us meet design
goals five and six. It does, however, make it impossible for issuers to selectively render a
particular attribute invalid prior to its expiration. We discuss the rationale behind and the
consequences of this decision in Section 5.5.1.
Our approach to representing the content of an assertion stays within the PC specifica-
tion. Proxy Certificates contain a policy field that can contain arbitrary text. Thus, we can
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use this field to support any assertion we desire, allowing us to meet design goal number
four.
Lastly, PCs bind an assertion and a subject identifier to a key pair. The private half of
this pair can be used to issue new PCs. This allows users to issue new PCs using attributes
that have been granted to them by other users. Thus, we enable the creation of chains of
signed assertions, as required by goal three.
5.2.2 ABUSE attribute issuance
In a true PKI, individual entities generate and control their own private keys. Whether as
a stepping stone to this world or due to a institutional unwillingness to deploy real PKI
tools, we have seen centralized PKI signing services begin to make inroads in enterprise
environments. [63,82] Having end entities control their own secrets and perform their own
cryptographic operations is much more scalable, and also more secure; the distributed ap-
proach avoids the introduction a single point of compromise into the system. That said,
while a distributed approach is superior, it is more complex to implement.
To simplify the implementation of our prototype, we did not implement attribute is-
suance in a distributed fashion. Instead, the centralized store plays a key role in the process,
as shown in Figure 5.3. At this point, our greatest need is to build something that we can
test, to verify the utility and usability of our approach to solving the email trust problem
we have laid out. The rest of the ABUSE architecture is designed to be agnostic to the
details of attribute issuance, which allows us to upgrade to a distributed solution at any
time without modifications to the rest of the system. We outline such a distributed scheme
in Section 10.1.1; Alice interacts directly with Bob in order to issue him an attribute. In
that scenario, each participant performs his or her own cryptographic operations and the
centralized store becomes nothing more than an attribute backup and key escrow service, a
situation that is much less risky and far more scalable. Before doing any kind of wide-scale
deployment, we would certainly implement this change.
In the current implementation, when Alice wishes to grant a new attribute to Bob, she
first decides what she wants to say about him. Then, Alice authenticates to the attribute
store with her identity certificate, downloads her current attributes from the centralized
store and selects one whose authority she feels allows her to make the desired assertion.
After inputting the assertion content, Alice indicates for how long she would like this at-
tribute to be considered valid. Her client then sends this data, along with Bob’s public key,
over the authenticated channel to the store. The store creates a Certificate Signing Request








attribute to chain from
Done
Get Bob's public key, 
from LDAP or received 
signed mail
Generate CSR
Sign with private key
from chosen attribute
Figure 5.3: The protocol by which Alice issues a new attribute to Bob. After the process is com-
plete, Bob acquires his new attribute the next time he authenticates to the attribute store.
ject field, the attribute content in the policy field, the validity period specified by Alice, and
the public half of the key pair that has been generated for this PC. The store then signs the
CSR with the private key associated with the attribute indicated by Alice. Since the store
generated this key in the first place, allowing the machine to use this key for signing only
upon Alice’s appropriately authenticated request does not create any additional vulnerabil-
ity. Only Alice can initiate the chaining of new assertions off of attributes that have been
issued to her. Since the private key associated with an attribute never leaves the store, the
only way an attacker could generate false attributes is by colluding with Alice, stealing the
private key associated with her identity certificate, or by breaking into the machine hosting
the centralized store.
Of those three weak points, the attribute store is the only one in the scope of our work.
The attribute store should be appropriately hardened against compromise, and it should
not run services other than the attribute store to limit the possible avenues of incursion.
Running the store on a secure-hardware-based system [77] could be one useful avenue to
protect the attribute keys against compromise, but this is a matter of implementation.
5.2.3 ABUSE attribute storage
All of Alice’s attributes are available to her in the centralized store after she correctly
authenticates using her credentials from the organizational identity PKI. This store is an
LDAP directory, searchable by public key. Alice cannot get the private keys associated with
her attributes; those never leave the store. Although we restrict access to Alice’s attributes
at the point of storage, ABUSE cannot guarantee the privacy of these assertions. Alice
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binds her attributes to outgoing messages and does not retain control of them thereafter.
We do not provide any mechanism for Alice to delete or otherwise prevent forwarding of
her attribute information; much like any text she puts into an ABUSE-enhanced message,
the attributes are under the control of the recipient once they are sent.
5.2.4 ABUSE attribute distribution
As we mentioned above, Alice pulls her attributes down from the centralized store when
she connects. She may cache them if she so desires, but this is an implementation detail.
Until now, we have merely said that Alice can “bind” attributes of her choosing to her
outgoing messages. In this section, we explain how this binding is realized, helping us
meet our first design goal. One caveat here is that ABUSE is a prototype, and so there are
likely ways that we could increase the efficiency of attribute distribution and validation.
We have chosen to build something that works before concerning ourselves overmuch with
reducing overhead.
Bundling an attribute with a message
As we mentioned earlier, an ABUSE attribute is a “chain” of X.509 Proxy Certificates.
Such chains are represented as a set of individual certificates, where one is tied to the next
by a digital signature as in Figure 5.1. PCs, as mentioned in Section 4.2.4, are natively
formatted as binary data. In order for information to be sent along with email, it must be
formatted as printable text. Fortunately, there are standardized ways to encode certificates
as text, which we use to prepare attributes for transmission with an email message. De-
lineators are inserted between certificates and also between attributes, so that the client on
the receiving end can appropriately parse the attributes for verification and display. For a
message with two simple attributes, chains of length one, the header section of an outgoing
message, has the following content added:
X-AbuseAttributes: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----








Attack type Prevention strategy Detection strategy
Assertion deletion








Encrypt with recipient public
key
Hash of attributes appended






Total attribute removal Unpreventable by ABUSE
Table 5.1: Possible technical attacks on the binding of attributes to messages.
Common graphical email clients (Apple Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird, Microsoft Outlook,
etc) do not recognize the X-AbuseAttributes header name, and thus do not display
this content. This is in contrast to schemes that enclose extra information as email at-
tachments, like S/MIME and PGP/MIME. Before widespread client support for the format
existed, users of PGP would experience push-back from the non-users to whom they sent
mail, as the signature would be presented as a mysteriously named attachment by the re-
cipient’s email software. [47, p. 322] By using headers to carry the information we avoid
this problem, thus helping achieve our seventh design goal.
Cryptographically tying attributes to a message
Digital signatures on email cover only the body of the message. We have already mentioned
that this leaves subject, date, sender and other header information open to modification by
attackers in Section 1.2.1. As our attributes are contained in headers, it is possible that
they might be vulnerable. Attributes are, as we mentioned earlier, a chain of assertions.
Each assertion is an X.509 Proxy Certificate, digitally signed by the private key associated
with the previous certificate in the chain. Thus, none of the assertions in a given attribute
can be removed or modified without the system detecting it during the validation process.
The signatures on the certificates also allow us to determine the appropriate order of the
assertions in an attribute, so attackers cannot insert single assertions or re-order the existing
ones without detection. An attacker could add an entire attribute, though he would have
to possess or create one that has been appropriately issued to the sender. He could also
remove one or more attributes without detection, as long as he deletes them in their entirety.
We could combat these attacks by somehow extending the signature on the message to
cover our headers, but this would break compatibility with existing S/MIME clients and
drastically increase push-back. What we choose to do, then, is to allow these attacks to
happen but make them detectable. We do risk a small amount of push-back, but less than
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From: "Maria Page" <mariap@dnc.org>
To: "Campaign Coordinator" <ccord@dnc.org>
Subject: Welcome to the campaign!
X-AbuseAttributes: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
X-AbuseAttributes: <multi-line certificate content>
X-AbuseAttributes: <multi-line certificate content>




Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; 
micalg=sha1; boundary="----0F0B28E8064E340658B0CA9C636D898F"
Message-Id: <20080714032257.E280E290056@citric.cs.dartmouth.edu>
Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2008 23:22:57 -0400 (EDT)



























Figure 5.4: In order to protect the attributes we have placed in the header, we generate a hash and
append it to the text in the message. When the email client generates an S/MIME signature over the
message body, the signature covers the hash as well.
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was faced by PGP/MIME and S/MIME.
In order to detect the addition or removal of whole attributes, we generate a hash of the
attributes that the sender has chosen to bind to the message, append it to the message text,
and then allow the client to generate a signature over the entirety of the message body as
usual (Figure 5.4). Remember that any modification of the body will cause the signature
on the message to be invalid, enabling the attack to be detected. This includes any attacks
on this attribute hash. If the S/MIME signature is invalid, we can no longer be certain if
the attributes in the headers are those that the sender meant to bind to the message, so we
suppress all of them. This also allows us to detect the total removal of attributes; if there is
a hash at the end of the message but no attributes in the headers, we know that something
is wrong. The possible attacks on ABUSE attributes as a result of their placement in email
headers and attendant mitigation strategies are shown in Table 5.1.
Having described all the facets of ABUSE in which the centralized store participates,
we now move on to duties handled solely by the client.
5.2.5 Attribute validation
When a message is received, the email client does its standard S/MIME signature valida-
tion. If this fails because the signing certificate has been revoked, we ignore the attributes
altogether. This allows an organization to exercise at least some coarse-grained control
over user attributes; if the organization chooses to cut ties with an individual, we no longer
allow that individual to claim attributes rooted in that organization’s trust infrastructure.
Assuming the signing certificate is not revoked, the attributes are parsed out of the header
and individually validated. Currently, ABUSE does not support bridged PKIs, described
in Section 1.1.2, though we discuss how to add this in Section 10.1.2. Thus, in the cur-
rent prototype, the first assertion in an attribute must be signed by the organizational trust
root. The validation process is shown in Figure 5.5. We take a single attribute, pull off
the final assertion in the chain, and then pass it to OpenSSL [90] command-line tools to be
validated against the organizational trust root. The intermediate certificates in the chain (if
any) are also passed in to be used by OpenSSL as it tries to build a path of valid certificates
connecting the final assertion to the trust root. We run the software in such a way that it
ensures that all the signatures on the certificates are valid, flagging any certificates that are
outside of their validity period. We keep track of this validity information so that we can
display it to the user later, rather than declaring the attribute invalid. We also ensure that the
hash of the public key in the message signing certificate matches the subject of the terminal








































Trust root Certificate to 
validate
Certificates to use 
for path-building
Figure 5.5: We use OpenSSL to validate ABUSE attributes. The terminal assertion in the chain is
passed to OpenSSL command line tools to be validated, using the organizational CA as a trust root.
The other assertions in the attribute (if any) are passed in to enable the validation tool to rebuild the
entire certificate chain. Validation is only concerned with ensuring that it is possible to build a chain
of correctly signed certificates connecting the trust root to the certificate being validated. It is up to
the user to read the assertions contained within these certificates and decide whether the attribute
makes sense.
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were not issued to the signer of the message to which they are bound, are not displayed
to users. Attributes containing expired (or not-yet-valid) assertions are displayed, but with
some special visual cues that help users understand what this status might mean to their
trust-decision. We discuss these visual cues in Section 5.4.1.
Validation screens out attributes that cannot be legitimately claimed by the sender.
Fabricated attributes and attributes that were issued to someone other than the sender are
blocked. Thus, validation is an important part of presenting users with appropriate context
information—our second design goal.
5.2.6 Attribute presentation
Presenting an attribute to the user (in support of design goal number two) is primarily a GUI
issue. However, there are a few support tasks that the infrastructure must perform in order
to provide the interface with all the information it needs to appropriately convey context
information to the user. For example, we wish to support the use of process-based trust
in ABUSE by calling users’ attention to assertions made by people with whom they are
familiar. We also wish to downplay information that users have seen frequently in order to
avoid habituation, a concept discussed at greater length in Chapter 7. Intuitively, the visual
impact of our GUI will scale with the novelty of the information ABUSE has to display.
Familiar attributes from familiar senders are of the least import; the message recipient
already shares some trust relationship with the sender, and so ABUSE is not particularly
helpful. Messages from unfamiliar senders, the case in which ABUSE is designed to be
most useful, have attributes displayed prominently.
In order to support this behavior, the ABUSE client must keep track of a couple of
pieces of information:
• familiarity of message senders, and
• familiarity of attributes.
Familiarity must be defined if we are to programmatically track it. A variety of familiarity
metrics make sense here, and the meaning of “familiar” could be different for senders and
for attributes.
Familiarity of senders
For senders, we adopt the approach Garfinkel used in his CoPilot system [50], following
his “track received keys” pattern (p. 44). If the client has received signed mail from a
given sender, it remembers the associated public key and, if it sees that key associated with
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the signature on a new message, the sender of that message is considered familiar. We
could also set some kind of threshold in addition to this metric; three messages received, or
perhaps require an actual exchange of multiple messages between the sender and recipient.
We could introduce some kind of temporal evaluation as well; perhaps a sender becomes
unfamiliar if he has not been heard from in some number of months. It might also make
sense to consider senders in the user’s address book as familiar, even if they have not sent
signed mail before. Their identity certificate (and public key) could be queried from a
database associated with the organization’s identity PKI in that case.
Determining the best metric for sender familiarity is a question that should be addressed
future work. For now, as mentioned above, we follow Garfinkel’s “Track received keys”
design pattern (p. 44).
Familiarity of attributes
Determining the “right” metric for attribute familiarity is, again, open. We choose a naive
metric: if we have seen this exact chain of assertions before, the attribute is considered
familiar. It might be the case that users would find it useful for ABUSE to alter its display
if an attribute is expressing a familiar kind of relationship. For example, Alice has received
many messages from Bob, who binds to his correspondence an attribute from Carol indicat-
ing that he is her executive assistant. When Alice receives a message from Darrell with an
attribute stating that he is also Carol’s executive assistant, it might be useful for ABUSE to
somehow convey to Alice that this is a kind of attribute with which she is familiar, though
she has not seen this particular chain before.
Tracking familiarity
The ABUSE client caches a sender’s public key whenever it sees a validly signed incoming
message. Attributes are cached after they are validated. This is fine the first time a message
is viewed; unfamiliar senders and attributes are appropriately flagged as such. When a
message is viewed again, though, the sender and attributes are already in the cache and will
be flagged as familiar. While this could be a legitimate semantic decision, early testing
showed that this was confusing to users. Thus, we decided that familiarity status should
be “sticky”; the first message from an unfamiliar sender continues to be displayed as such.
To support this behavior, we made the ABUSE client add a nonce to the headers it inserts
into outgoing messages. Upon receiving a message from an unfamiliar sender, the ABUSE
client caches the sender’s public key and associates it with the nonce found in the headers.
When re-loading messages, the client checks not only whether the sender is familiar, but
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also whether or not the nonce on the message being loaded matches the nonce stored along
with the sender’s public key. If so, the message is rendered as being from an unfamiliar
sender. We explore the details of this more thoroughly in Section 5.4.1.
Preparing an attribute for presentation
In addition to determining familiarity, the client must also do some work to get the infor-
mation necessary to present attributes to the user. The presentation GUI that we designed
displays each attribute as an entity unto itself. Though it is possible (even probable) that
multiple attributes on a given message may share some assertions near the top of the cer-
tificate chain, we did not explore visualizing the content in this way—though it may be
interesting to explore this in future work. To prepare a single attribute for presentation, the
client first determines and stores the name of the attribute’s trust root, and then separates
the chain into its component assertions. For each assertion, the client then parses out the the
subject, issuer, validity period, and assertion content. Remember that subjects and issuers
in ABUSE assertions are identified by hashes of their public keys from the organizational
identity PKI. The client resolves these key hashes into human-readable names by looking
up the appropriate identity certificates.
5.2.7 Towards expressiveness, good signals and usability
Earlier in this chapter, we laid out seven design goals that, if achieved, would help ABUSE
exhibit the three characteristics that we require from a solution to the email trust problem
we have laid out in this thesis: expressiveness, good signals and usability. We allow users
to issue arbitrary digitally signed assertions to each other and distribute them reliably along
with email while avoiding both the need for a central administrator and push-back from
users without ABUSE-savvy email clients. Designing an architecture that provides these
features gets us part of the way towards our goal of a user-centric system that solves the
email trust problem we have laid out. Now, we must discuss the GUIs that present context
information to users, allow users to issue assertions, and allow users to bind attributes to
their outgoing messages.
5.3 Design goals for the ABUSE user interfaces
In support of ABUSE’s overall goal, we must design user interfaces capable of ensuring
that Carol, when she receives an attribute issued by Alice bound to a message from Bob,
can understand what Alice meant to say about Bob. This implies goals at both ends: we
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must present Bob’s attribute to Carol accurately and also help Alice accurately convey
what she wants to say about Bob. As we mentioned in Section 5.2, this requires GUIs
for attribute issuance, so Alice can accurately express what she wishes to say about Bob;
attribute selection, so that Bob can accurately pick the attributes he wants to send with his
message; and attribute presentation, so that what Alice said is accurately represented to
Carol. When developing design goals for these user interfaces, we must again take into
account the characteristics we desire ABUSE to possess: expressiveness, good signals, and
usability.
5.3.1 Getting good signals all the way to the end user
We have already discussed in Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.2 the ways in which we make
it difficult for an attacker to falsify an ABUSE attribute. We cited that, by allowing users to
issue assertions to one another, attackers would need to collude with people in the system
to generate convincing false attributes. This assumes that the chained nature of ABUSE
attributes can be accurately expressed to users; if message recipients do not understand how
the assertions in an attribute relate to one another, this opens a door for social engineering
attacks. Thus, our first design goal for our user interfaces is to
• make the semantics of assertion chaining clear to users.
Now, we must address the issue of mimicry. If an attacker can convincingly mimic the
appearance of having an attribute bound to his message, he does not need to create a false
chain of certificates at all. It ceases to matter that we have made it difficult to craft a falsified
attribute, because the attacker can create the appearance of having done so. We mentioned
a small example of this briefly in Section 1.4.1: web-based phishing attacks that include
“Verified by VeriSign” or “TRUSTe” icons in fraudulent web pages. [32] Other researchers
have also noted similar problems with the padlock icons that web browser use to denote
SSL-encrypted connections to web servers. [26, 129] An email client that renders HTML
email (Thunderbird, Mail, Outlook, etc.) faces similar challenges; the sender of an attack
email can use the formatting capabilities of HTML to craft convincing false signals. To
combat mimicry, then, we must
• provide users with a way to reliably distinguish content presented by ABUSE from
content delivered in the body of HTML email.
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5.3.2 Making the UI expressive
The first goal enumerated above addresses expressiveness concerns as well; chaining se-
mantics are an important part of understanding the meaning of an ABUSE attribute. Also, if
people familiar to the user have issued component assertions of an attribute we are present-
ing, we would like to highlight this. The user may share some pre-existing trust relationship
with one or more of the issuers involved in the creation of an attribute; reminding them of
this will help better inform their decision. Adding a few more self-explanatory semantic is-
sues, we come up with the following list of concerns that we must address when presenting
an attribute:
• the semantics of chaining,
• the presence of familiar users in a chain of assertions,
• the meaning of expired/not-yet-valid assertions, and
• the presence of multiple attributes bound to a message.
We have said before that we allow users to make any assertions they desire. However,
it is possible that providing them with suggestions could be useful. Starting with a list of
common assertions could reduce the burden of attribute issuance. The size and variety of
such a list would vary across domains, and navigating a sizable list could perhaps introduce
new usability issues. This requires further study, which we propose in Section 10.3. Intu-
itively, it seems as though providing suggested attributes could be useful to users, and so
it behooves us to include a facility for defining such a set within the system. A similar set
up for suggesting attribute validity periods could also be useful. Again, this would be very
context dependent. A university scenario could suggest periods such as “until the end of
this term” or “fall semester, 2008” while a business setting might provide suggested periods
aligned with financial quarters. So, we can add another goal to our list:
• provide a facility for suggested assertions and validity periods.
Practitioners must be careful not to turn this facility into a “policy kit” by providing a
myriad of suggestions. As we mentioned above, work should be done to determine where
the tradeoff point is between providing a helpful set of suggestions and overwhelming users
with choice.
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5.3.3 Designing the UI to be usable
In this section, we discuss which of Garfinkel’s patterns influenced the usability design
goals we set for our GUIs. We also address the patterns that we did not apply anywhere
in our design and why we consider them inapplicable. Evaluation of our designs occurs
later: we relate the iterative design process we used—along with our prototypes—in Chap-
ter 6, perform a usability analysis in Chapter 7, and provide empirical evidence that users
understand our GUIs in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.
We have already mentioned in Section 5.2.6 that ABUSE follows Garfinkel’s “track
received keys” pattern (p. 44) by keeping track of sender and attribute familiarity. In order
for users to take this information into account, we must
• express sender and attribute familiarity to users in a clear and concise fashion.
When designing the actual look and feel of our GUIs, we must apply the “consistent
meaningful vocabulary” and “consistent controls and placement” patterns (p. 42 and 42).
Not only must we avoid overloading any pre-existing terminology, but any that we in-
troduce should be used to mean the same things throughout the ABUSE interfaces. For
example, we should not tell users that they can “attach” or “include” attributes, because
these terms have specific meanings in the email space. We should also endeavor to make
our selection of control elements similar to the program into which we build our ABUSE
client, as well as consistently using the same representation for the same kind of informa-
tion throughout our software. Attributes should be represented similarly regardless of the
context in which they appear, for instance. Thus, we add the following goals:
• avoid overloading existing terminology/use new vocabulary consistently, and
• be consistent with design and functionality of control elements
Patterns that do not apply to ABUSE
Despite being presented as “designed to advance the goal of secure messaging for all
users” [47, p. 330], we consider some of Garfinkel’s patterns inapplicable to ABUSE. This
is, primarily, because our work is designed to be deployed inside a logical organization
and to rely upon an institutional identity PKI—a choice that Garfinkel admits is reasonable
where the wherewithal exists to support such a system.
• Email-Based Identification and Authentication (p. 43): As we assume the exis-
tence of an identity PKI, we do not require the use of EBIA to set up identities for
users in ABUSE.
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• Create keys when needed (p. 44): Though we create keys every time a new asser-
tion is issued, we do not use these in cryptographic communication protocols. The
only keys we use in that fashion come from the identity PKI.
• Key continuity management (KCM, p. 44): KCM is designed for situations in
which no identity PKI is likely to be in existence; as such, we do not employ this
pattern.
• Track recipients (p. 44): Any ABUSE-savvy email client is by default also S/MIME
compliant. Thus, we have no need to track the message receiving capabilities of
recipients.
• Migrate and backup keys (p. 45): Any keys that we create are stored within the
centralized attribute store; key escrow for identity keys is outside the scope of our
work.
5.3.4 Collecting the GUI design goals
Summing up the design goals for our GUIs, we have the following:
1. make the semantics of assertion chaining clear to users,
2. highlight the presence of familiar users in a chain of assertions,
3. make clear the meaning of expired/not-yet-valid assertions,
4. help users notice when multiple attributes are bound to a message,
5. provide users with a way to reliably distinguish content presented by ABUSE from
content delivered in the body of HTML email,
6. express sender and attribute familiarity to users in a clear and concise fashion,
7. provide a facility for suggested assertions and validity periods,
8. avoid overloading existing terminology/use new vocabulary consistently, and
9. be consistent with design and functionality of control elements.
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Hany Farid says that David Kotz is a professor of Computer Science
(a) An example of a single ABUSE assertion.
You’ve never heard from Hany Farid before.
You’ve never heard from David Kotz before.
Hany Farid says that David Kotz is a professor of Computer Science.
Hany Farid guarantees this to be true until 9/1/09.
(b) Verbose description of the above assertion.
Figure 5.6: An ABUSE assertion show both in summary form, and in the long form available by
clicking on the information icon shown at the right end of (a).
5.4 The ABUSE GUIs
As we mentioned in Section 5.2, the ABUSE client has GUIs for attribute presentation,
issuance, and selection (which is a sub-task of distribution). As both issuance and selec-
tion require the system to present attributes to users, we first discuss the ABUSE attribute
presentation GUI.
5.4.1 Attribute presentation GUI
A single assertion
Though assertions are never presented on their own, it is convenient to break one out for the
purposes of explication. Figure 5.6 shows a single ABUSE assertion, issued by someone
unfamiliar to someone unfamiliar. We modify attribute presentation based on the familiar-
ity to the recipient of issuers and subjects in the chain, but will discuss this later. For now,
note that we use simple, straightforward vocabulary in the summary form (Figure 5.6a).
The content of this assertion is displayed in larger font to draw attention to it; as the names
of the issuer and subject are unfamiliar, the content is the most important piece of context
presented here. A standard information icon is placed at the end of the row of elements
shown. When this icon is clicked or hovered over with the mouse, an expanded version of
the information is presented. This long form, shown in Figure 5.6b, spells out the meaning
of an assertion and provides expiry information. The validity period can also be seen by
hovering the mouse over the assertion content.
A single attribute
An attribute is, essentially, displayed as a series of assertions. Figure 5.7 shows a complete
attribute. Assertions are stacked in the order in which they are chained, with the first
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Hany Farid says that Sean Smith is in charge of 045 Sudikoff
Dartmouth College says that Hany Farid is a Chairperson, Computer Science
Sean Smith says that Chris Masone can grant undergrads access to 045
Chris Masone says that Kate Bailey can access 045
Color modified 
for visibility
Different background draws 
eye to most important content
Standard color, icon for
a warning.  Denotes assertion 
outside of validity period.
Colored, underlined like a hyperlink.  
Invites user to click for more information. Standard information icon
Figure 5.7: An example of an ABUSE attribute. Note the use of the standard warning icon in the
last row; this denotes that the last assertion in the chain is outside of its validity period. The names
of familiar individuals are large and made to appear similar to standard web links. When a name is
clicked, any attributes that ABUSE has seen issued to that individual are displayed in a dialog box.
assertion (signed by the trust root) at the top. The ordering, showing the subject of each
assertion as the issuer of the next, shows users how assertions are chained into an attribute,
meeting our first design goal.
Looking now to our second design goal, familiar users are denoted by enlarging the
font used to display their names. In the example shown, “Sean Smith” and “Chris Ma-
sone” are familiar to the user. This means that the system knows the user has encountered
them before; thus, it likely has cached attributes issued to each man. The system enables
the user to access that contextual information directly from this GUI by clicking on their
names. It renders the names in the style of hyperlinks in a web page, as users are familiar
with clicking on links to get more information in the web-browsing context. This is one
specific way in which we worked to remain consistent with existing control metaphors: fur-
ther information about some item is accessible behind a hyperlink anchored on that item.
We also modify the long form (Figure 5.6b) of an assertion when a principal is familiar;
instead of “you’ve never heard from Sean Smith before,” we display the phrase “you have
communicated with Sean Smith before.”1
To meet our third goal, the accurate expression of validity period information, we use
standard coloring and “warning sign” iconography to indicate to the user when there is
some cause for concern. Hovering over the attribute content displays a short message
1If the user asks for the long form of the final assertion in a chain the text regarding the subject is subtly
different. For the attribute shown in Figure 5.7, as an example, we would display “You are communicating
with Kate Bailey right now.”
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Status Summary message Long message
Valid This statement expires on [date] [Issuer] guarantees this to be
true until [date]
Expired This statement EXPIRED on [date] [Issuer] only guaranteed this to
be true until [date]
Not yet valid This statement is NOT VALID until
[date]
[Issuer] does not guarantee this
to be true until [date]
Table 5.2: Textual explanations of assertion validity status.
Figure 5.8: The ABUSE prototype is built atop Mozilla Thunderbird. Here we show a pair of
attributes, displayed in a part of the Thunderbird email window.
indicating the current validity status of the assertion; if the assertion is not currently valid,
the text is correspondingly concerning. The long form of the assertion is similarly modified,
as in Table 5.2.
Presenting attributes with email
We toyed with a number of names by which to refer to ABUSE attributes in the prototype
client we built. We started with sender attributes in the early mockups used in Chapter 8,
but some feedback from the subjects in that study led us to re-think our terminology. The
term didn’t capture the idea that other users are attesting to or vouching for characteristics
of or permissions held by the sender. Digital introductions, the term upon which we settled,
better captures the idea: a third party, with whom the recipient shares some existing trust
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The "digital introductions" bar.
Consistent maximize/
minimize controls
Figure 5.9: A familiar sender who has included introductions that the system has seen before.
relationship, is providing some reasons to consider extending trust to the sender. So, as
Figure 5.8 shows, we display an attribute as an “introduction” through some issuer in the
chain of assertions. If none are familiar to the recipient, we just use the trust root. Our
solution for goal four, displaying multiple attributes bound to a message, is also shown in
Figure 5.8. We tab the attributes, a metaphor familiar to users from web browsers such as
Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari, and the latest version of Microsoft Internet Explorer.
Another key GUI element is visible in Figure 5.8, just above the tabs. This is the digital
introductions bar, also shown in Figure 5.9. This bar is displayed as a part of the chrome
for every message, in order to prevent attackers from spoofing it in messages that have no
attributes bound to them. Chrome refers to the portions of a GUI that do not blindly render
user-provided content. The pane displaying the attributes themselves can be maximized
and minimized by using a control consistent in appearance with one that performs the same
function elsewhere in the same window (pointed out in Figure 5.9). Since the introductions
bar is always present, if an attacker attempts to mimic it, the user will see two. If this is
not enough to clue users in to an attack, there is existing work on how to better distinguish
chrome from rendered HTML [26, 129] that we could apply. This is a potential area for
further study.
As we discuss at length in Chapter 7, the prominence of the digital introductions bar
and attribute pane are designed to increase as ABUSE decides that the information it has
to present to the user is more and more relevant. Figure 5.8 shows a case in which an
unfamiliar sender has bound as-yet-unseen attributes to his message; the bar is yellow
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Attributes Color Pane Introductions bar text
Present Yellow Open This is the first message from this sender
and it includes introductions
None Yellow Open This is the first message from this sender
and it includes no introductions
(a) Behavior for unfamiliar senders
Attributes Color Pane Introductions bar text
Familiar Blue Closed This familiar sender has included familiar
introductions
Some new Blue Open This familiar sender has included some
new introductions
None Blue Open This familiar sender has not included any
introductions
(b) Behavior for familiar senders
Table 5.3: Display options versus sender and attribute familiarity.
and the attributes automatically displayed as a result. In Figure 5.9, a familiar sender has
bound to her message attributes that the user has already seen. The bar is thus blue (a
neutral color) and the attributes are hidden by default. Table 5.3 details all the cases and
the resulting display choices
5.4.2 ABUSE selection GUI
Selecting attributes to bind to outgoing messages is currently a simple process. Alice is
the subject of the final assertion in all of her attributes, and presumably knows the person
who issued that assertion. ABUSE generates a list of all such issuers, and Alice chooses
among them. Assume that she chooses the issuer Bob. Alice is presented with all of
her attributes in which Bob issued the final assertion, and indicates which she wishes to
bind to her message. She may choose more, or she may choose to be done. It may be
useful to implement some kind of search functionality; we cannot know until we see how
the attribute space grows in a real-world ABUSE deployment. Regardless, this is more a
matter of convenience. Similarly, enabling the user (or the organization) to set a default
set of attributes could also be useful, but real-world use patterns are necessary to judge the
utility of these features.
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Hany Farid says that Sean Smith
Dartmouth College says that Hany Farid
Sean Smith says that You
You say that
is in charge of 045 Sudikoff
is a Chairperson, Computer Science
can grant undergrads access to 045




Choose your own date:
Figure 5.10: The ABUSE attribute issuance GUI. Shown here with suggested expiration dates, but
not suggested assertion values.
5.4.3 ABUSE issuance GUI
As a part of our desire to be consistent in our representation of information, the GUI for
issuing attributes relies heavily on both the attribute selection and presentation GUIs. After
Alice picks an attribute off of which she wishes to chain a new assertion (using, essen-
tially, the same GUI discussed in Section 5.4.2), she is presented with Figure 5.10. The
subject field auto-completes like an address field in a message composition window in a
modern email client; as Alice types the name of the person to whom she wishes to issue
this assertion, her address book and the organizational directory are used to help ensure
that she unambiguously specifies her subject. Pursuant to our seventh design goal, we pro-
vide drop-down menus for both assertion content and validity period in the event that Alice
wishes to choose a suggested value for either of these fields. The administrators of the
ABUSE deployment can specify lists of suggested assertions and validity periods (XML
files, downloaded by the client from the centralized attribute store) to populate these menus.
If Alice eschews the content suggestions, putting the skeleton of the attribute (“Alice says
that Bob...”) in place helps guide Alice to frame the wording of her assertion content in a
way that will make sense when viewed later.
Having detailed the entirety of our system architecture and user interface, we now ad-
dress the design and implementation decisions that we were not able to fit into the flow of
the preceding discussion.
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5.5 Design and implementation decisions
5.5.1 Attribute revocation
The thorniest design decision we have made revolves around the issue of attribute revoca-
tion. This is unsurprising, as revocation is one of the more contentious issues in the PKI
community at large. Researchers and security professionals tout a variety of approaches,
including: Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [19], on-line revocation status checking
protocols [43, 81], and leaving it out altogether. [120] The X.509 identity PKI upon which
ABUSE relies must have some strategy for dealing with this issue, or else it would be
incomplete. In cases where an individual is separated from the organization, his identity
certificate will be revoked, causing all his attributes to be invalidated. This “nuclear option”
aside, the issue of revoking individual attributes is rife with concerns.
Given the plethora of certificates that we expect to be issued in an ABUSE deployment,
it is possible that maintaining and distributing an up-to-date CRL would quickly become
onerous. This brings us to on-line approaches, which are technically appealing but would
not work when one is reading email offline. Enabling either approach introduces the need
for users to manage revocation, which brings with it a host of new usability questions and
management burden. Leaving revocation out saves us this burden, but it opens up the
possibility that there will be periods of time during which a subject can claim an attribute
that the issuer would like to revoke. Perhaps Alice has issued to Bob an attribute stating
that he works in her office for the month of August. Part way through the month, they
have a falling out and Bob is transferred. In ABUSE, Bob can still bind to his messages
an attribute that states “Alice says that Bob works for me. Alice guarantees this to be
true until 8/31.” It may be possible to limit this risk by providing users with a maximum
possible validity period, but it is unclear whether we can, as system designers, determine
the “right” duration to use. Even if we consider only role-style attributes, we believe that
the correct lifetime would vary drastically across deployments. Our contacts in the financial
industry [28, 114] tell us that retail banks have very stable role assignments (like “teller”),
but that investment banks experience a drastically greater rate of churn. The question of
the “correct” validity period duration has been pondered before; we defer to the designers
of SPKI, who realized that “the answer...comes from risk management. It will probably be
based on expected monetary losses, at least in commercial cases.” [36]
Given this set of tradeoffs, we have chosen to provide a facility for setting a maximum
validity period, but not provide one by default. The file in which administrators specify
suggested validity periods can also specify a maximum period, but it is not required. We
have also not designed the system such that it rules out revocation. It is possible that some
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deployment scenarios would consider it necessary; the “top-level” attributes issued directly
by the organization would be prime candidates for revocation in this case. For this proto-
type, we have chosen to avoid the extra usability and management burdens of revocation.
We propose in Section 10.2 to study the efficacy with which short-lived certificates and
well-chosen suggested validity periods can manage the inevitable risk incurred by users
being able to claim attributes to which they should no longer have a right.
5.5.2 Implementation decisions
As mentioned briefly in Section 5.4, we have chosen to build the ABUSE client prototype
on top of Mozilla Thunderbird. The reason for this is that Mozilla applications support
an extension framework that makes it relatively easy to add functionality. As Thunder-
bird is fully S/MIME compliant, it has much of the functionality that we needed to build
ABUSE. Proxy Certificates are not well supported by Mozilla software, however, so we
use OpenSSL [90] instead for those pieces of functionality. OpenSSL supports PCs with a
few simple configuration tweaks.
As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, we have implemented the central attribute store with
an LDAP database (OpenLDAP [89]). One reason for this choice is that Thunderbird pro-
vides LDAP querying functionality natively; a second is that it supports client-side SSL
authentication.
5.6 Wrapup
In this chapter, we have laid out the architecture and user interface of ABUSE and shown
how it meets the criteria we laid out for a solution to the problem of deciding trust in
unfamiliar email correspondents. The system is expressive, and we discuss in Chapter 9
how it can be used for all of the flows enumerated in Chapter 2. The signals (attributes)
are difficult for an attacker to emit while being easy for legitimate senders to bind to their
outgoing messages. Finally, we have explained how design patterns from the HCISEC
space guided our work. We evaluate the usability of our GUIs in Chapter 7. In the next
chapter, we discuss the iterative, user-focused process that we used to refine the GUI for
attribute presentation, central as it is to the entire ABUSE user experience.
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Chapter 6
Designing the Attribute Presentation UI
All three user interfaces used in ABUSE rely on the ability to present an attribute to the user
in a comprehensible fashion. We sought to optimize the psychological acceptability [103]
of our interface by following an iterative design process [85], focusing at each step on un-
derstanding the flaws in each candidate representation from the user’s point of view. [137]
Our resulting GUI is the result of this process.
6.1 First attempts
When first we proposed ABUSE, we hoped to deploy our system here at Dartmouth in order
to collect data on a large population of users. To facilitate this, our initial designs had us
building ABUSE functionality into BlitzMail, an email client developed at Dartmouth that
enjoys widespread among the student population. One of our early mockups is shown in
Figure 6.1. Assertion chaining is shown using indentation, and the attributes are protected
from mimicry by placing them in a tray-style UI element to the side of the message window.
The names of subjects and issuers are bold, but there is no distinction between familiar and
unfamiliar users. The content of the final assertion in the attribute is expressed clearly,
but non-terminal assertions are somewhat unclear. Issuers do not appear on the same line
as subjects, and the attribute content is place in parentheses next to the subject’s name.
Assertion validity status is indicated by the color of the text representing the assertion
content. Green means valid, and amber would mean that the assertion is outside of its
validity period.
For a variety of reasons, we abandoned our plans to deploy ABUSE here on campus and
were thus no longer tied to the BlitzMail platform. Primarily, the issue is that the Dartmouth
community is too close-knit. Many people, especially faculty and staff, know each other
already. Thus, it is unlikely that users would frequently find themselves in situations where
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Figure 6.1: The initial UI mockup, dating back to when we planned to build ABUSE on top of
Dartmouth’s homegrown email client, BlitzMail. The attributes are in the tray to the right.
ABUSE would help. After abandoning BlitzMail, we chose Mozilla Thunderbird, for the
reasons discussed in Section 5.5.2. The next mockup, used to carry out the experiment
detailed in Chapter 8, is based on this new client platform and shown in Figure 6.2. The
most obvious difference between these two mockups (aside from the change to Thunderbird
from BlitzMail) is the absence of the tray element. This element is not in the Mozilla UI
toolkit, so we had to move to a different display option. Note the precursor of the digital
introductions bar, with a first pass at a UI element that provides in-program help for the user
(the “What is this?” text element). The formatting of attribute content remains unchanged
from the first mockup to this one. At this point, we had already settled on having some
ABUSE GUI element be present in the email message reading window at all times; this
evolved without user input into the digital introductions bar discussed in Section 5.4.1.
Before our power-grid-inspired user study, we performed a number of trial runs to test
out the study interface, protocol and infrastructure. The mock-up we were using at that
time was almost exactly the same as the one shown in Figure 6.2; it lacked only the on-line
help functionality. In addition to smoothing out some issues with the study, we also got
valuable feedback from the pre-testers about the mockup. Pursuant to these discussion, we
developed a number of concerns:
1. Some users initially thought that “Hany Farid (Chair, Computer Science)” meant that
Hany Farid was asserting that someone else was the Chair of Computer Science.
2. Indenting did not reliably convey the notion of chaining; some users initially per-
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Hi, Ms. Witch.
This is a signed message with some attributes on it.
Thanks!
Carol Crawford
Sender Attributes (What is this?)
Cinergy Corp. asserts, via
  Roger Dodger (Dir., Human Resources)
    that
    Carol Crawford is
      Cinergy Employee
Line Overloads
"Carol Crawford" <carolc@cinergy.com>
Sun, 20 Jul 2008 16:05:34 -0400











Figure 6.2: The first mockup based on Mozilla Thunderbird. The tray element is gone, as it is not
available in the Mozilla UI toolkit.
ceived the sequence of assertions as a simple list.
3. Our usage of “asserts, via” sometimes contributed to the perception of the chain as a
list.
4. Users did not naturally mouse-over or click on UI elements about which they were
confused; things needed to “look more clickable.”
5. Multiple attributes placed next to one another caused the UI to become crowded
quickly.
As every pre-tester indicated that they had eventually understood the meaning of the at-
tributes, we felt comfortable going ahead with the study after adding some on-line help.
The feedback they provided, however, sent us back to the drawing board to redesign the
presentation GUI from scratch.
6.2 Getting on the right track
The first decision we made upon returning to the drawing board was that we would not try
to display more than one attribute at a time. We would instead use tabs to allow users to
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flip through a set of attributes. This freed us from the space constraints under which we had
placed ourselves and allowed us to make decisions based solely on which designs tested
best with our small pool of pre-testers.
Remember from Section 5.3.2 that our goals for the presentation of a single attribute
were as follows:
• make the semantics of assertion chaining clear to users,
• highlight the presence of familiar users in a chain of assertions,
• make clear the meaning of expired/not-yet-valid assertions,
We also wanted to provide access to lots of on-line help from this interface; there should
be information about each assertion as well as any information the system has regarding
any of the principals involved in the attribute. The elements providing this access should
look “clickable”, so that users realize they are controls and not simple labels. This thought
process led us to the idea of using the visual cues used by web links; users are quite familiar
with the concept of clicking on things that look like links. So, we will style the names of
familiar principals as links, providing access to information about these individuals when
their names are clicked. We also chose to apply similar styling to the content of each
assertion, meaning to signify that more information (long-form explication, validity period)
would be made available upon clicking.
In addition to making controls appear more clickable, we also wanted a way to make
certain pieces of information more prominent. We settled on the idea of using varying font
sizes to draw the user’s attention to important text. In all of the following prototypes, there
are the three cases in which we choose to enlarge text:
• when a subject or issuer is familiar to the user, we enlarge his name.
• when neither the subject nor issuer is familiar to the user, we enlarge the assertion
content.
• for the last assertion in the chain, we always enlarge the attribute content.
The final assertion in an attribute is the upshot of the whole thing, after all, so it makes
sense to enlarge this no matter what. These decisions, in addition to choosing to stick with
color as a way of representing validity status led us to three initial prototypes, shown in
Figure 6.3, which we sent to our pre-testers. We first asked them to tell us what information
was being represented, and then provided them with the following questions to answer
about each prototype:
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Hany Farid says that Sean Smith is in charge of 045 Sudikoff
Dartmouth College says that Hany Farid is a Chairperson, Computer Science
Sean Smith says that Chris Masone can grant undergrads access to 045
Chris Masone says that Kate Bailey can access 045 (expired)
Hany Farid says that Sean Smith is in charge of 045 Sudikoff
Dartmouth College says that Hany Farid is a Chairperson, Computer Science
Sean Smith says that Chris Masone can grant undergrads access to 045
Chris Masone says that Kate Bailey can access 045 (expired)
Hany Farid says that Sean Smith is in charge of 045 Sudikoff
Dartmouth College says that Hany Farid is a Chairperson, Computer Science
Sean Smith says that Chris Masone can grant undergrads access to 045
Chris Masone says that Kate Bailey can access 045 (expired)
Figure 6.3: Our initial attempts at a revamped prototype. We have moved to a tabular format, to
emphasize that we are expressing a series of transitive statements; “A says B about C, C says D
about E” and so on. We continue to use color to indicate validity status, and have added link-styling
to elements that we wish the users to perceive as clickable.
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1. To what is your attention drawn?
2. Which elements would you click on?
3. What information would you expect to see when you clicked on those elements?
We were surprised that some of the testers reported that they had initially parsed the display
as being organized by columns; this was the first thing we addressed in our next prototype.
In general, though, they perceived the presented attribute as a sequence of transitive state-
ments; “A says B about C, C says D about E” and so on. Our new design had already
out-performed our initial attempts at expressing the semantics of chaining. Thus, we de-
cided to stick with this tabular presentation going forward.
The responses to our questions were fairly uniform across both pre-testers and the first
two prototypes. Few responded well to the third prototype; the over-use of color was
deemed too distracting. “Sean Smith” and “Chris Masone” were the most frequently noted
pieces of information, followed by “can access 045.” The link-style formatting worked
well in one case; users thought that if they clicked on the names, they would get more
information about those people, which is exactly what we hoped to see. However, the
testers indicated to us that we had erred in using the same styling on the attribute content.
They believed, perfectly logically, that clicking on those links would provide insight into
the meaning of the content itself; where 045 Sudikoff is, or what the duties of the Computer
Science Chairperson are. They also expressed confusion as to why there were links of
several different colors; the connection between color and validity status had been lost. In
discussions with the testers, we came to the conclusion that there is actually no real need
to color attributes that are valid; we expect attributes to be valid. We should reserve the use
of color for information to which we wish to call special attention. We realized one last
flaw on our own: using the text “(expired)” to denote an assertion that is outside its validity
period is inaccurate; an assertion may also be not-yet-valid.
From our first round of prototypes, we found several choices that were worth keeping:
• the tabular format (though make sure users scan horizontally and not vertically),
• link-styling on the names of familiar people, and
• yellow/amber coloring on non-valid attributes, as this is an anomalous case.
We also discovered a number of problems that needed to be addressed in the next iteration:
• using too many different colors with different meanings is confusing,
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Sean Smith is in charge of 045 Sudikoff
is a Chairperson, Computer Science
Sean Smith says that Chris Masone can grant undergrads access to 045





Hany Farid says that
Dartmouth College says that Hany Farid
Hany Farid says that Sean Smith is in charge of 045 Sudikoff
Dartmouth College says that Hany Farid is a Chairperson, Computer Science
Sean Smith says that Chris Masone can grant undergrads access to 045
Chris Masone says that Kate Bailey can access 045
Figure 6.4: The second set of designs. Dividing lines between cells are de-emphasized, and a dark
gray background is used to draw attention to the subject and content of the final attribute.
• link-styling on assertion content did not express that the available information would
be about the entirety of the assertion, and
• using the term “expired” is inaccurate and must be changed.
In addition to these changes, we also decided that we wanted to draw more attention to the
subject and content of the final assertion.
6.3 Moving forward
In order to help users parse the tabular format we are using as a set of rows, we de-
emphasized the dividing lines between elements, as shown in both designs in Figure 6.4.
Furthermore, we need to come up with a new way to express to the user that extra in-
formation is available about each assertion—and show them where to click to see that
information. In the second set of prototypes, we have added a fourth column to the table;
one design places a button in each row with the label “details”, while the other uses an icon
that is reminiscent of an information bubble. We have also gotten rid of the coloring on
valid assertions; as we said above, this is what we expect to happen. Having more content
in black makes the amber text of invalid assertions and the blue of familiar principals pop
out more. In the interest of clearing out extraneous text and making error cases more visu-
ally noteworthy, we have replaced “(expired)” with a standard warning icon. The detailed
validity information can be accessed by mousing over or clicking on this warning icon. As
Garfinkel recommended, we chose iconography consistent with that used elsewhere; in ret-
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rospect, we should have done the same when trying to choose an icon for our information
button. We did eventually, but not until our final prototype, the one discussed in Chapter 5.
In addition to making the above changes in an attempt to address the flaws our testers
found in the first set of prototypes, we also added a dark gray background to the cells
containing the subject and content of the final assertion in the attribute. The idea is to call
extra attention to this, the most pertinent part of the attribute. We also bolded the names of
unfamiliar subjects and issuers, to distinguish their names from the boilerplate text.
We selected a new set of pre-testers and sent them our new prototypes, with the same
questions we asked the first group. Again, some indicated that they initially parsed the
tabular layout as being a set of columns before reading the text and understanding the
presented information. This group noted that their attention was drawn to the familiar
principals and to the invalid attribute, though they did not use this terminology. They
pointed out that the bottom row appeared to be important, and also said that they noticed
the “Chairperson, Computer Science” assertion; clearing out the extra color and link-styling
seems to have helped make that information more noticeable, which is what we wanted to
see. This group indicated that they would also click on the link-styled text; they added that
they would click on the “details” button, but did not recognize the information bubble icon
as something that would be worth clicking on. Again, the pre-testers seemed to believe that
the information button would provide further detail about the assertion content directly to
its left. No one reacted positively to the bolding of sender and issuer names. From this
iteration, we determined to keep the following features:
• valid attributes are written in black and are not link-styled,
• dark gray background in the final assertion,
• big text on assertions without familiar principals, and
• common warning iconography.
We decided to drop the bolded text (as it made no difference), make the table appear still
more row-oriented, and continue our search for a better “more information” button.
6.4 The final steps
In our third design, we nearly obliterate the cell dividing lines within rows. After this
change, our third group of testers all to perceived the attribute in a row-wise fashion. We
had also added a downwards triangle to the end of the row, trying to ape the appearance of
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Hany Farid says that Sean Smith is in charge of 045 Sudikoff
Dartmouth College says that Hany Farid is a Chairperson, Computer Science
Sean Smith says that Chris Masone can grant undergrads access to 045
Chris Masone says that Kate Bailey can access 045
Figure 6.5: The penultimate design. Dividing lines between cells within a row are almost wholly
erased, and we make another attempt at finding the right “more information” icon.
Hany Farid says that Sean Smith is in charge of 045 Sudikoff
Dartmouth College says that Hany Farid is a Chairperson, Computer Science
Sean Smith says that Chris Masone can grant undergrads access to 045
Chris Masone says that Kate Bailey can access 045
Figure 6.6: The final design, which we discussed at length in Section 5.4.1.
drop-down menus and express to the user that more information would be available upon
clicking. This, once again, did not work. The third group agreed with their predeces-
sors about what appeared important and what seemed clickable. In response, we explored
a number of GUIs in search of consensus on a kind of icon to use for this purpose—
something we should have done in the first place. We discovered that many used a stylized
letter “i” in a blue circle; putting this in our GUI seems to have given us the results we
desire. We have already discussed the final design at length in Section 5.4.1.
6.5 Wrapping up
In this chapter, we have described our application of a user-centric, iterative design process
to develop the GUI most central to the use of ABUSE. We now move on to analyze our
user interfaces using Cranor’s Human-in-the-Loop framework [21], a tool used to evaluate




We have already discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 the ways in which we designed the
ABUSE architecture and user interfaces according to principles laid out by the HCISEC
community. Now, to analyze our work, we turn to another tool provided by usable security
research: Cranor’s human-in-the-loop framework.
7.1 Reasoning about the human in the loop
While it may seem ideal to automate every security-critical function in every piece of soft-
ware, this is sometimes simply infeasible—or even undesirable. [34,41] There exist tasks at
which humans are simply better (noting “suspicious behavior”, for example), and at other
times decisions rely on a level of human context that is difficult to capture and encode.
Since we are left with no choice but to rely on humans for some security-critical decisions,
Cranor advances her framework as a way to “systematically analyze the human role in a
secure system to identify potential failure modes and find ways to reduce the likelihood
of failure.” [21] Built on top of a simple communication-processing framework borrowed
from warnings science literature, Cranor’s framework is centered on the idea that the secure
system is attempting to send a communication to a non-malicious human receiver in order
to trigger some behavior. These communications could be in the form of a status icon, a
training manual, a configuration wizard, security policies, notification dialogs, or anything
else that can be considered as some component of a system attempting to convey security
information to a user. A number of factors can influence the communication-to-behavior
pathway, at a variety of points in the process. Cranor’s framework describes a number of
stages that make up the reception and processing of a communication by a receiver and
discusses them individually, noting pitfalls and considerations for each. It is possible that






































Figure 7.1: Slightly modified diagram of Cranor’s human-in-the-loop framework. We have rede-
fined the components of the “communication impediments” stage. Adapted from [21].
eral different stages. Using this framework to discuss ABUSE provides ample opportunity
for confusion, since ABUSE is a tool for facilitating communication between people. In
Cranor’s terminology, ABUSE would be said to be ”communicating” to a human receiver
about a communication (email) that he’s received from some other human being. To alle-
viate this problem, we refer throughout this chapter to information sent from one human
to another as messages, while any signals provided by ABUSE for the consumption of a
human will be referred to as communication.
An overview of each stage in Cranor’s framework and its attendant issues follows. The
material presented here is paraphrased from Cranor’s original paper on the framework [21],




The first thing to consider in our analysis is the communication itself. Cranor breaks the
space of possible communication types into several categories:
• Status Indicators - express a small set of possible states (e.g. an SSL lock icon)
• Notice - for expressing a richer set of characteristics (e.g. SSL certificate or privacy
policy)
• Warning - an alert requiring immediate action (these should be a last resort)
• Training - communication used to convey and promote retention of information (e.g.
teaching wizards)
• Policy - a policy statement, perhaps as a part of a training regimen
Communications can also range from fully passive (in no way interrupts the receiver’s
workflow) to fully active (the receiver cannot do anything until he performs the action
demanded by the communication).
The system designer must weigh a number of factors when deciding on what kind of
communication to use, and where to place it on the passive–active spectrum. Severity of
the threat, expected frequency of threat conditions, and the complexity of the user action
required to avoid danger all come into play.
Impediments
Cranor classifies any factors that could negatively impact the receiver’s ability to perceive
a communication as impediments. She breaks these impediments into two categories: envi-
ronmental stimuli that may divert the receiver’s attention from the communication whole-
sale and interference which may obscure the communication in some fashion. Interference
may be intentional or coincidental (environmental stimuli can cause interference as well),
but the idea is that the receiver has missed some part of the communication. We consider
this distinction to be somewhat awkward, as environmental stimuli can be discussed in both
categories. Instead, we posit malicious versus incidental impediments as a more useful dis-
tinction. Adversarial behavior that in any way impedes reception of the communication as
the sender intends would fall into the former category. Any other stimulus (other tasks,
other communications, ambient noise or light, etc.) or technological failure not caused by
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an adversary that obscures or prevents reception of the communication falls into the latter.
Malicious impediments are the kind that are commonly considered in security literature:
whether the system can be made to lie, can be spoofed so that it appears to lie or mislead,
can be manipulated to provide enough false positives or negatives that the user ceases to
trust it, or can be in some way obscured or removed from the receiver’s experience. Inci-
dental impediments raise a similar set of questions, but rather than looking for malicious
input that may trigger these behaviors, the designer must consider a wider set of factors.
For instance, when designing an active warning for a system in a steel plant, the designer
must keep in mind that audio notification is likely to be obscured. If the receiver is required
to field multiple communications per minute, a passive status indicator is likely to be over-
looked. That said, if the designer chooses to use an active communication, the system had
better be correct—otherwise the user will ignore, work around, or disable it in order to get
her job done. [118, 125]
7.1.2 The Human Receiver
Once the communication gets to the receiver, there are two classes of considerations with
which a system designer must be concerned:
• factors involved in the actual reception and processing of the incoming communica-
tion, and
• characteristics of the receiver that can color his ability to process and act on the
communication.
Communication delivery, communication processing, and application make up the first
group, while the latter consists of personal variables, intentions and capabilities.
Communication Delivery
The delivery of a communication consists of two steps, attention switch and attention main-
tenance. First, the communication must attract the receiver’s attention and then keep his
focus long enough to be understood. Both of these steps can obviously be impacted by the
impediments of Section 7.1.1, but they are also vulnerable to habituation, the tendency for
users to pay less attention to stimuli they experience frequently. The color, font, size, mo-
tion, sound and other characteristics of the communication come into play here, though the
desire to increase the odds of delivery must be balanced against the potential for annoying
the receiver—the impact of which is addressed in Section 7.1.2. It has traditionally been
easy to overlook a failed delivery as a source of design error; after all, the communication
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was sent as the system architect intended. The successful sending of a communication does
not mean that it was successfully received, however. [27, 31, 124]
Communication Processing
Communication processing can only happen provided that attention maintenance has been
achieved. The receiver must focus on the communication long enough to consume the
content, and then actually be able to understand it. This is a tremendous challenge for
security software, as evidenced by users’ difficulties with browser security warnings and
indicators [31, 44], as well as our own experiences here at Dartmouth transitioning users
to the PKI-authenticated secure wireless network. After comprehension, the receiver must
also be able to figure out what to do in response to the communication, which may need
to happen over time or with the help of training. Cranor refers to this second stage as
knowledge acquisition.
Application
If a communication is not present in all cases in which it may be applicable (like training
or a policy), the receiver will need to both recognize when the communication would be
relevant, and then remember it and figure out how to apply it. Cranor calls these knowledge
retention and knowledge transfer, respectively. Consider a training dialog that discusses
the meaning of an SSL lock icon in a web browser. This training communication will not
be present every time the user navigates to an SSL-secured web page, and thus she must
realize that the training is relevant in this case, remember the meanings of the various icon
states, and decide how to behave based on what she sees.
Personal Variables, Intentions and Capabilities
These three groups of factors are all internal to the receiver. There is some overlap among
them, so we address them as a group. Personal variables include the receiver’s age, gender,
education, culture, occupation, and so on. All of these factors can play into the receiver’s
comprehension of an incoming communication. As ABUSE is part of an email system,
no real assumptions can be made about personal variables. Since it is designed for use in-
side organizations, we can assume that receivers will have some knowledge and experience
relevant to interpreting the content of attributes, but not to interpreting ABUSE communi-
cations as a whole. For example, deploying ABUSE in a power company would allow us
to make some useful assumptions about the occupation of users in that deployment, but we
104
cannot make these assumptions when analyzing ABUSE in the general case. Thus, we do
not consider personal variables elsewhere in this discussion.
Even assuming that a receiver has taken in, processed and understood a communication,
designers must still consider his intentions. He might choose to ignore a communication,
guided by his attitudes and beliefs as well as his motivation. There are a variety of attitudes
and beliefs that might impact this decision. Among other things, the receiver might:
• be annoyed by a communication,
• not trust the communication,
• feel as though he cannot complete a recommended action,
• feel as though recommended actions do not help, or
• believe that the action will take too long. [13]
Many factors can influence these attitudes and beliefs, not the least of which is prior experi-
ence with the system. Motivation deals with the incentives the receiver has to comply with
the communication. Since the right “security behavior” often distracts from the receiver’s
task at hand [125, 126], motivation can be difficult to provide. Research is actively being
done in this area (Section 4.3.1), and goes beyond the scope of ABUSE.
Lastly, the designer must consider whether the receiver has the proper capabilities to
perform an action recommended by a security communication. Even assuming he decides
to exhibit the proper behavior, it remains possible that the system may not enable him to do
so.
7.1.3 Behavior
The ultimate goal of a communication is to elicit a desired behavior. There is already a body
of work examining what can go wrong between a receiver deciding to behave in the desired
way and correctly achieving his goal. A Gulf of Execution can exist, between the user’s
intentions to do something and the mechanisms provided by the system to help him. [85]
A user may also achieve the desired outcome, but be unable to determine that he did so—a
Gulf of Evaluation. [85] Users may make mistakes (plans that will not achieve the desired
goal), lapses (skipping a required step), and slips (performing an action incorrectly). [97]
Having explained Cranor’s framework in full, we now move on to analyze the three
ABUSE GUIs introduced in Section 5.4.
105
Figure 7.2: The attribute presentation GUI at its most passive. The digital introductions bar is a
neutral color and the attribute pane is minimized by default.
7.2 Human in the loop analysis: ABUSE presentation GUI
ABUSE relies on the human in the loop to look at attributes bound to an incoming message—
if any—and decide whether or not to take whatever action is requested in the message body.
If he decides that the attributes do not lead him to trust the message, he ignores it.
7.2.1 Communication Type
The ABUSE presentation GUI is, in Cranor’s nomenclature, a passive security notice. The
system scales the passivity of attribute presentation according to the familiarity of the mes-
sage sender and the presence/familiarity of attributes. We discuss familiarity metrics back
in Section 5.2.6 and present the entire range of GUI behaviors in Table 5.3. The presumed
common-case behavior (familiar sender with familiar attributes) is shown in Figure 7.2.
This is the most passive version of the presentation GUI; the digital introductions bar is a
neutral color, and the attribute pane is minimized when the message is opened. The least
passive version, displayed when an unfamiliar sender binds no attributes to her message, is
shown in Figure 7.3.
Since the common case is that the user doesn’t really need ABUSE’s help, making the
presentation GUI indicator passive makes the most sense. Furthermore, given that ABUSE
is never able to determine with certitude that a user should ignore a given message, it would
be inappropriate to interrupt the user’s primary task of reading email. Moving toward the
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Figure 7.3: The attribute presentation GUI at its least passive. The digital introductions bar is
amber and the attribute pane is open by default, displaying an alert message in red text. The message
depicted in this screenshot is from the user study detailed in Chapter 9, the basic elements of which
are drawn from prior secure email usability research.
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active end of the spectrum in cases where ABUSE is more likely to be useful is a good way
to increase the likelihood a user will notice the extra information when it matters, but avoid
habituating them to the presence of ABUSE communications.
7.2.2 Communication impediments
Malicious impediments
Often, when a security indicator does not apply, it is simply not present. For example,
when most modern web browsers receive a web page over an SSL-encrypted channel, they
display a security indicator of some kind. When they download a page over plain HTTP,
they do not display an alternate “insecure” indicator. Instead, those security indicators
are simply absent. This allows an attacker to put expected “security” indicators (e.g., a
lock icon) into the content presented to the receiver somehow, and can often trick the un-
wary. [32,129] A similar situation exists with S/MIME signature indictors in email clients.
Normally, unsigned messages simply lack the “digitally signed” indicator, as opposed to
having some kind of “unsigned” indicator. ABUSE avoids falling prey to this issue by
having an ABUSE indicator always present in the chrome of the messaging client, though
it is made unobtrusive when it is unlikely to be useful to the receiver. If concerns about
the spoofability of the ABUSE chrome persist upon further evaluation, one could certainly
apply one of the known methods of providing users with a trustworthy way to distinguish
content provided by their system from content provided by a remote party. [26, 129]
Incidental impediments
ABUSE communicates attribute presence with a passive status indicator at the moment
that a message is viewed by the human receiver. Thus, other passive or active indicators
appearing at that moment might distract the user from the presence of a communication
from ABUSE. Much of that is beyond the system’s control. One avenue that we have
chosen to mitigate this problem is to de-emphasize or remove ABUSE communication in
situations where it is unlikely to be useful or necessary, as discussed earlier. Keep in mind
that the user’s primary task is to read their incoming messages and, if a request is being
made of them, to service that request. ABUSE does not interrupt this task and, by remain-
ing unobtrusive when it is unlikely to be needed, can optimize its impact in situations when
it should be heeded, despite being passive. Another avenue that could be explored is mak-
ing an attempt to integrate ABUSE more tightly with the Mozilla Thunderbird, the email
client upon which we have built our prototype. For instance, Thunderbird has a built-in
method of communicating to the user that it believes a message to be “Junk”. Presumably,
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the designers have taken steps to help the reception of this communication of junk status;
ABUSE could potentially take advantage of this by communicating in a similar fashion.
7.2.3 The human receiver
Attitudes and beliefs
As per Section 7.1.2, the receiver’s prior experience with a communication influences her
perception of it. If ABUSE communications frequently make the receiver suspicious of
messages that he eventually deems trustworthy, he will be more likely to discount ABUSE
notices in the future. In addition, frequent distractions from the primary task (reading
email) could lead to frustration and create a negative attitudes towards the system. [125]
ABUSE mitigates the latter problem by scaling its passivity as discussed in Section 7.2.1.
As for the former, ABUSE never makes a behavioral recommendation to the receiver; the
system never tells the user what to do. If senders frequently bind irrelevant or misleading
attributes to messages the receiver winds up deciding are trustworthy, this could negatively
impact the receiver’s attitude towards ABUSE. This could be ameliorated by educating
senders about how to choose attributes appropriate to their message.
Motivation
Motivation is intimately tied to the receiver’s primary task. Naively, in the case of the
presentation GUI, this is always “reading messages”, but the real issue is what the receiver
is then bidden to do by that message. The potential risks of the action requested by the
message vary widely across domains. As related in Section 1.2.3, users have a bad track
record when it comes to being motivated to be skeptical of incoming email. To recap,
interviews conducted here at Dartmouth with a selection of staffers indicate that average
users will do one of two things when confronted with a message from someone they do not
know: if the request is sufficiently sensitive, they will consult some out-of-band resources
to verify that the sender and/or message are legitimate; otherwise, the user will just assume
that everything is fine and satisfy the request. Similar behavior can be seen in the phone
transcripts from the 2003 blackout. “Sufficiently sensitive” is, of course, subjective and
varies across domains. ABUSE allows senders to move some of these out-of-band checks
in-band. The level of effort required to check on legitimate senders is lowered, and thus the
bar for ”sufficiently sensitive” should be similarly lowered.
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Capabilities
The receiver in an ABUSE-enhanced system is always making a choice between acting on
a message and ignoring that message. Any human always has the capability to make this
choice. Whether they can actually usefully act upon the message in question is addressed
in Section 7.2.4, and is immaterial for this portion of the analysis. The decision is whether
to act or not; the receiver is always capable of making this choice.
Communication Delivery
The first goal of a security communication is to get the receiver to notice it. In addition
to potential impediments discussed in Section 7.2.2, habituation is also a big hurdle here.
ABUSE’s strategy for avoiding these issues has been mentioned already (Section 7.2.1).
The next step is getting the receiver to focus on the notice long enough to understand the
message being conveyed. Active notices can attempt to force the receiver to do so, but
this can cause problems in other areas (negative attitude towards the system, habituation,
etc.). The ideal way to explore whether ABUSE is effective in this dimension would be to
deploy it and see what happens. As this is infeasible, we performed a pair of user studies
to explore the efficacy of the ABUSE approach. The results of our first study, detailed in
Chapter 8, suggest that users do pay attention to ABUSE attributes long enough to take in
their content.
Communication Processing
The process by which we designed the presentation GUI was focused on coming up with a
comprehensible representation of an attribute. The discussion in Chapter 6 supports our de-
cision to go with a tabular format, familiar iconography to denote assertions that are outside
of their validity period, and link-styling to indicate the names of familiar principals. We
also provide on-line help to allow users to investigate attributes (detailed in Section 5.4.1)
and to remind themselves of the purpose of the presentation GUI (Figure 7.4).
The ideal way to explore whether receivers comprehend ABUSE attribute presentation
communications would be to deploy the system. Since we cannot do that, the user study
detailed in Chapter 9 seeks to confirm that users of ABUSE-enhanced email clients effec-
tively use communications from the system to understand the meaning of attributes bound
to incoming messages.
The issue of knowledge acquisition is difficult to discuss with respect to ABUSE. There
is no simple mapping between a set of attributes with a particular status and the correct
action. The message plays a large role in the determination of the right thing to do, as
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When a message is selected, this bar informs you of the status of any
“Digital Introductions” bound to the message.
Digital Introductions allow email senders to inform you of the ways in
which they are connected to people you already know, or to your home
organization.
If you are unsure whether to trust this message, use the information in the
pane below (click the bar to maximize it, if it is closed) to help you decide.
Figure 7.4: A piece of on-line help available from within the presentation GUI. Clicking on the link
shown opens a dialog containing the message shown above.
does the specific content of the attributes. It is possible that one message with a single
expired attribute would be trustworthy, while a second should be ignored. A pre-training
step (perhaps Whitten’s safe-staging [126]) could help address this if it turns out to be
a problem. The ABUSE system does provide mouse-overs that explain new notices and
status indicators when they appear.
Application
ABUSE helps the receiver recognize times when communications from the system will be
applicable by making itself more prominent in appropriate situations. We have attempted to
ameliorate knowledge retention issues by choosing symbols that are familiar and providing
informational mouse-overs at all times. We have no training phase, though we would ex-
pect ABUSE communications to become more immediately comprehensible with greater
familiarity.
7.2.4 Behavior
The receiver’s behavior as a result of communications from the presentation GUI is to either
choose to act on a message, or to ignore it. This decision is the behavior with which we are
concerned.
The results in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 show that users understand communications
from ABUSE and that they do make more accurate trust decisions when armed with our
system.
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7.3 Human in the loop analysis: the other GUIs
As we discuss in Section 5.4.2 and Section 5.4.3, the other GUIs in ABUSE rely heavily on
the presentation GUI analyzed above. The vast majority of security information commu-
nicated during either the attribute selection or issuance process is in the form of attributes.
In the selection UI, as a matter of fact, there are no security communications at all out-
side of attribute information—which is handled by an instance of the presentation GUI. In
the issuance GUI, suggested assertion values and expiration dates can be seen as security
policies being communicated to the user. We treat them as such and discuss them here.
7.3.1 Communication type
The suggested values are passive policies. The receiver is meant to understand that the
organization would prefer for them to choose one of pre-defined options. Especially in the
case of recommended assertion values, there is a slippery slope here towards the creation of
a “policy kit” approach that overwhelms users with choice. Domain-specific studies would
need to be completed in order to determine how many suggestions make sense, and new




We do not consider the case in which adversary-controllable content is active during the
attribute issuance process.
Incidental impediments
The ABUSE issuance GUI appears as a modal dialog; Thunderbird cannot take control
from the GUI, and so the only concerns in this space arise from factors outside the applica-
tion, over which ABUSE has no control
7.3.3 The human receiver
Attitudes, beliefs and motivation
It is difficult to judge these aspects of the receiver’s mindset without real-world information.
User studies that try to get at these questions would be of limited utility; these factors
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develop over time. We do know that users are overwhelmed by overly complicated policies
and too much choice [1, 47], and so we believe that more than a small number of options
would be ill-advised.
Capabilities
A user could certainly use a small number of well-chosen suggestions to issue an attribute
that expires within a timeframe condoned by the policy. Again, too much choice here would
likely be paralyzing.
Communication Delivery
If the set of options does not change frequently, the receiver needs only to notice when
modifications to the policy are made. An icon indicating new content could easily attract
the attention of the user in this case. A constantly changing set of dates or assertion options
would likely quickly cause habituation, and so this is recommended against.
Communication Processing
Future researchers could conduct user studies (proposed in Section 10.3) in order to explore
how well receivers responded to pre-defined assertions and expiration dates.
Application
As the communication is present at all times during attribute issuance, we are not concerned
with the receiver’s ability to apply these policies. If they are not overwhelmed by choice,
they should be able to use the suggestions without difficulty. This expectation can be be
supported by studies such as those discussed in Section 10.3.
7.3.4 Behavior
The desired behavior here is the issuance of attributes that use suggested values when
deemed appropriate by the human receiver. With only a small set of suggestions, this
should be easily achieved. Verification of this belief can be acquired by real-world deploy-
ment or by user studies.
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7.4 Conclusion
According to Cranor’s framework, the ABUSE attribute presentation GUI should effec-
tively allow users to understand attributes and use them to make decisions. The attribute
issuance GUI can, in a sense, communicate a security policy to users as well; as long at this
“policy” is kept simple, we believe that Cranor’s framework indicates that users should be
able to comply.
In this chapter, we have demonstrated consideration of all the usability issues that gave
rise to Cranor’s work and made reasonable decisions about the ways in which the GUI
should address them. We performed a pair of user studies in order to validate the choices
we made, and we now move on to discuss them.
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Chapter 8
Evaluation: ABUSE in Power Grid
Scenarios
We performed a pair of user studies in order to gather in support of ABUSE. The first study,
which used task setups drawn directly from the August 2003 blackout [88], was designed
to compare users’ ability to make trust judgments when equipped with ABUSE-enhanced
email versus their ability to do so when equipped only with current email technologies. We
hoped to verify two hypotheses during this comparison:
1. ABUSE enables users to identify trustworthy messages from unfamiliar third parties,
and
2. ABUSE users do not exhibit a significantly higher rate of false positives during trust-
worthy message identification.
We define “trustworthy messages” in this case to be those whose attributes indicate that it is
reasonable to believe that the sender has the authority to request the stated course of action.
If subjects in the group using ABUSE-enhanced mail were no more able to distinguish the
trustworthy messages presented in the study than were the rest of the subjects, this would be
evidence that ABUSE is not functioning as intended. If, however, the subjects were more
able to pick out the trustworthy message, this could indicate that ABUSE enables users to
migrate their trust-building strategies from real life into the world of digital communication.
The second point would then become the crux of the matter: if subjects treated the mere
presence of ABUSE attributes as an indication that a message was trustworthy, then any
perceived improvement in their ability to pick out the good messages from the bad should
be dismissed as noise. Subjects would be treating attributes as a binary security indicator;
the mere presence of attributes would be leading them to trust messages. However, if they
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were no more likely to trust attack messages than their peers, but were more readily able
to identify the actual trustworthy messages, then it would be clear that ABUSE is actually
helpful.
8.1 Methodology
Risk and trust go hand in hand. ABUSE seeks to provide users with better context for mak-
ing risky decisions than S/MIME and plaintext email. Setting plaintext against S/MIME
against ABUSE, however, is not an entirely fair comparison. ABUSE includes extra con-
textual information that the others do not. Currently, users may resort to out-of-band chan-
nels to get this extra context. To more fairly compare these pre-existing technologies to
ABUSE, it is necessary to simulate for subjects the ability to consult those extra sources
of information. Framed in terms of risk, subjects had to want to make a choice based on
only what was presented in the email in front of them, but still be able to fall back on other
sources of information if they decided the risk was too great. Thus, the metric for com-
parison becomes not simply whether subjects can make the right decision more often with
ABUSE over other technologies, but rather whether subjects armed with ABUSE make the
right trust decisions without resorting to out of band channels more often than subjects
using plaintext email or S/MIME. More precisely, the questions are these:
Can subjects armed with ABUSE identify trustworthy messages from unfa-
miliar third parties without resorting to out-of-band channels with greater fre-
quency than other subjects? Does the same group erroneously identify untrust-
worthy messages as trustworthy more often than subjects using S/MIME or
plaintext email?
Consulting out-of-band channels causes delay, which users in time-sensitive situations (like
crises in the grid) may not be able to afford. Indeed there may be cases in which these
channels are not even available. Moreover, as we discussed in Section 1.2.1, we know that
users have a tendency to assume that messages are trustworthy and reliable when getting
additional confirmation for the request is too difficult. ABUSE seeks to remove the extra
barriers, making it easier for users to make an appropriately informed decision.
To answer the questions posed above, we needed to put subjects in situations in which
they needed to trust messages from unfamiliar third parties in order to complete a task, and
also had reason to worry about getting fooled by untrustworthy messages—but were not so
afraid of getting tricked that they would invariably seek the reassurance of traditional trust-
building methods (i.e. contacting some trusted individual with knowledge of the situation).
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We accomplished this by creating the incentive structure detailed in Section 8.1.1.
Armed with this reasoning, we chose to use scenarios lifted from the August 2003
blackout for this study. An emergency in the power grid (a contingency in the parlance of
the industry) is clearly a high-stakes situation and, as we discussed in Section 1.2.2, the
people working to keep the system under control frequently have to trust people that they
have not encountered before. Furthermore, they use informal methods to build that trust.
They currently either leverage human connections by making phone calls to people they
do know [88, pp. 56–58], or they assume that anyone who knows the right phone numbers
to call and can “talk the talk” is worthy of at least a measure of trust. [30] These operators
know that, when a contingency arises, the more quickly it can be mitigated the better—and
that doing nothing can sometimes be just as bad as doing the wrong thing [88, pp. 480–
484]. However, the conversations in the phone transcripts indicated that the operators were
simultaneously hesitant to act unless they felt confident in the decision they were making—
or, at least, confident that someone with the appropriate authority was ordering the action
they were about to take [88, pp. 236–238]. So, in these power grid scenarios, operators
need to trust third parties they do not know in order to do their jobs, but concern over a
variety of factors gives them pause.
Ideally, we would have been able to perform the study on actual grid operators, provide
as much realism as possible, and report the results. However, this was infeasible; like
most academic researchers performing these kinds of experiments, our pool of subjects is
mostly limited to college students. Choosing this scenario, therefore, required us to devise
an incentive structure, detailed in Section 8.1.1, that adequately mirrored the tradeoffs faced
by real grid operators while remaining comprehensible to the subjects.
8.1.1 The incentive structure
Devising an incentive structure for this study was challenging for a number of reasons.
First, power companies are disinclined to disclose cases of operator failure, unless there
is a case of “gross (criminal) negligence.” [91] It is therefore difficult to determine what
consequences exist for employees that make bad decisions, since the companies don’t want
to admit that errors occur at all. Second, quantifying the risk of information leakage is an
open question. There could be economic consequences, as the power market can be gamed
using inside information just like many others. There could be collateral damage, if the
information is used to better target a physical attack. In either case, if generation or trans-
mission capacity is lost or disabled accidentally, how much money is lost by being unable
to sell that power? Wholesale power pricing is constantly changing in accordance with
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market conditions. [75] There may have been an outage, or perhaps competing companies
were able to provide coverage. Either way there is some cost. Determining an accurate
model for this is undeniably interesting, but beyond the scope of this research.
For the purposes of this study, the subjects required an incentive structure that would
provide them with a mindset similar to that of a grid operator. So, we set out to collect
anecdotal evidence of potential consequences of operator error and discovered the follow-
ing:
• the obvious outages and/or equipment damage;
• internal reprimand or other disciplinary action;
• an investigation, perhaps by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or
Congress if the scale becomes large enough;
• guilt, leading to nervous breakdowns [107];
• legal trouble, akin to an insider-trading-type scandal; or
• if the grid is under physical attack, leaking status information could expose weak-
nesses in the grid to the adversary. [91, 107]
Based on this and some personal conversations with industry insiders, we determined that
the disincentive for making the wrong decision about a message had to be more highly
negative than the reward for making the right choice was positive. Breaking-even after one
correct choice and one incorrect choice would be unrealistic. So, if r is the incentive to be
right, and w is the penalty for being wrong, we wanted r < w to hold. That said, a subject
who makes a wrong decision should still have the opportunity to be above the break-even
point. We had five tasks for the subjects to perform, so 4r − w needed to be greater than
zero. Furthermore, a subject should not be able to simply make the same choice every time
and come out ahead. As there are three attack scenarios and two trustworthy scenarios,
rejecting every time nets the subject three correct decisions and two incorrect decisions.
Thus, 2w − 3r < 0 needed to hold as well. Setting r = +10 and w = −20 satisfied all
these conditions, and had the added benefit of being easily memorable by the subjects.
As a secondary concern, though, we also wanted to provide a disincentive against delay-
ing a trust decision by consulting out-of-band sources. In real situations, doing so delays
operator action, exposing the grid to more risk. Leaving such a disincentive out of the
study would likely cause subjects to go for the potential extra certainty every time. We





None Phoned someone Checked chart Both
Reject
Trustworthy: −20 Trustworthy: −20 Trustworthy: −20 Trustworthy: −20
Attack: +10 Attack: +8 Attack: +8 Attack: +6
Accept
Trustworthy: +10 Trustworthy: +5 Trustworthy: +7 Trustworthy: +2
Attack: −20 Attack: −20 Attack: −20 Attack: −20
Table 8.1: The incentive structure used in the study, as discussed in Section 8.1.1. Subjects are
rewarded for making correct choices, penalized for delaying in proportion with how problematic
the delay might be, and strongly penalized for making the wrong choices.
an acquaintance for more information and using the company organizational chart to check
for someone’s presence or position. As the former would take more time than the latter in
the real world, it was assigned a stronger disincentive. Pre-tests indicated that the stronger
of the two needed to be half of the potential gain; subjects were never disinclined to “phone
a friend” otherwise.
Finally, we wanted to moderate the disincentive for delaying a decision in the event that
a message turned out to be untrustworthy. Logically, the right thing to do with an attack
message in real life is to ignore it; while the subject is still wasting time, he should not
be penalized as much for delaying a choice to do nothing as for delaying a choice to act.
Taking all this into account, the final structure is presented in Table 8.1.
8.1.2 The protocol
The study employed a between-subjects design to examine whether ABUSE users are better
able to identify trustworthy messages compared to users of other email clients. Subjects
were randomly assigned to one of three groups defined by the type of simulated email client
used during the study: (1) Plaintext, (2) S/MIME (with validly signed messages), and (3)
ABUSE (with signed and cryptographically valid attributes). The pre-study instructions,
the simulated email headers displayed, the bodies of the messages, the task scenarios and
the post-study debriefing were identical across the three groups. We randomized the order
of tasks within each email group to control for order effects; the results could be muddied if
our chosen ordering predisposed users in a given group to make certain types of decisions.
The study was composed of three separate phases: the instruction phase, the task phase
and the debriefing phase. During the instruction phase, each subject was read the same
set of instructions (Figure A.3) while following along in a handout they had been given
(Figure A.4), which contained a bullet-pointed version of the same information they were
hearing orally as well as some diagrams that were helpful in explicating the structure of
the organizations that manage the power grid and their relationships to one another. Read-
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We are investigating a new method of enabling power grid operators to collaborate
in order to maintain North America’s power generation and distribution infrastruc-
ture. You will take the role of a grid operator, and face a series of scenarios that
simulate instability in the grid. Consider each as totally independent; information
presented in one scenario should not impact your decisions in any other. In each
scenario, you will be presented with a message sent to you by a third party that asks
you to perform some action in response to a problem. Though the message will
come from someone you do not know, your task is to decide whether to trust it or
not. If you choose to trust an untrustworthy message (or to ignore a trustworthy
message), there are several negative consequences that could ensue:
• First, part of the grid could collapse, leading to a wide-area blackout. This
could lead to anything from a reprimand for you to a Congressional investiga-
tion of your employer. Additionally, guilt over causing an outage of that scale
has led some operators in your situation to experience a nervous breakdown.
• Second, you could wind up disclosing grid status information, which is uni-
formly regarded as sensitive. Not only would this expose the grid to a targeted
physical attack, but it could also land you in legal trouble.
Figure 8.1: The text read to subjects in order to introduce the study and sensitize them to the
dangers of making mistakes as a grid operator.
ing the instructions to the subjects too approximately four minutes. The purpose of these
instructions was manifold:
• to sensitize the subjects to the risks of making the wrong trust decisions,
• to educate them about the study interface and overall structure,
• to make sure they were capable of interpreting the job titles and roles they would
encounter, and
• to explain the incentive structure used to score the study.
Subjects were not sensitized to the particular kinds of attacks they would be facing, or
to particular “gotchas” inherent in any of the three communication technologies that were
simulated. They were simply told that they would be receiving some messages that were
trustworthy and some that were not. Figure 8.1 provides some detail. After being read the
instructions, the subjects were allowed to start performing the study tasks.
The study was constructed as a game that consisted of a set of five tasks. Having
five tasks allowed us to test each of three interesting attack scenarios while also having
a pair of trustworthy scenarios to help verify that the subjects who correctly identified
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the trustworthy messages didn’t just get lucky. In each scenario, the subject was given a
new persona with a name, email address, social network, and position at some power grid
organization unique to that task scenario. The subject was also presented with a summary of
the status of the portion of the grid over which she exercised control, and told of a problem
that had arisen. Her goal was to help return the grid to stability as soon as possible, but she
was incapable of doing this on her own. The study infrastructure then presented her with a
message that provided her with a strategy that the sender claimed would help mitigate the
contingency. The subject had to decide whether to heed the message right away, reject it out
of hand, or consult out-of-band channels to attempt to get more context for her decision.
These out-of-band channels (the ability to query an acquaintance or consult a company
organizational chart) are provided for two reasons: first, to provide greater verisimilitude;
and second, to enable subjects without the benefit of ABUSE to have a chance to make
the correct trust decisions in all cases. Basing the study incentives upon making correct
trust decisions and then making it impossible for some subjects to “get it right” would be
unethical. After completing the five tasks, the subjects passed into the final phase of the
study.
At the beginning of the debriefing phase, subjects were informed that they had com-
pleted the tasks and told that they would now be asked to review their answers. They were
also reminded that they would not be able to change them; they would only be allowed
to indicate whether or not they, in retrospect, would change the decision they made. In
addition, the subjects were allowed to provide free-form comments about why they were
comfortable with their initial trust decision or not. These comments allowed us to not only
see some very encouraging signs that people were actually reading and using ABUSE at-
tributes in their decision-making process, but also allowed for us to find cases in which a
subject had become confused by the study interface or by some of the power-grid trappings
of the setup. Upon completing this review, subjects were informed of their score, thanked,
paid, and allowed to leave.
8.1.3 Power grid background
In order to discuss the setup of the study, it is necessary to flesh out the power grid intro-
duction we provided in Section 2.2. The subjects received a more extensive primer, seen in
Figure A.3. It is important to note that the organizational relationships we enumerate here
reflect our understanding of the generation and transmission management side of things at
the time of the 2003 blackout. We make no claims about the business relationships among




Figure 8.2: The relationships between MISO, PJM, and their associated operation companies. Note
that MISO and PJM are peer organizations, while the operation companies each have a subordinate
relationship to one of the two.
Power organizations
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, there are two classes of management organizations in the
grid: operations companies that own and operate infrastructure, and Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs) that mediate among them. The subjects encountered two RTOs—
PJM Interconnect, and Midwest ISO (MISO)—as well as a number of operation companies.
These organizations and their relationships to each other are shown in Figure 8.2.
Power jobs
We already introduced a smattering of power grid jobs in Section 2.2.3. We reiterate those
here, and include a few more that we used in this study.
In every scenario in the study, subjects were in the employ of an operation company, so
they were assigned one of the following roles in each of the five scenarios:
• Generator System Operator controls his company’s power generators.
• Transmission System Operator controls her company’s power lines and other trans-
mission infrastructure.
• Reliability Engineer works with Generator and Transmission System Operators at
the company to maintain stability in the portion of the grid over which the company
has control. Interfaces with Reliability Coordinators at RTOs during wider-scale
problems.
Message senders also sometimes claimed one of the jobs above, or they might reference
someone in a superior position like one of the following:



































(b) The structure of an RTO
Figure 8.3: Sample organizational charts for power grid entities
• Reliability Coordinator works with Reliability Engineers at operation companies
and Reliability Coordinators at other RTOs to effect the changes necessary to mitigate
outages and grid instability.
Subjects who saw attributes would be exposed to more job titles, and thus needed to
have a sense of what those people were allowed to do. The text that they saw to explain
these roles can be seen in Figure A.4.
Power problems
The subjects face three different contingencies:
• Loaded Lines - the subject is a Transmission System Operator at IP&L. Due to out-
ages, some lines between substations belonging to the company are heavily loaded.
This information is sensitive, as this knowledge could be used to better target phys-
ical attacks on the power infrastructure. The specter of coordinated physical attacks
was a concern that arose during the 2003 blackout [88, p. 256].
• Tie Lines - the subject is a Reliability Engineer at First Energy. First Energy is
connected to AEP by several tie lines, high-voltage lines that are used to ship power
from one area to another in bulk. Losing all the tie lines between two areas of the
grid cuts off the ability to directly ship power between the two. In this contingency,
some of the tie lines between First Energy and AEP are down and so the remaining
ones are overloaded, though still functional. This case is distinct from the above
because there are actual deactivated transmission lines here, and because the lines
cross organizational boundaries.
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Scenario Contingency Subject role Response
Attack coopetition Tie lines Reliability Engineer at
First Energy
Ignore
Attack role-based Overloaded lines Transmission system
operator at IP&L
Ignore
Attack delegation Over-generation Generation system op-
erator at Cinergy
Ignore
Legitimate coopetition Tie lines Reliability Engineer at
First Energy
Accept
Legitimate delegation Over-generation Generation system op-
erator at Cinergy
Accept
Table 8.2: Summary of the five scenarios faced by the subjects.
• Over-generation - the subject is a Generation System Operator at Cinergy. Al-
legheny is sending too much power into Cinergy’s area from the west. Cinergy’s
east-west transmission lines are thus overloaded. Either Allegheny needs to bring
down their generation, or Cinergy needs to generate less in the west and more in the
east.
8.1.4 The five scenarios
Each task scenario was based on an actual event that occurred during the North American
August 2003 blackout. Some scenarios unfolded over multiple phone conversations, while
some were contained in a single call. In each scenario, we identified the relying party, the
trust source, the trust sink, the authorizer and any intermediaries. The experimental subject
was put in the position of the relying party. The scenarios in which the subjects received
trustworthy messages are actual contingencies that actually occurred, and the action re-
quested by the sender is the strategy that was actually used to mitigate the real problem.
The attributes bound to the message express the same flows of trust that we distilled from
the phone transcripts discussed in Chapter 2. The scenarios in which the subjects received
attack messages were designed to closely ape the trustworthy cases, with contingencies
that were analogous to real problems that arose in the grid. The “mitigation strategy” rec-
ommended by each attack message was designed to seem plausible when evaluated in the
context of its accompanying scenario. [23–25] There were three different kinds of attackers:
1. a completely external attacker,
2. an internal-insider, employed at the same company at which the subject’s persona
worked, and
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3. an external-insider, employed at another power grid organization.
The attackers are individuals without any fellow conspirators on the inside. While two of
the attackers are insiders, neither is a person who has the authority to directly order poten-
tially damaging actions. The insiders carry out their attacks in their own name, behavior
that has been seen in the real world. [112] For the purposes of the study, it was assumed
that there was some kind of power-grid-wide PKI bridge, so that S/MIME signatures from
and attributes granted by people at other power grid organizations would all be verifiable.
This is reasonable, as the aerospace industry [14], the pharmacological industry [102] and
several other groups that must all interact with the federal government regularly already
employ such technology. By the time ABUSE could be deployed, it is certainly plausible
that a bridge could be as well. The external attacker is not able to claim any attributes at all
that chain back to this bridge; he would require an inside conspirator or access to the orga-
nization’s attribute boot-strapping infrastructure. The insiders were assumed to have a set
of attributes that were granted to them by their home organizations and the people working
there. ABUSE does not require senders to bind all their attributes to their messages, so the
attackers were allowed to bind any attributes that they felt would help them mislead the
subjects into trusting them.
The makeup of a single scenario
A single scenario consists of several pieces of information:
• the subject’s identity: name, email address, job, affiliation, social network
• the sender: affiliation (or claimed affiliation), certificate issuer, attributes
• the contingency: what has gone wrong and where
• the message: kind of attack (if any), message text
• out-of-band information: subject’s company organizational chart, information avail-
able from a peer
The five scenarios are detailed in Section A.4 and summarized in Table 8.2. The messages
received in each scenario are paraphrased in Table 8.3 The attackers either eschewed at-
tributes altogether, or included some valid attribute that would not specifically lead to trust,
but might lend more credence to their message (e.g. an “is an employee” attribute from
their company). The trustworthy senders bound attributes to their messages indicating that
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Scenario Content
Attack coopetition The sender claims to be having an issue with her work email,
thus motivating her use of a yahoo.com email address. She
attaches no attributes, though her message is signed—albeit
with a non-grid-company-issued certificate. She claims to be
a transmission systems operator at AEP and tells the subject
that the downed lines are about to come back up, so it is ok
for First Energy to begin drawing more power.
Attack role-based The sender signs his message with a cert from the MISO
CA, and binds an attribute to his message stating that he’s
a MISO employee—which the subject should see as insuffi-
cient to create trust. He claims that something’s gone awry
with his system and he needs the subject to provide him with
information about which lines are currently at risk of failure.
Attack delegation The sender signs her message with a cert from the Cinergy
CA, and binds an attribute to her message indicating that
she’s a Cinergy employee. The subject also works at Cin-
ergy. She claims she’s been working with a Cinergy con-
troller operator and a MISO reliability coordinator to get Al-
legheny to bring down their generation, and asks the subject
to boost generation in the west.
Legitimate coopetition The sender signs his message with a cert from the AEP CA,
and binds attributes from the company saying that he is a
reliability engineer, as well as one through a reliability co-
ordinator at MISO that indicates he is allowed to ask First
Energy to buy power or shed load. He requests that the sub-
ject do so.
Legitimate delegation The sender signs his message with a cert from the MISO
CA, and binds attributes from the organization saying that
he is a reliability coordinator, as well as another rooted at
Cinergy that indicates he is allowed to ask Cinergy to shift
some generation from the west to the east. He requests that
the subject do so.
Table 8.3: Messages received, by scenario
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(a) Screenshot showing how the setup for each scenario was
presented to the subjects.
(b) A graphical representation of grid
status.
Figure 8.4: Two different methods of presenting scenario setup information to subjects.
had been granted permission to request the proposed mitigation by someone with the au-
thority to do so. Subjects who saw ABUSE attributes bound to messages were still allowed
to fall back on the out-of-band channels provided by the study infrastructure, but ideally
they would realize that they did not need to.
8.2 Study infrastructure
The subjects took the study through a web browser (Mozilla Firefox 2). Each scenario
is defined by an XML file. Once the subject inputs his randomly-assigned ID number,
the system generates a random ordering of the five scenarios and parses them one-by-one,
populating a standard GUI each time. After the subject makes his decision, the system
moves to the next scenario in its random ordering. Stepping through the presentation of the
“Legitimate coopetition” scenario will be illustrative. Screenshots of all five scenarios are
shown in Appendix A.
8.2.1 Initial conditions
The subject is first presented with the initial scenario conditions: the details of the subject
persona and the current contingency. In early versions of the study, the grid status and
contingency information was presented graphically using a screenshot of an actual power
grid state estimator [94], a piece of software that is used in real power facilities to visualize
power flows. Though we had trimmed the model used by the estimator down significantly
(only a few busses, generators and loads), pre-test subjects still found this to be overwhelm-
ing. As a result, we swapped this graphical representation for a concise textual explanation








Continue to the next task
Figure 8.5: A screenshot of the interactive portion of the study interface.
who has more experience crafting user studies [106], we believed it would remove a source
of error from our data. At this stage, the subject learns his name, email address, job, re-
sponsibilities and social connections (Figure 8.4).
8.2.2 The message
After having some time to digest the initial setup information, the subject “receives” the
message for this scenario. The links to access out-of-band information are also presented at
this time, as well as the buttons that allow the user to indicate whether they wish to act upon
or disregard the message (Figure 8.5). If the subject is in the S/MIME or ABUSE groups,
the simulated message will have the standard Thunderbird signature indicator present, and
mousing over it will provide the text given to the user in the Thunderbird dialog box that
appears when a user clicks on a signature icon in the real client. Subjects in the ABUSE
group also, obviously, see ABUSE attributes in the simulated message window. We display
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(b) A sample organizational chart from the study.
Figure 8.6: The two out-of-band channels available to subjects in the study.
the attributes using an early mockup of the final attribute presentation GUI. We discussed
the mockup in Section 6.1 and the final design in Section 5.4.1.
8.2.3 Out-of-band information
As mentioned earlier, the subjects were given the opportunity to “contact a friend” or
consult their company organizational chart in an attempt to figure out whether to trust a
message or not. Information was always available by these channels, but subjects were
informed that it may not be useful. In pre-tests, contacting a friend always told the subjects
the right course of action. This trained subjects to always use this information, even though
they lost some points. If they felt it would always work, they were willing to absorb the loss
in exchange for certainty. The test was, therefore, modified. A summary of which pieces
of information were useful in which scenarios is in Table 8.4.
It was challenging to decide how to appropriately simulate the ability to contact a friend.
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coopetition External attacker None No No
Attack
role-based
External-insider Vague but valid Yes No
Attack
delegation Internal-insider Vague but valid No Yes
Legitimate
coopetition Trustworthy Specific permissions Yes No
Legitimate
delegation Trustworthy Specific permissions Yes No
Table 8.4: A summary of which kinds of senders were active in each scenario, and what information
the subject had available to help his trust decision. In the “attack coopetition” scenario, the usage of
a non-company email address should have been enough to indicate that the subject should not act
upon the message.
It may have been nice to allow the subject to contact any of the people in the social network
provided. However, for the purposes of the study, this was pointless; all that mattered was
whether they consulted an out-of-band channel or not. It would also have complicated
the scoring of the study and the study infrastructure. Thus, we decided to allow them to
indicate that they wished to contact an acquaintance, and then the system would provide
for them an instant-messaging-style transcript of a short conversation with a person of
our choosing (Figure 8.6a). A few subjects in a few scenarios indicated that they would
have chosen a different person than the one we provided; however, those scenarios were
designed such that contacting an acquaintance would not be helpful, so it would not have
made a difference in the results.
8.2.4 The review
During the portion of the study in which subjects were allow to review their answers, they
were presented much the same GUI as shown above. Instead of being allowed to access all
the out-of-band channels, they were shown only the information they had chosen to look
at during the study. The purpose of this was not to see what they would have done had
they accessed more information, but to control for whether or not things they saw later in
the study made them reconsider what they did early on. For example, one subject in the
ABUSE group saw an “employee” attribute during an early scenario and thought it was
enough to go on. After seeing the more extensive attributes in later scenarios, the subject
indicated that, in retrospect, “the sender attributes were weak compared to what we saw
later.”
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8.3 Results and discussion
A total of 34 subjects took part in the study, 12 in the ABUSE group and 11 in each of the
others. Details of subject recruitment appear in Section A.1.
Completing the tasks in the study took a mean of 14 minutes, and no subject took more
than 20 minutes to complete the tasks. All subjects completed the debriefing stage and
finished the entire study in thirty minutes or less..
8.3.1 Task comprehension
Based on the comments provided in the followup review, most subjects understood the sce-
narios provided and the tasks which they were to perform. One subject (7641) admitted
being confused about the study setup and infrastructure on the first task he was presented,
but indicated that he understood what was happening on later tasks. That observation was
removed from the sample, as was one observation of the external-insider in the S/MIME
group. In these two cases, the subject’s comments indicated that their choices reflected
only confusion with the mechanics of the study and so the exclusion of the two observa-
tions is warranted. Other than that, the comments indicated that the subjects bought into
the scenario and understood their responsibilities and those of the people around them. En-
couragingly, several subjects in the ABUSE group specifically noted that they were paying
attention to the “sender attributes” bound to the messages they were seeing, in trustworthy
scenarios as well as attack scenarios:
“The sender attributes listed many high-ranking people that support his author-
ity to request this action.” (Subject 1093)
“we used the Sender Attributes to determine that Darren was an appropriate
source of information.” (Subject 1063)
“The sender attributes all seemed valid,” (Subject 1073)
“[The external-insider] had no other people listed under sender attributes to
back up his authority to request information.” (Subject 7603)
Subject 1073 also indicated regret about falling for the internal-insider attack, noting that
“the sender attributes were weak compared to ones we saw later,” so he clearly learned
more about the meaning of ABUSE attributes as he was exposed to more of them. Results
of a second study, performed to dig deeper into questions surrounding user comprehension
of attribute content, are discussed in Chapter 9
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(a) The mean overall level of success rates for
each email type





(b) Overall success, ABUSE vs. all non-ABUSE
user-rounds
Table 8.5: Percent of correct responses to tasks by type of email.
8.3.2 Evaluating ABUSE versus existing technologies
We discovered that subjects using ABUSE are indeed able to identify trustworthy messages
from unfamiliar third parties without needing out-of-band channels significantly more fre-
quently than subjects provided only with S/MIME or plaintext mail. Furthermore, ABUSE
subjects were no more likely than subjects in other groups to fall for attack messages, in-
dicating that ABUSE confers an advantage upon users of the system without making them
any more vulnerable to attacks than users with current technology.
Overall success
Overall success rates are shown in Table 8.5. Success is measured as the percent of all
tasks (n = 5 per subject) that were correctly completed, i.e. the subject acted on trust-
worthy messages and chose to ignore untrustworthy messages. In Table 8.5a, we look at
the performance of subjects in all scenarios across the three email groups. Subjects us-
ing ABUSE were correct 75% of the time, compared to rates of 65% and 60% among
plaintext users and S/MIME users respectively. Statistically comparing the mean percent
correct in each group using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test indicates that there is
no statistically significant difference between the three email groups (F = 1.5, P = .224).
Table 8.5b compares overall success for ABUSE (again, 75%) to success in all non-ABUSE
user-rounds, showing a nearly statistically significant difference considering a p-value of
.10 (F = .266, P = .105). This is nice to see, but it really isn’t actually what we want to
know. We wish to see whether users armed with ABUSE can identify trustworthy messages
without requiring out-of-band help more frequently than users with existing technologies.
Success level by scenario
Next, we examine whether subjects in each email type were correct more or less often de-
pending on scenario type—trustworthy vs. untrustworthy. Table 8.6 shows this analysis.
132










ABUSE 24 92% 67% 36 64% 14%
Plaintext 22 91% 14% 33 48% 18%
S/MIME 22 64% 27% 33 58% 18%
F = 4.24 F = 9.31 F = 0.83 F = 0.15
p = .0186 p = .0003 p = .4405 p = .8605
Table 8.6: Success rates by type of scenario and whether subjects resorted to out-of-band channels
before making a decision. In trustworthy scenarios, a significantly higher percentage of ABUSE
users were correct overall, and correct without help (column in bold). In untrustworthy scenarios,
we see no significant difference in percentage correct across email types, with or without help.
In trustworthy scenarios, a significantly higher percentage of ABUSE users were correct
overall (F = 4.24, P = .019), though additional analysis (a Bonferroni test) shows that
there is no statistical difference between the plaintext and ABUSE email groups. Both,
however, are significantly higher than S/MIME. More importantly, a significantly higher
percentage of ABUSE users were correct without help in trustworthy scenarios (column
in bold) compared to plaintext and S/MIME users. These results support the hypothesis
that ABUSE subjects can correctly identify trustworthy messages without getting help sig-
nificantly more often than either the S/MIME or plaintext subjects. We also see that the
subjects in all three groups were similarly able to resist attacks; there is no significant
difference in percentage correct across email types, with or without help.
To examine the relationship between email type and success level in more depth, we
performed a logistic regression analysis of the likelihood of success in trustworthy sce-
narios, controlling for any positive correlation between subjects seeking help and having
success. We found a significant correlation (p = .033) between using ABUSE and the
correct identification of trustworthy messages without seeking help.
ABUSE in untrustworthy scenarios
One might find it surprising, looking back at Table 8.6, that ABUSE users were no more
successful than others in untrustworthy scenarios, with or without help. In these scenarios,
use of ABUSE does not significantly correlate with willingness to forego help (p = .193).
This implies that subjects in all three groups, when faced with an untrustworthy message,
were similarly likely to resort to out-of-band channels before making their decision. We
believe this can be explained by looking back at the incentive structure shown in Table 8.1.
Recall that the penalty for going out-of-band in situations where the subject suspected that
the message was an attack was quite low. We designed the study to attempt to mimic real
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world costs and benefits; when the subject believes he is being attacked, and the correct
response to an attack is to do nothing, there is little harm in taking extra time to be certain.
Thus, it is likely that the study disincentive was low enough that subjects almost always
sought help when they believed they were being attacked, though we cannot be sure this
is the case. Denying subjects access to out-of-band channels in some cases could have
allowed us to tease out this information, but we were ethically prevented from doing so.
We can, however, say that subjects using ABUSE are no more likely to fall for attacks than
subjects in the other groups, showing that ABUSE exhibits attack resistance as defined
back in Section 1.4.3.
There may have been ways to work around the ethics issue mentioned above. For
example, we could have forced subjects to record a choice before allowing them access to
out-of-band context information. In this way, we could have determined what the subjects
would have done if the “phone” was unavailable or the company directory was down; it is
possible that subjects using with ABUSE might have been more successful when forced
to decide in the absence of out-of-band channels. It is also possible, however, that forcing
subjects to come to a decision before getting the extra context information would have
impacted their behavior on future tasks. Asking subjects to review their answers allowed
us to gather similar information without impacting the subjects’ decision making process.
We review this information in the next section.
Analyzing the “regret” data
In addition to commenting on their decisions at the conclusion of the study, the subjects
were asked which choices they would change, given the chance. They were not provided
with the correct answers at any point. Looking at the regret data for all subjects does not al-
low for any conclusions about messaging technologies; subjects who consulted out-of-band
sources have multiple channels of access to information, all of which may have impacted
their post-facto feelings of certainty about their decision. By taking only the observations
in which subjects did not request out-of-band help (n = 81) and looking at their answers
to the question of regret (Figure 8.7), it is possible to see some trends emerge. Subjects
in all three groups were similarly likely to feel no regret over their choices. However, it is
clear that subjects in the ABUSE group were much more justified in this sentiment; they
were wrong much less often. In both of the other groups, subjects had similar levels of
confidence (no regrets) but were more often wrong.
It is also interesting to note that in rounds in which subjects did not seek help, subjects
in the ABUSE group who felt confident were more likely to have made the right choice.



















Figure 8.7: Regret data among subjects who did not consult out-of-band channels. Comparing the
frequency with which subjects were correct with no regrets, ABUSE comes out significantly better
(F = 3.61, p = .0307).
being confidently correct. This lends credence to the idea, supported by comments from
the review phase, that subjects are reading and understanding the ABUSE attributes. If the
subjects were treating the mere presence of attributes as an indicator that messages were
trustworthy, one would expect to see high levels of confidence regardless of whether they
were right or not. However, while ABUSE subjects regret their decision at a rate similar
to that of subjects in the other groups, the percent of “confidently wrong” subjects is much
lower. At the same time, the percent of subjects in the ABUSE group who are “confidently
right” is much higher. The attributes bound to ABUSE messages allow them to make the
right decisions more often, and feel confident in their choices.
Other interesting results
Looking at the observations in trustworthy scenarios within Table 8.6 again, it is interest-
ing to note that the S/MIME group performed significantly worse when compared to the
plaintext group. This is counterintuitive; S/MIME, when compared to plaintext email, is
supposed to help users better identify messages that are trustworthy! The next column
in the table shows that, when the subjects seek help, the S/MIME group and the plain-
text group perform comparably. The discrepancy in the numbers for the plaintext group
indicates that most of those subjects relied on out-of-band channels for information and
subsequently made the correct decision. The lesser discrepancy in the S/MIME groups
numbers shows that either they are eschewing assistance and getting the decision wrong,
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Figure 8.8: Percentage of S/MIME and plaintext subjects willing to do without out-of-band chan-
nels, per scenario.
subjects in the S/MIME group fell back on out-of-band channels with a similar frequency
in every scenario. The subject in the plaintext group, however, did not. When the penalty
for consulting out-band-channels was higher, the subjects in the latter group became less
willing to go out on a limb. The willingness of the S/MIME subjects to accept risk re-
mained the same despite the differing incentives, leading to more incorrect decisions. This
indicates not only that the presence of S/MIME signals was noticed by the subjects in that
group, but also that some of them seem to have been given a false sense of confidence in
their own decision-making process by the presence of the simulated digital signatures.
8.4 Summary and conclusions
Using scenarios drawn from the August 2003 blackout, we developed a decision-making
game to compare how well users were able to correctly extend trust to third parties they
do not know when equipped with plaintext email, S/MIME and ABUSE-enhanced mail.
We found that subjects equipped with ABUSE were able to identify trustworthy messages
without needing to resort to out-of-band channels significantly more often than subjects
using S/MIME or plaintext email.
We also found that the presence of ABUSE attributes correlated favorably with higher
rates of subjects reporting post-facto confidence in correct trust decisions. In both of the
other groups, subjects were confidently right and confidently wrong with similar frequency.
This provides initial support for the assertion that subjects actually understand what the
attributes bound to ABUSE messages mean.
The study also uncovered a result totally unrelated to ABUSE. Subjects in these power
grid scenarios seemed to miss trustworthy messages more often when equipped with S/MIME
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than with even just plaintext email. This correlated with the increase in penalty for resort-
ing to out-of-band channels in trustworthy scenarios; when subjects had something to lose,
S/MIME made them more willing to go out on a limb. They wound up losing more fre-
quently than the plaintext users who, because they really did not have much to go on, played
it safe, took the help, and took the smaller number of more certain points.
Taking all this together, it seems that the ABUSE approach has promise. Questions
about how much users actually understand about ABUSE attributes abound, however. We




The second user study that we performed to evaluate ABUSE focused on finding qualitative
evidence that users could understand the information conveyed by the ABUSE attribute
presentation GUI. Our hypothesis, then, is as follows:
When presented with an ABUSE-enhanced email, users notice the attributes
bound to the message, process them accurately, and use the information to
make a rational trust decision about the request contained in the message text.
A rational trust decision in this case means a decision that follows logically from the user’s
internal trust policy, given the information she gleaned from the message and its attendant
attributes. Recall from the discussion in Section 3.1.1 that users do indeed have these
internal trust policies; they decide to whom to release private information every day, in a
“nuanced and seamless manner,” constantly refining their thought process, re-categorizing
individuals, and encountering exceptional cases. [1] The challenge for us as we designed
this experiment was to determine how to get users to feel compelled to process attribute
information, run it through their mental trust model, and relate to us their thought process
while coming to a trust decision.
9.1 Experiment overview
As in our power-grid-inspired user study, we sought to provide users with a scenario that
motivated them to make decisions about acting on individual incoming email requests from
people they did not know. This time, however, we wanted to provide a series of related
tasks; in this fashion, we could allow subjects to build at least some semblance of a trust
relationship with the characters in the study and investigate the ability of ABSUE to express
trust flows that involve process-based relationships in some way. We also wanted to make
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sure that we could create messages that would express all of the different trust flows detailed
in Chapter 2. Thus, showing that users could understand the messages in the study would
support the conclusion that ABUSE is sufficiently expressive, according to the definition
of expressiveness that we advanced in Chapter 3.
The subjects again needed a task to focus on outside of deciding email trust; in our ear-
lier study, they were focused on keeping the power grid stable—a task that has important
real-world implications, but with which our subjects were completely unfamiliar. In par-
ticular, the risks of failure were somewhat abstract to kinds of subjects to which we have
access. We addressed this by providing an incentive structure that mimicked the trade-
offs experienced by power grid operators in the field. In this study, we wanted to find a
scenario that was more accessible to our subject base. Following in the footsteps of pre-
vious research into secure email usability [47, 50], we based our study on the trappings
used by Whitten and Tygar in their seminal study of PGP usability “Why Johnny Can’t
Encrypt.” [125] Hence the name of our study: “Abusing Johnny.”
In our study, the subject is placed in the role of a political campaign volunteer who is
charged with maintaining his candidate’s schedule for the next week. This seemed particu-
larly appropriate, as we performed this study in the midst of presidential primary campaign
season. The subject is to update the schedule in response to authorized requests and to
distribute it to other individuals working on the campaign upon request—but no one else.
The main difference here is that previous work by other researchers did not concern itself
with attackers adding events to or removing events from the schedule. This gives us the
opportunity to create a wider range of interesting trustworthy and untrustworthy messages.
Similar to previous work, we introduced the subjects to this scenario, asked them to think
out loud while taking the study, and then took copious notes about their behavior while they
received a series of email messages. We also recorded the emails they sent and received for
later analysis.
In addition to modifying the subject’s task from the original study and Garfinkel’s
follow-on “Johnny 2” [47, 50], we have expanded the campaign scenario used in previous
experiments by adding a wider range of characters with a more diverse set of character-
istics. Our cast is outlined in Table 9.1. The subject and campaign members work for
Senator Oman, one of two fictional Democratic presidential candidates represented in the
study. Every character is in some way affiliated with the Democratic party, though not all
are aligned with a particular campaign. The attackers in our experiment are drawn from
the set of “DNC insiders”, though not every persona on this list attacks every subject. The
particular attackers vary across the subject groups, and we detail this in Section 9.2.4. For





ccord@dnc.org The subjects are told: “You are the Campaign
Coordinator.”
Campaign insiders:
Brian Oman no email The Senator for whose campaign the subject
works.
Maria Page mariap@dnc.org Oman’s Campaign Manager; Subject’s boss.
Paul Schmidt pauls@dnc.org Oman’s Chief Strategist. Can authorize sched-
ule changes.
Ben Donnelly bend@dnc.org Paul’s assistant. Also recruits short-term vol-
unteers at campaign stops.
Dana McIntyre dmi@dnc.org The former Campaign Coordinator. Went on
maternity leave.
DNC insiders:
Hannah Copeland no email Senator Oman’s opponent.
John Oren no email Copeland’s Campaign Manager.
Jane Smith janes@dnc.org John’s assistant.
Bill Brasky billb@gmail.com A former volunteer on the Oman campaign.
George Kontos georgek@gmail.com Varies across groups.
Phoebe Mann no email Varies across groups.
Frank Shemp franks@dnc.org varies across groups.
Paul Schmidt pschmidt@dnc.org A second Paul Schmidt, also employed by the
DNC.
Table 9.1: Abusing Johnny cast of characters. All characters with email addresses actually com-
municate directly with the subject. The others are referenced either in text or in attributes.
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affiliation with the Democratic party to trick the subject into mistakenly modifying or re-
leasing the schedule. Some even have some kind of connection to characters on the list
of “campaign insiders” that they try to leverage. They are all equipped with knowledge of
the campaign personnel, perhaps obtained from the candidate’s website or by some other
sort of social engineering attack. The attackers do not collude with one another, and none
of the legitimate campaign staff are colluding with any of the attackers either. Due to a
variety of circumstances, the other campaign staff are all out of the office; despite it being
the subject’s first day on the job, he is alone at work. Furthermore, one of the attackers has
decided to increase his odds of success by jamming the phone lines at campaign headquar-
ters, denying the subjects use of out-of-band channels for trust-building. Such attacks are
not that difficult to carry out, and have in fact been executed before, in the context of a po-
litical campaign. New Hampshire’s Democratic party was victimized by a phone-jamming
scheme in 2002, designed to interrupt their efforts to get voters to the polling place on
Election Day. [113]
Thus, we have designed an experiment around a scenario that has already been accepted
in the literature as being suitably motivating to cause subjects to buy in and legitimately try
to complete the tasks set before them.
9.2 Methodology
9.2.1 The three subject groups
Like our first experiment, this study employed a between-subjects design. The subjects
were randomly assigned to one of three groups. All three groups saw the same validly-
signed message content sent by the same senders. The first group, who we will call the
control group, saw no ABUSE content. The other two groups, ABUSE-one and ABUSE-
two, saw different sets of ABUSE attributes over the course of the study. For a given
message, subjects would see the same text, signed by the same sender, but in some cases
subjects in ABUSE-one would see different attributes bound to the message than subjects
in ABUSE-two. For one group, the presented attributes would justify taking action on the
message; the other group would see a different set of attributes, which should not lead
them to trust the accompanying message. The exact same message, received under the
exact same circumstances, should be heeded when accompanied by one set of attributes





Welcomes the subject to the campaign, informs him that things are very
busy, and that Dana just left on maternity leave. Adds that some impor-
tant information is forthcoming.
Setup Maria
Page
Provides subject with schedule and task details. Indicates updates
should have go-ahead from either her or Chief Strategist Paul Schmidt.
Says that legitimate campaign staff should be given schedule quickly
upon request. Introduces the opponent (Senator Copeland), and sug-
gests that her people might be actively trying to create a scheduling
snafu for Oman. Signs off saying she tried to set her phone up to ac-




Ben says that Paul has set up new events; asks for them to be added.
Also requests a copy of new, up-to-date schedule.
Table 9.2: The setup messages for the study. These are always received in order and have the same
attributes for subjects in both ABUSE groups. The control group sees these (and all other) messages
with no attributes.
9.2.2 Abusing Johnny message overview
The Abusing Johnny study consisted of ten email messages sent to the subject, who was
playing the role of a Campaign Coordinator on fictional Democratic Senator Oman’s pres-
idential primary campaign. In the scenario presented, the campaign was ramping up for
the Pennsylvania primary election when their former Coordinator had a baby and went on
maternity leave; the subject stepped in for her in the middle of a very busy time. Over
the course of the first three messages, which the subject always received in order, he is
introduced to the campaign, informed of the details of his task, provided with the campaign
schedule, and asked to update the schedule. These three messages are summarized in Ta-
ble 9.2. The attributes bound to all three are the same in both ABUSE groups. The purpose
of these messages is threefold:
• introduce the subject to the task,
• introduce him to Maria (his boss, with whom he shares process-based trust), and
• to present him with some simple trust relationships expressed in ABUSE attributes.
We provide a detailed discussion of the message content and attributes in Section 9.2.3.
After the three setup messages, subjects began the meat of the task. They received
six messages, the order of which was randomized across subjects to control for order ef-
fects as in our previous study. Recall, however, that the attributes bound to some of these







George asks to receive the schedule, saying that Ben recruited him
as a volunteer in Philadelphia.
Consultant Frank
Shemp
Frank, claiming to be a consultant who works for the party, says that
he’s going to be working with the campaign in Pittsburgh. He asks
urgently for the latest version of the schedule.
Coopetition Jane
Smith
Jane is the assistant to Senator Copeland’s Campaign Manager. She
indicates that the Senators are working together on an event, and that





Dana, who the subject replaced, informs the subject of an event that
she was working on setting up before she left. She that this event be





Bill indicates that he was hired as a volunteer by Ben, and complains
that the campaign has failed to communicate well. He asks for the





A Paul Schmidt asks for the schedule. But this is not the Paul
Schmidt who works for Senator Oman!
Table 9.3: The six messages received during the meat of the study.
same attributes in both groups and three that differ. We summarize the content of all six in
Table 9.3 and go through the nine different content/attribute pairings in Section 9.2.3.
The last message the subjects received was a simple wrap-up note from Maria, thanking
them for completing the study and telling them to ask the experimenter for the debriefing
interview form.
9.2.3 Abusing Johnny message details
We provide a detailed discussion of the messages presented to subjects for several reasons.
First, the attributes bound to three of them differ across the two ABUSE groups; it is im-
portant to note these differences. Second, between the three setup messages and the nine
different possible content/attribute combinations in the meat of the study, we have seven
trustworthy messages and five attack messages. Among the seven trustworthy messages,
each kind of trust flow detailed in Chapter 2 is expressed at least once. Thus, showing that
users can understand the attributes on these messages shows that ABUSE is sufficiently
expressive. The other five messages exhibit a selection of possible social engineering at-
tacks that remain possible in ABUSE. We explain these attacks in Table 9.4. Two of these
attacks, the no attribute and vague attribute attacks, were used by the adversaries in our
other study. The adversaries in this study are a bit smarter. Showing that users can rec-
ognize these attacks supports our assertion that ABUSE is attack resistant (as defined in
Chapter 3). In Table 9.5 we go through the messages received by the subjects in the two
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Attack Explanation
Expired attribute The attacker attempts to leverage an expired attribute to earn trust he
does not deserve.
Nonsense chain The attacker binds an attribute whose assertions do not logically fol-
low from one another. Requires collusion on the part of some issuer
in the attribute chain.
No attribute The attacker binds no attributes, trying to convince the subject to
trust him using the message body alone.
Vague attribute The attacker binds a valid, sensical attribute to his message, but not
one that confers authority for the accompanying request.
“John Wilson”1 The attacker’s name is similar to someone in a position of author-
ity. He tries to leverage this to get the subject to trust him. Best
combined with the no-attribute or vague-attribute attacks.
Table 9.4: The kinds of attacks explored in Abusing Johnny.
Message ABUSE-one ABUSE-two
Welcome Process-based trust Process-based trust





New Volunteer Role-sourced arbitrary dele-
gation, Role-based delegation
No attribute
Consultant Nonsense chain Friend-sourced arbitrary delega-
tion
Coopetition Coopetition Vague attribute
Former Worker Non-contemporaneous trust Non-contemporaneous trust
Former Volunteer Expired attribute Expired attribute
“John Wilson” “John Wilson” “John Wilson”
Table 9.5: The kinds of attacks and trust flows expressed by the messages as received by each of
the two ABUSE groups.
ABUSE groups and indicate which are trustworthy and which are attacks. If trustworthy,
we indicate which trust flow(s) they are expressing; if not, we indicate which attack the
message sender is attempting to execute.
Trustworthy messages
Welcome and Setup In both groups, these messages leverage process-based trust that the
subject shares with Maria. He is told beforehand that he knows her.
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Attributes:
Democratic Party says that Brian Oman is a Senator
Brian Oman says that Maria Page is my Campaign Manager
Update In this message, Ben asks the subject to change the schedule on Paul’s behalf.
This is a role-based delegation trust flow, introduced in Section 2.3.2. The subject knows
from the earlier setup messages that Paul is allowed to update the schedule; Ben’s role as
his assistant implies that Ben can relay information on Paul’s behalf. A shared understand-
ing of the relationship between assistants and their busy bosses should exist between Ben
and the subject, causing trust to flow from Paul to Ben. Ben’s request for the schedule
information later in the same message should be heeded due to a simple role-based trust
flow (Section 2.3.1); he works on the campaign, and thus is entitled to ask for the schedule.
Heeding Ben’s requests would indicate that the subjects understood that these trust flows
were active.
Attributes:
Democratic Party says that Brian Oman is a Senator
Brian Oman says that Paul Schmidt is my Chief Strategist
Paul Schmidt says that Ben Donnelly is my Exec. Assistant
Democratic Party says that Brian Oman is a Senator
Brian Oman says that Maria Page is my Campaign Manager
Maria Page says that Ben Donnelly recruits new temporary workers in
Philadelphia
New volunteer, ABUSE-one As shown above, Ben Donnelly possesses an attribute that
was given to him by Maria, indicating that she has granted him the right to designate new
volunteers in Philadelphia. There is a role-sourced arbitrary delegation flow (Section 2.3.2)
from Maria to Ben based on this attribute. In the version of the New Volunteer message
seen by subjects in ABUSE-one, George Kontos leverages this flow, and then also a role-




Democratic Party says that Brian Oman is a Senator
Brian Oman says that Maria Page is my Campaign Manager
Maria Page says that Ben Donnelly recruits new temporary workers in
Philadelphia
Ben Donnelly says that George Kontos is a local campaign coordinator
Consultant, ABUSE-two In the version of the Consultant message seen by subjects in
ABUSE-two, Frank binds to his message two attributes: one indicating that he is a cam-
paign consultant active in Pittsburgh, and one from Maria indicating that he should have
access to information relating to the Oman campaign for the purpose of assisting in events
being run there. Maria, who shares process-based trust with the subject, delegates a subset
of her rights (access to information about Pittsburgh events) to Frank. This is a friend-
sourced arbitrary delegation trust flow (Section 2.3.2).
Attributes:
Democratic Party says that Phoebe Mann is the Pittsburgh Party Chair
Phoebe Mann says that Frank Shemp is a Local Campaign Consultant
Democratic Party says that Brian Oman is a Senator
Brian Oman says that Maria Page is my Campaign Manager
Maria Page says that Frank Shemp is working with us in Pittsburgh
Coopetition, ABUSE-one In the version of the Coopetition message seen by subjects
in ABUSE-one, Jane Smith indicates that the Senators Oman and Copeland are working
together on an event, and that she needs to know Oman’s schedule to set something up.
Jane binds two attributes to her message: one indicating that she is the assistant to Senator
Copeland’s Campaign Manager and one from Maria indicating that she condones Jane’s
request for the schedule in this case. As the subject is pre-disposed to distrust Jane (she




Democratic Party says that Hannah Copeland is a Senator
Hannah Copeland says that John Oren is my Campaign Manager
John Oren says that Jane Smith is my Exec. Assistant
Democratic Party says that Brian Oman is a Senator
Brian Oman says that Maria Page is my Campaign Manager
Maria Page says that John Oren can ask about Oman Harrisburg Schedule
John Oren says that Jane Smith can ask about Oman Harrisburg Schedule
Former worker Dana McIntyre, whom you replaced, informs the subject of an event that
she was working on setting up before she left. She binds to her message her old attribute
from Maria that indicates she was the Campaign Coordinator and asks the subject to add
this event to the schedule. Though Dana’s attribute is expired, the message content indi-
cates that she was working on this event back when she was still with the campaign. The
subject should understand that Dana had the appropriate authority back when this decision
was made; thus it makes sense to accept the role-based trust that used to exist; an example
of a non-contemporaneous trust flow (Section 2.3.4).
Attributes:
Democratic Party says that Brian Oman is a Senator
Brian Oman says that Maria Page is my Campaign Manager
Maria Page says that Dana McIntyre is our Campaign Coordinator (expired)
The five attacks
New volunteer, ABUSE-two In the version of George’s message seen by subjects in
ABUSE-two, he claims to be a new volunteer hired by Ben, but provides no evidentiary
support. He then asks for the schedule. This is an example of the no attribute attack. Recall
that the subjects in this group do not see the other version of George’s message, only this
one. This allows us to pinpoint the ABUSE attribute as the cause if the two groups perform
differently on this message.
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Consultant, ABUSE-one The content of Frank’s message seen by subjects in ABUSE-
one is the same as indicated above. However, in this attack, he binds only one attribute to
his message. The attribute says that Frank is a local campaign consultant, but it is chained
off of an attribute that confers only “Full-time Employee” status on the holder. This is an
example of the nonsense chain attack.
Attributes:
Democratic Party says that Phoebe Mann is a Full-time Employee
Phoebe Mann says that Frank Shemp is a Local Campaign Consultant
Coopetition, ABUSE-two The version of the Coopetition message seen by subjects in
ABUSE-two has only one attribute bound to it as well. The attribute indicates that Jane
Smith works as John Oren’s assistant. The text of the message, as in the trustworthy case,
claims that Maria is there in Senator Copeland’s office but incommunicado. However, Jane
provides no evidence that Maria has, in fact, delegated to her the right to ask for Senator
Oman’s schedule. This is an example of the vague attribute attack that was also used in our
previous study.
Attributes:
Democratic Party says that Hannah Copeland is a Senator
Hannah Copeland says that John Oren is my Campaign Manager
John Oren says that Jane Smith is my Exec. Assistant
Expired attribute Bill Brasky indicates that he was hired by Ben, and asks for the sched-
ule for tomorrow’s events in Pennsylvania. He binds to his message an attribute saying that
he is a volunteer, but it is expired; it is also chained off of an expired attribute indicating
that Ben “recruits new temp workers in New York.” Bill is attempting to use the expired
attribute attack.
Attributes:
Democratic Party says that Brian Oman is a Senator
Brian Oman says that Maria Page is my Campaign Manager
Maria Page says that Ben Donnelly recruits new temp. workers in New
York (expired)






Figure 9.1: The study environment. We provided a “phone” to determine the frequency with which
subjects would want to resort to out-of-band channels. The “phone” provided no useful information,
however.
“John Wilson” Obviously, this message is executing the “John Wilson” attack. A Paul
Schmidt asks for the schedule, binding an attribute that indicates he works for the DNC.
But this is not the Paul Schmidt who works for Senator Oman!
Attributes:
Democratic Party says that Paul Schmidt is a Full-time Employee
9.2.4 The protocol
This study employed a between-subjects design to examine how well users understand
attribute content. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three groups discussed
in Section 9.2.1. After arriving in the study location (Figure 9.1), all subjects received a
study procedure information sheet containing information shown in Figure B.3. This sheet
served several purposes:
• Ask the subjects to “think aloud”, as we would need to keep track of not only what
they were doing, but also get insight into their thought process during the study.
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For the purposes of this study, you may assume that all email you send or receive
can only be read by the sender and the intended recipient(s). Furthermore, you
may assume that a message that appears to be from “Jane Doe” with the email
address “jdoe@example.com” is actually from a person that the Democratic Party
recognizes to be named “Jane Doe” with the email address “jdoe@example.com”.
Any further judgments about who Jane is or what Jane does must be made by you.
Figure 9.2: Text from the study procedure information sheet. Subjects are instructed to assume
message secrecy, message integrity and sender assurance.
• Introduce the subject’s role, Maria Page, and the two Senators.
• Introduce the task: maintain and distribute the schedule, but only upon authorized
requests.
• Assure the subjects of sender authenticity and message integrity.
The text performing this last purpose is shown in Figure 9.2. Essentially, we are assur-
ing the sender that the guarantees provided by correctly-implemented and correctly-used
S/MIME are in place. The reason for this is to control for S/MIME usability problems.
We are not interested in exploring problems that arise due to confusion about Certificate
Authorities or ill-configured revocation checking, or any of the myriad of other issues that
arise in a real S/MIME deployment. We already know those problems exist, and realize
that there could be an interesting interplay between these issues and the use of ABUSE.
However, we have already motivated that issues exist even in the face of perfect S/MIME;
we developed ABUSE to attack those problems, and its efficacy in that space is what we
explore in this experiment. Exploring into how ABUSE performs atop a real, potentially
flawed S/MIME deployment is outside the scope of this work, though we propose such an
investigation in Section 10.2.
In addition to the procedure information sheet, all subjects received a short pre-study
briefing (Figure 9.3) to set the stage. The briefing received by the ABUSE groups had added
content proving a short (less than one page) introduction to “digital introductions.” This
is in line with Garfinkel’s approach in his revision [50] of Whitten’s original study. [125]
The idea is that, in an environment in which ABUSE would be deployed, users would not
be asked to figure everything out on their own. They would have at least some help. The
“training” we provided is shown in Figure 9.4; the experimenter would not answer any
questions during the study, however, beyond those about basic Thunderbird functionality
(sending mail, opening new mail, etc.).
After being given a brief primer on the message sending and receiving functionality of
Mozilla Thunderbird, subjects were also informed about a text-editor on the computer that
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You are the campaign coordinator.
You are working for the campaign manager, Maria Page, mariap@dnc.org.
You have emailed with her before.
You have arrived early for work. No one else from the campaign is in the
office.
If you wish to use the telephone to call a campaign member, please ask
the experimenter for a “phone.”
Maria will send you the initial campaign schedule. Once she has done this,
wait for incoming messages from other people working for or involved with the
campaign and follow any directions they give you.
Don’t forget to “think aloud” as much as you can.
Figure 9.3: Content from the pre-study briefing seen by all groups.
they could use for notes. Then, the subjects were sent the “Welcome” message, and the
study began.
9.2.5 Running the study
Messages were pre-generated before the study began, and sent to the subjects using a web-
based interface to custom command-line scripts. The ordering of the messages for a given
trial was randomly determined by computer when the subject arrived. The next message
in the sequence was sent by the experimenter when the subject had either responded to
the current message as requested, or (by thinking aloud) indicated that they had decided
to ignore the message at hand. Subjects were allowed to ask for a “phone” at any time,
though upon doing so they would discover that the land lines were jammed and that they
had forgotten to charge their cell phone. If the subjects became quiet for any period of time,
they were gently reminded to think out loud. Upon completion of the task, subjects were
given a debriefing questionnaire. Subjects in the control group received the form shown in
Figure B.4, while the ABUSE subjects got a longer version, shown in Figure B.5. After
filling this out to their satisfaction, subjects were thanked, paid, and allowed to leave.
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NOTE: This version of Thunderbird has been configured to support Digital Intro-
ductions.
Digital Introductions allow senders to inform you of the ways in which they are
connected to people you already know, or to the Democratic Party. The header bar of the
Digital Introduction pane is always present at the bottom of the email window, colored
blue if you have emailed with the sender before and yellow if you have not.
This is a digital introduction, 
included by the sender of this message.
Click these for
more information
When a message is accompanied by new introductions, this pane will be automatically
opened for you when the message is read.
An introduction reading “Alice says that Bob is a shepherd” means that Alice did,
in fact, assert at some point that Bob is a shepherd. Whether you believe Alice or not is
up to you, as is the interpretation of what this says to you about Bob.
Figure 9.4: The extra briefing seen by subjects in the ABUSE groups.
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9.3 Results and discussion
The data we collected in this study provides qualitative evidence that users are able to un-
derstand the communication coming from the ABUSE attribute presentation GUI. Subjects
exhibited an understanding of the six different kinds of trust flows enumerated in Chapter 2
1. role-based trust,
2. role-based delegation,
3. role-sourced arbitrary delegation,
4. friend-sources arbitrary delegation,
5. coopetition, and
6. non-contemporaneous trust.
In addition, subjects using ABUSE showed that they had not become any more vulnerable
than the control group when attacked in any of the five ways we detailed in Table 9.4.
We saw a wide range of reaction to ABUSE in this study. There was one subject who
never seemed to notice the “digital introductions” at all (S9). On his debriefing question-
naire, he said that he had thought they were advertisements, so he ignored them. One sub-
ject, after struggling to make a decision about whether to trust the “update” message from
Ben, remembered the attributes, looked down at the pane and said “Oh, I can use these
to tell...I totally forgot about that, that’s awesome.” (S27) Subject S12 initially did not
want to trust Ben’s message either, but then noticed the attribute from Paul that indicated
Ben’s status as his assistant and said “Oh, that’s a very useful tool...Yeah...if he’s Paul’s
executive assistant, ok.” A third subject, S24, noted that it “seems that Ben’s trustworthy,
as Paul’s executive assistant, because the digital introduction says he is. And I know who
Paul is because my boss [Maria] said so.” These statements, and the fact that every sub-
ject accepted Ben’s message, support the conclusion that ABUSE can express role-based
delegation. That is expected, however, as these are very simple and most familiar kinds of
flows. We now go on to discuss our results with respect to more complex trust flows as
well as the attacks that we executed on our subjects.
9.3.1 Comparing “New volunteer” across groups
In the ABUSE-one group, the “new volunteer” message was used to test role-sourced ar-
bitrary delegation and role-based delegation. In the ABUSE-two group, it tested resistance
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to the no-attributes attack. No subject fell for the no-attributes attack. Conditioning the
subjects to expect attributes on legitimate messages made them reject this attack out of
hand. S36 pointed out “this message doesn’t have any extra information about position or
permissions,” as he deleted the email. Another subject, S3, replied to George telling him to
seek out an introduction from Ben before continuing to work with the campaign. A third,
S13, immediately responded “No, I’m just not gonna send you anything.”
Subjects in the ABUSE-one group, on the other hand, responded very positively to the
message when accompanied by an attribute from Ben identifying George as a campaign
volunteer. All but two chose to act on it. One of these subjects, S14, had expressed uncer-
tainty about the whole concept of re-delegation. She did not accept any messages that did
not have attributes in which Maria or Paul had issued the final assertion. Subjects in the
control group, working without ABUSE at all, were highly unlikely to act on the message;
only three out of twelve chose to respond with schedule information.
9.3.2 Comparing “Consultant” across groups
The “consultant” message is used to test both the nonsense-chain attack and friend-sourced
arbitrary delegation. In the ABUSE-one group, subjects saw the message with an assertion
chained off of a generic “employee” attribute. Subject S35 pointed out that Frank said
he was in touch with Maria, but that has no attribute issued through her. Furthermore, he
said, “the only person saying this guy’s a consultant is just an Employee. So, that kind of
concerns me.” Subject S32 concurred: “[Frank] says he’s been in touch with Maria, but
there’s no intro through Maria, so I don’t know if I should trust him. I am not going to give
[the schedule] to him.” Compared to the control, in which 33% of the subjects acted on the
consultant message, 46% of the subjects in this group chose to send Frank the information
he wanted, despite his meaningless attribute.
These rates are comparable, especially when placed against the 93% in ABUSE-two
who acted on Frank’s message when it was accompanied by an attribute from Maria that
expressed friend-sourced arbitrary delegation. Subject S15 inspected both attributes on
Frank’s message, clicked on Maria’s name to view her attributes and, when satisfied that
Frank’s permission came from the “right Maria,” decided to send Frank the information he
requested. A second subject, S17, justified his response to Frank’s email by saying that he
“trust[s] old Maria!”
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Comparing “Coopetition” across groups
The coopetition message is inherently suspicious. We expected subjects to be pre-disposed
against trusting it, and we were correct. 17% of subjects in the control group acted on
this message, with that number dropping to 15% in the ABUSE-two group, who saw the
message paired with the vague-attribute attack. We already have confirmation from our
previous study (Chapter 8) that ABUSE is resistant to vague-attribute attacks, so we are
not concerned about the general untrustworthiness of this message impacting our attack-
resistance conclusions.
The percentage of ABUSE-one subjects who acted on the coopetition message when it
was accompanied by a coopetition trust flow was 46%(6/13). However, there were three
more users (23%) who clearly indicated that they understood what was being expressed
by the attributes on the message; they simply remained leery of responding with sensitive
information. This was usually because of a concern about delegation; S16 said “I’m reading
Maria says that John Oren can ask about the schedule, and John Oren says that Jane Smith
can ask,” but kept wanting to see Jane be “more directly connected” to Maria. Subject
S32 expressed a concern over delegation even in the case of Ben’s original schedule update
message (though she accepted it), and the coopetition message was suspicious enough to
begin with that she could not overcome her concern about delegation. Other subjects,
however, were fine with it, saying things like “If Maria actually said these things, if the
introductions are accurate, this seems reasonable. Since 1PM doesn’t work, according to
the most recent update, I’m going to send [Jane] the Harrisburg schedule.” (S19) Subject
S35 offered this: “Ok, so someone is emailing me from the other side, from Copeland.
However, Maria has said that John can ask about the Harrisburg schedule, and John said
that this person can ask.”
9.3.3 On expiration
Since the study was structured as a single continuous experience, all the messages had to
make sense within the plot. We could not devise a single message text that could be either
trustworthy or untrustworthy given two different sets of expired attributes. Thus, we chose
to have two separate messages, one which remained trustworthy despite its accompanying
expired attribute and one which remained untrustworthy. We can still use this setup to
figure out what we need to know:
• whether users understand the GUI elements that express expiration, and
• how binding expired attributes to a message impacts its perceived trustworthiness.
155
We can use their behavior and statements to determine the former, and there are two options
for the latter: warning signals from expired attributes could make subjects more suspicious
in general, or they might ignore expiration and become more trusting overall.
According to the results from the control group, the message “expired”, sent by Dana
is easy to trust; eight of twelve subjects (66%) trusted it without the benefit of ABUSE.
“Former volunteer,” from Bill, is less so; only three of twelve control subjects trusted this
message. If users do not consider attributes, their expiration status, and message context in
concert, we should expect to see trust rates for both messages impacted in the same fashion.
If expiration makes messages more suspicious regardless of surrounding context, we should
see Dana’s message being trusted less often; Bill’s should exhibit little change. Conversely,
if appropriate attributes confer trust upon the messages to which they are bound regardless
of expiration status, both messages should receive some kind of boost.
The numbers we see confirm that users pay attention to expiration status. Dana’s mes-
sage was acted upon in 78% of cases across both ABUSE groups, Bill’s in only 15%.
And, we know that subjects accepted valid attributes like the one bound to Bill’s message;
George’s message with a similar attribute was accepted nearly universally. Furthermore,
many subjects showed an inclination to explore the GUI elements that indicate that an as-
sertion is outside of its validity period. Subject S17 noticed that “something’s in...hazard?”
on Bill’s message before clicking for more information. S13 pointed out that he was re-
jecting Dana’s request because “she could be working for someone else now.” So, while
he chose not to trust her, he clearly understood the information which the GUI was telling
him. On Bill’s message, S12 clicked on the content of both expired assertions, pointing
out that the dates had already passed (“5/1...that’s already happened”). When S16 opened
Dana’s message, he exclaimed “Whoa! What’s this yellow thing?...this statement expired
before?” Clearly, he understood what he was being told by the GUI. Subject S22, upon
inspecting the attributes on Bill’s message pointed out that “Ben’s recruiting in Philly now,
I guess he used to recruit in New York.” Subject S29 looked down and exclaimed “Why is
there...? Oh, it’s expired.”
Taking this together, we certainly have evidence that subjects understand the way in
which ABUSE expresses the validity status of assertions. They also showed that they
became no more vulnerable to the expired attribute attack carried out here, and were not
dissuaded from trusting Dana’s message—which was expressing a non-contemporaneous
trust flow.
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9.3.4 The “John Wilson” attack
This attack is very difficult to defend against, especially when the user is not personally
familiar with the “John Wilson” being impersonated. Also, in the context of a study that
requires subjects to make tricky trust decision after tricky trust decision, some jumped at
what seemed like an easy choice. They saw the name Paul Schmidt and responded without
thinking much. The numbers were consistent across the groups; six of twelve fell for
the attack in the control group as opposed to 13/27 in the ABUSE groups. However, the
subjects who avoided this attack in the control group were mostly those who generally
refused to trust messages in the study at all. Three of the six only trusted mail from Maria
and no one else; two of the others trusted Maria and Dana alone. The ABUSE subjects
who rejected the message did not show any such pattern, and many verbally indicated that
it was odd that this message “doesn’t say he’s part of the campaign.” (S 32) Subject S33
specifically noted that he’s got an attribute indicating his employee status, but no specifics
at all. S31 began to compose a reply, and then stopped himself when he looked back at the
original message; he had noticed that this Paul Schmidt had not demonstrated that he was
the Chief Strategist at all; this, he judged, was odd.
9.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we detailed a study designed to provide qualitative evidence that users do,
in fact, understand ABUSE attributes when presented by our GUI. We crafted a set of
ABUSE-enhanced messages that expressed among them each kind of trust flow that we
detailed in Chapter 2 and showed first-hand evidence that subjects viewed them, parsed
them, understood them, and then made rational decisions based on the information they
gleaned. In addition, we enhanced the attacker model from our previous user study, allow-
ing for some more nefarious attribute-based social engineering attacks. Users showed the
ability to avoid these attacks at least as well as a control group, though future researchers
could expand the volume of subjects used in a study of this type to generate some stronger
quantitative results in that area. Our goal was primarily to get qualitative information from
users indicating that they understood the content presented to them by the ABUSE GUI
and were capable of using it to inform their decisions. We believe we have achieved that.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and future work
In this chapter, we first discuss the places that we envision ABUSE going in the future. We
answer some implementation questions, identify areas for future study, and provide initial
thoughts on some potential follow-on experiments suggested by our research. Finally, we
sum up the contributions made by this thesis and provide some concluding remarks.
10.1 Implementation issues
10.1.1 Decentralized attribute issuance
We acknowledged back in Section 5.2.2 that our prototype, centralized implementation of
attribute issuance is less than ideal. Here, we discuss a decentralized protocol by which
Alice can directly issue a new attribute to Bob, shown in Figure 10.1. Before engaging
in this protocol, Alice provides to her client all the information to issue a new attribute:
Bob’s public key (gotten from his identity certificate), the desired content, the desired va-
lidity period, and the attribute off of which she wishes to chain. Alice and Bob begin by
establishing a mutually authenticated SSL connection. Alice checks that Bob has presented
a certificate with the expected public key, while Bob’s only concern is that he can verify
Alice’s certificate. After this, Bob generates a key pair for the new attribute and returns
the new public key. This step is necessary, as Bob would otherwise not be able to chain
new assertions off of this attribute. Alice creates a new CSR from the received key and
the information she specified earlier, which she then signs using the private key associated
with the desired attribute. The resulting assertion, combined with the attribute off of which
Alice chose to chain, is Bob’s new attribute. Alice does not have the corresponding private
key, however; Bob is the only one who has this information. Alice forwards the attribute to





Generate new key pair
Pull key from CSR; 
Create new CSR with 
content, validity period;
Sign with private key
from chosen attribute
Verify that this is the 
right Bob
new public key
Figure 10.1: A distributed attribute issuance protocol. Using this method, the attribute store be-
comes nothing more than an attribute escrow service.
if he wants. To do so, he enciphers the whole thing (private key included) with his identity
private key, so that only he can retrieve the stored information. The primary advantage of
decentralizing the issuance process is that no user ever gives up control of the key material
associated with his attributes; furthermore, users can issue attributes to one another even if
the centralized store becomes unavailable
The downside of this approach is that Alice and Bob must both be available at the
same time; at least, Bob’s ABUSE client must be awake and able to perform cryptographic
operations with his identity private key. It is possible to create an asynchronous version of
this protocol using the centralized store as a go-between, but not as a key generation and
signing service. Alice provides to her client all the information necessary to create a new
attribute, which stores this information and associates it with a nonce. This nonce is signed
with Alice’s identity private key and uploaded it to the centralized store to be downloaded
by Bob the next time he checks in. When Bob’s client next connects to the store, it pulls
down the nonce, verifies Alice’s signature, and generates a new key pair. After signing the
nonce and public key, Bob’s client uploads them (along with his signature) to the store to
wait for Alice. The key pair is cached along with the nonce. Alice’s client, next time it
connects to the store, pulls down the signed key/nonce pair and verifies Bob’s signature.
Using the nonce to find the appropriate assertion specification, Alice’s client then creates a
CSR and signs it with the appropriate attribute private key. This assertion and the attribute
off which Alice chose to chain are uploaded to the store for Bob’s client to download at its
leisure. In this way, Bob’s attribute keys still do not leave his control, but he never has to
























Figure 10.2: An ABUSE-enabled client using a HEBCA-aware validation service to verify an
attribute from another institution. The client, at Princeton, trusts Princeton’s root certificate. It
presents the validation service with the attribute chain (rooted in Dartmouth’s trust root) and its
local trust root. The validation service, aware of the PKIs with which HEBCA has cross-certified,
responds with a chain of certificates that connect Princeton’s root to Dartmouth’s root. The client
can validate this chain on its own, allowing it to build a full path from its local trust root (Princeton)
all the way down through the entire attribute chain.
only Bob and Alice’s identity keys, potentially easing deployment, in Section 10.2.2.
10.1.2 ABUSE across domain boundaries
ABUSE relies upon users being able to interpret the meaning of assertion content. This
becomes difficult when users try to communicate across domain boundaries. Dartmouth’s
“Dean of Pluralism and Leadership” might be roughly equivalent to the “Diversity Direc-
tor” at another institution, for example. There is, essentially, a namespace issue. Domains
such as the power grid are overseen collectively enough that these issues are alleviated.
In that particular case, NERC provides guidelines that specify the names and duties of
roles at the different organizations that interact during crises. [83] Terminology surround-
ing equipment and actions that can be taken is uniform enough that users can make them-
selves understood. In such a domain, where namespace issues are not particularly relevant,
the problem is one of verifying attribute chains from foreign sources. Bridge Certificate
Authorities [59] (discussed in Section 1.1.2) provide a method of joining disparate hierar-
chical X.509-based PKIs in a non-hierarchical way. By making both ABUSE attributes and
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S/MIME digital signatures on ABUSE-enabled emails “bridge aware” (Figure 10.2), one
could address the problem of verifying foreign attributes. The Higher Education Bridge
Certification Authority (HEBCA) [56] has been set up and deployed at Dartmouth, so fu-
ture researchers would be able to evaluate such bridged applications as they work with real,
deployed infrastructure.
To take ABUSE beyond a single namespace (a single organization, or a domain like the
power grid), both the above issue of attribute chain verification and also that of mapping
unfamiliar attributes into a locally sensical context must be addressed.
To help users make sense of attributes created at outside institutions, one could consider
applying some ontology mapping results from the W3C’s Semantic Web project. [122] On-
tology mapping uses machine learning techniques to attempt to map one hierarchical clas-
sification structure onto another. [10, 29] An organization’s attribute space can be viewed
as an ontology, since it is structured like a tree, rooted at the local CA. It is possible that an
ontology mapper could be trained on this “home ontology” , and then treat incoming sets of
attributes as portions of a foreign ontology and attempt to perform a mapping (Figure 10.3).
While it is unlikely that this approach will provide a perfect solution, it should to be able
to provide some kind of confidence measure along with the resultant mappings.1
10.2 Studying ABUSE in the real world
There are a number of questions about ABUSE that we cannot answer in a controlled
laboratory setting:
• How granular are users when delegating permissions or vouching for other users?
Will we see general assertions like “works for me” and “is an employee” or specific
ones, like “can send email on my behalf about X” and “works on the foobar project
as a product tester”?
• What kinds of validity periods are used in practice?
• What patterns arise in the selection of attributes to bind to messages? Do users fre-
quently bind all their attributes to messages? None, unless they’re making a specific
request? Would a default set be useful?
The only way to explore some of the issues surrounding ABUSE is to begin testing the
system in a real-world deployment. Other researchers have realized the need for work
such as this; Schneiderman names it “Science 2.0,” [108] and calls for the realization of



























What does this 
attribute mean? I'm 90% sure it 
means this...
Figure 10.3: An ABUSE-enabled client using an ontology mapper at its home institution to try to
place a foreign attribute in a local context. The attribute is forwarded to the ontology mapper, which
attempts to find the local attribute that most closely matches it and return some kind of confidence
measure in the matching. Performing the mapping may involve using a natural language database to
attempt matches on the content of individual certificates in the attribute chain, in addition to trying
to find similarities between the structure of the chain and portions of the home ontology.
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replicable and generalizable conclusions through a greater commitment to case studies. We
believe that this is the right approach to truly evaluate ABUSE, though it is often an uphill
battle to convince an organization to deploy experimental technology that it did not develop
in-house. As we mentioned in Section 6.1, Dartmouth is ill-suited for an ABUSE testbed
due to the small and well-connected nature of the community here. A larger academic
institution with a more impenetrable bureaucracy could be fruitful grounds for study. Most
such institutions are already running centralized databases that comply with the eduperson
profile [33]; this would provide excellent fodder for bootstrapping an ABUSE deployment.
The academic calendar also provides a convenient set of recommended validity periods:
term boundaries, well-defined vacation periods, exam periods, etc. A researcher might try
the following:
• Deploy ABUSE, bootstrapped using eduperson profile data.
• Check email headers for the presence of attributes.
• Collect attributes as they are issued, store a hash, strip out subject/issuer information
and keep just chains of assertion content.
• Track validity period information.
• Hash individual attributes seen in email headers, check against the collected attributes
to determine usage patterns.
• Survey users periodically to determine what they are using the system for, if they
have ever wanted to revoke an attribute, and for feedback about the usability of the
system.
Researchers in NSF’s TCIP project have connections to power companies and power grid
management organizations. However, these users are managing critical infrastructure and
it is unlikely they would use such an experimental technology in their day-to-day work. It
might be possible to perform smaller-scale classical user studies on them, however, if the
tasks can be kept very short.
10.2.1 Towards deploying ABUSE
ABUSE has significant deployability advantages over other technologies that attempt to
address similar problems. The organization would need to roll out an updated email client,
but since we have designed ABUSE to avoid push-back, there would be no need to do so for
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every user at the same time. Furthermore, many solutions to the problem we have consid-
ered would require such a step.2 ABUSE requires neither the enumeration of all roles nor
the specification of all permissions within an organization; deploying an algorithmic ap-
proach (Section 3.1.1), Role-Based Messaging or other related technologies would require
at least some subset of these undertakings. Such approaches also require the specification
of policies by some users within the system; as per Section 3.1.1, it is unclear that this is
even possible. ABUSE imposes no such requirement. We do require an identity PKI, but
this stipulation is not unique to ABUSE. Moreover, a PKI can be useful in a variety of ap-
plications, especially for industries that interact heavily with the federal government—like
aerospace, pharmaceuticals, or the power grid. Above, we mention that ABUSE would also
need to have the attribute space “bootstrapped” in some way; we mention the eduPerson
LDAP profile as a starting point for higher education attributes, and expect that other orga-
nizations would have some similar set of employee information that could be used to create
an initial set of user attributes. Setting the clients to bind one or two of these attributes to
outgoing messages by default could begin to create interest in using the system; combined
with user education, this approach should enable the organization to get a deployment off
the ground with minimal hassle.
10.2.2 Reducing the number of key pairs
ABUSE does introduce one piece of complexity that may hamper deployment: every at-
tribute comes with its own private key that must be protected. Designing the system thus
allowed us to use commodity tools for the validation of ABUSE attributes, as well as parts
of the issuance process. It should be possible to, by writing new code to handle attribute
issuance and validation, modify ABUSE so that all signature operations are performed with
users’ identity private keys. Care would need to be taken to ensure that the modified at-
tributes maintain the properties possessed by attributes in the current system; that assertions
in a chain follow cryptographically in the appropriate order, that assertions cannot be trans-
posed from one chain to another, and so on. If done appropriately, this modification would
significantly reduce the number of keys that must be kept private, reducing the potential
burden of deployment.
2A proxy-based solution in the spirit of the work discussed in Section 4.4.1 would require only client-side
configuration changes
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10.3 ABUSE attribute issuance studies
One arena in which we could potentially use grid operators is in the study of the attribute
issuance process. The NERC Reliability Functional Model [83] provides a common set
of roles for the industry, which could be a useful set of suggestions for assertion content.
These do not cover the entire organizational structure, but a set that does so might be over-
large. Performing user studies on this population could help us to determine the “right”
number of suggested assertions. The subjects would need to be familiarized with ABUSE
and its approach, and then set to the task of issuing some set of attributes to some set of
other users. We could also perform similar studies using an academic population, perhaps
using the information we gather as feedback for adding the appropriate number of asser-
tion content suggestions to a real-world case study deployment of the kind discussed in
Section 10.2.
10.4 Investigating surprising our S/MIME result
In Section 8.3.2, we noted that data we took during our power-grid-inspired user study
indicated that S/MIME users actually performed worse than plaintext email users on some
tasks. Under the incentive structure we used, which rewarded users for deciding what to do
about incoming email without seeking outside assistance, subjects in the S/MIME group
were able to identify trustworthy messages significantly less often. They were not falling
for attack messages, but they were deciding to forego asking for assistance on trustworthy
messages, trying to earn more points at the cost of reassurance that their decisions were
correct. Since the only difference between the two groups was the presence of simulated
S/MIME signatures, we hypothesize that S/MIME signals, when noticed, make users more
confident in their decisions about the trustworthiness of email—regardless of whether their
decision is correct or not. It would be interesting to devise a new experiment, one that
simulates just S/MIME and plaintext email, to validate this hypothesis.
10.5 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have presented ABUSE, a system that enables users to build calculus-
based trust with third parties with whom they communicate over the Internet. We first ap-
plied tools from the social sciences (economics, sociology, psychology, etc.) to real-world
scenarios in order to understand the ways in which humans decide to trust people that they
have never encountered before. Phone transcripts from the August 2003 North American
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blackout provided a rich set of example cases, as power grid operators at a variety of ge-
ographically distributed locations had to use the telephone to coordinate potentially risky
actions and share sensitive information—without, in many cases, knowing each other be-
forehand. Using these test cases, and several that we drew from the academic setting, we set
out to characterize the ways in which trust flowed in these decentralized, human-to-human
scenarios.
We contribute a set of trust flows that allow for the classification of the kinds of trust
scenarios with which we are concerned. These flows provided us with a guide for designing
and a tool for evaluating our work as well; the system we created had to be expressive
enough to enable humans to leverage any kind of flow that we had enumerated. Only such
a system can successfully allow for the migration of human calculus-based trust into the
digital world. We also contribute a set of design criteria for such a system, based on usably
secure software design patterns and socio-technical research.
We contribute the design and implementation of ABUSE, a usably and usefully secure
email system. By starting with the appropriate tools to understand the issues underlying the
extension of human calculus-based trust and then designing with usability goals in mind
from the start, we were able to create a system capable of expressing and reliably conveying
to users the kinds of information they need to decide trust.
We evaluate ABUSE through user studies. The first is based directly on scenarios drawn
from the power grid. ABUSE is compared to plaintext email and S/MIME, and determined
to enable users to better identify trustworthy messages from senders that they do not know
without needing to resort to out-of-band channels for assistance. This information, while
useful, does not necessarily confirm that users are really understanding attribute content. To
investigate this issue, we performed a second user study, based on a venerable scenario in
secure email usability research. Subjects indicated by thinking aloud during the study, and
through the answers on their debriefing questionnaires, that the information communicated
by ABUSE was comprehensible and contributed to their ability to succeed at the task set
before them.
The problem of human trust requires large amounts of human context to decide, and
computers are ill-suited for these kinds of tasks. Our approach has been to build a sys-
tem that gets the right information from one human to another, and then lets the relying
party decide what she wants to do. Applying tools from the social science was a key part
of exploring what that “right information” is, and we hope that more computer science
researchers will take these tools into account when studying problems that involve users.




ABUSE in power grid scenarios
appendix
In this appendix, we provide scenario details for our power-grid-based ABUSE user study.
We also provide the materials viewed by the subjects.
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A.1 Grid study recruitment
In addition to posting the flyer shown in Figure A.1, we sent an email with the same in-
formation out to a number of campus email lists, with an encouragement to forward it to
anyone in the Dartmouth community who might be interested in participating.
1
Participate in Rewarding Dartmouth research
Who: Dartmouth undergraduates
What: 25-30 minute decision-making study
Attend a laboratory session;





A!researcher will contact you to schedule your session.
Questions? Contact me at cmasone@dartmouth.edu
This study [and this blitz] have been approved by the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects (CPHS). This study is
sponsored by Professor Sean Smith. For more information about this study blitz cmasone@dartmouth.edu.
If you have general questions about being a research participant, you may call or blitz the Office of the Committee for the
Protection of Human Subjects at Dartmouth College (603) 646-3053.
posted [date]
Figure A.1: Recruitment flyer. An email with the same content was also used for recruitment.
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
Dartmouth College
Study title:    Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  Your participation is
voluntary.
Your decision whether or not to participate will have no effect on your academic
standing or employment.   You will be paid for your participation.  Please ask questions
if there is anything you do not understand.
This study examines decision making in computer-mediated disaster mitigation
scenarios.  Your participation involves an in-person experiment that will last 25-30
minutes.  In the experiment, you will sit at a computer and be presented with a series of
simulated disasters in the United States power infrastructure.  In each scenario, you will
receive a message recommending a particular mitigation strategy.  You must choose
whether or not to act upon this recommendation.  At the end of the experiment, you
will receive an amount of cash in the range of $5 to $25.  The amount you receive will
depend upon how well you perform in the experiment.
You have the right to withdraw from the experiment at any time, but if you do so you
will forfeit these gains.
Your participation in this experiment will not expose you to any physical harm or
psychological risk, although you may be pleased or disappointed by your earnings.
Publications or other reports of this experiment will not identify you in any way.  The
data generated in this session will be maintained and analyzed by the investigators and,
in accordance with standard academic practice, will be shared with other researchers
upon request.  However, the data will not identify you in any way, and we use your
contact information only to schedule the time for your participation in the study.
Questions about this study may be directed to Chris Masone at
cmasone@dartmouth.edu or (603) 646-9180.
If you have questions, concerns, or suggestions about human research at Dartmouth,
you may call the Office of the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at
Dartmouth College (603) 646-3053 during normal business hours.
CONSENT
I have read the above information about Attribute-Based, Usefully Secure Email.  I
understand that I may earn from $5 to $25 depending on my choices during the study.  I
understand that I am free to discontinue participation at any time if I so choose, and
that the investigator will gladly answer any questions that arise at any time during the
course of this study.
     <AGREE>                            <DO NOT AGREE>
Figure A.2: Consent form
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A.3 Grid study instructions
The subjects in the study were given a four page handout (Figure A.4) summarizing infor-
mation on the task they were to complete, background information about the power grid,
and an explanation of the study’s incentive structure. They were also each read a set of
verbal instructions, fleshing out the summarized information they received in the handout.
The verbal instructions are provided in Figure A.3.
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A.3.1 Verbal instructions
We are investigating a new method of enabling power grid operators to collaborate in order to maintain
North America’s power generation and distribution infrastructure. You will take the role of a grid operator,
and face a series of scenarios that simulate instability in the grid. Consider each as totally independent;
information presented in one scenario should not impact your decisions in any other. In each scenario,
you will be presented with a message sent to you by a third party that asks you to perform some action
in response to a problem. Though the message will come from someone you do not know, your task is
to decide whether to trust it or not. If you choose to trust an untrustworthy message (or to ignore a
trustworthy message), there are several negative consequences that could ensue:
• First, part of the grid could collapse, leading to a wide-area blackout. This could lead to anything
from a reprimand for you to a Congressional investigation of your employer. Additionally, guilt over
causing an outage of that scale has led some operators in your situation to experience a nervous
breakdown.
• Second, you could wind up disclosing grid status information, which is uniformly regarded as sensitive.
Not only would this expose the grid to a targeted physical attack, but it could also land you in legal
trouble.
When making your decision about an incoming message, you may use the following sources of informa-
tion as guidance:
1. The message text, and any extra information that is presented in the email window (sender address,
header information, etc). Many elements in this window will provide more information when you
move your mouse over them.
2. An organizational chart of the facility at which you work. You may choose to consult this if you
believe it will help you to determine whether the sender has the authority to request the action you’ve
been asked to take.
3. Someone you know that may have extra information about the sender, although this is not guaranteed.
We will provide you access to a diagram of your social network among co-workers and employees at
other power facilities.
Note, however, that checking your company org chart or ”phoning a friend” constitute extra steps that
delay your decision. This leaves the grid at risk for a longer period of time, and is thus undesirable. In the
study, you will receive 10 points for each correct decision – choosing to act on a trustworthy message or
choosing to reject an untrustworthy message. Risking grid failure by making the wrong decision – refusing
to honor a legitimate request or acting on an untrustworthy request – will cost you 20 points. Delaying
making the correct decision by consulting extra sources of information will moderate the amount of points
you receive, as follows:
• If the message is legitimate, you will incur a five point penalty for phoning a friend, and a three point
penalty for checking your org chart
• If the message is falsified, you will incur only a two point penalty for each delay.
For example, if you receive a message that is legitimate and choose to look at your company org chart
before accepting, you will receive 10 points for making the correct decision, but lose 3 for causing a delay,
resulting in a net gain of 7 points. If you receive a message that is faked, query someone in your social
network that turns out to be unhelpful, and then choose to act on the message, you will lose 20 points.
So, if you feel confident in your decision, it is to your advantage to act on it without consulting any
information outside the message itself.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid between 5 and 25 dollars, depending on the total number
of points you have accumulated.
1
(a)
Figure A.3: Verbal instructions, page 1
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Background information:
There are two classes of management organizations in the US power infrastructure: Operation companies
and Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). Operation companies own generators and/or power
lines, and it is they who directly control these pieces of equipment. RTOs mediate among di!erent operation
companies to help maintain stability and reliability in the wider grid. When problems in the grid arise,
RTOs are allowed to tell operation companies what actions to take in order to address the situation.
In the tasks you will perform, you will encounter two RTOs: PJM interconnect and Midwest ISO
(MISO). You will also encounter a variety of operation companies, including First Energy, AEP, Allegheny,
Cinergy and IP&L. They are related as shown in figure 1. MISO and PJM are peers, and AEP is overseen
by PJM. MISO presides over the rest.
Messages you receive during the study will reference people with a variety of jobs, some who work for
operation companies and some who work for RTOs. The jobs are described in section 4 (Background info),
and the relationships among them are shown in Figure 2.
An example of a single task:
Sara Sinclair is an operator for First Energy. She sees that some of her company’s generators are down,
stressing the ones that are remaining. She receives the following message:
From: jen.mcnicholas@aep.com
To: Sara.Sinclair@firstenergy.com
Hi, Sara. I am an operator at AEP and got your contact information from Chris Masone at
MISO. I see that the lines between our two areas are getting stressed because of some generation
issues you guys are having. Can you let me know which ones are overloaded so I can decide what
to do to compensate?
Thanks,
Jen McNicholas
Sara does not know Jen, but she knows Chris, so she contacts him to ask if this message is on the
up-and-up. He tells her that it is, so she acts on the message and reveals the requested information. Sara
receives 5 points for this task: 10 for making the right call, minus five for ”phoning a friend”.
Remember, your goal is to keep the grid stable. In each scenario, it has become unstable and you wish
to help return it to stability as quickly as possible...BUT be careful not to make ill-advised decisions in
your haste. If you feel confident in your trust decision, executing it swiftly is to your advantage. If you
are unsure of your decision, feel free to consult extra sources of information – but be aware that this will
cost points.
At the end of the study, you will be asked to review your answers, though you may not change any at
that time. You will be able to note tasks on which you would change your decision, however, if you were
allowed to do so.
2
(b)
Figure A.3: Verbal instructions, page 2
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A.3.2 Written instructions
We are investigating a new method of enabling power grid operators to collaborate in order to maintain North
America’s power generation and distribution infrastructure.
1 What you will do
• You will face a series of events that simulate instability in the power grid
• You will receive a message asking you to take some action to resolve the issue. This message may or may
not be trustworthy
• You will decide whether or not to act on this request.
• You will earn or lose points based on the result of your decision.
– You want to act on trustworthy messages as quickly as possible, as delaying subjects the grid to
additional risk and cost you points
– You want to reject all untrustworthy messages, as acting upon one may cause the grid to fail
2 What you will know
• The text of the message
• Common e-mail header information, including the sender, recipients, date, etc.
• Any extra information that was bundled in with the message, which should be understandable from the
interface with which you are presented
• You will be able to access the following sources of extra information, though doing so will cause delays, thus
costing you points:
– an organizational chart of the organization for which you work
– members of your social network, who may work at any number of other power facilities
3 How you will be rewarded
You gain points for keeping the grid stable
• Rejecting messages that are untrustworthy = 10 points
– However, if you incur delays on the way to making this decision, you will lose 2 points per delay
• Acting on messages that are trustworthy = 10 points
– However, you will lose 5 points for phoning a friend and 3 for checking your org chart
Risking grid failure, whether by action or inaction, will cost you 20 points. The grid may fail if
• you act on a falsified message, or
• you ignore a legitimate message.
4 Background information
There are two classes of management organizations in the US power infrastructure: Operation companies and
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs).
1
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Figure 1: The relationships between MISO, PJM, and their associated operation companies.
Operation companies
• own generators and/or power lines
• directly control these pieces of equipment.
RTOs
• mediate among di!erent operation companies
• help maintain stability and reliability in the grid
• can order operation companies in their area to take whatever steps they deem necessary.
You will encounter two RTOs:
1. PJM Interconnect, and
2. Midwest ISO (MISO).






First Energy, IP&L, Allegheny and Cinergy all operate under the purview of MISO, while AEP is overseen by
PJM Interconnect, as shown in Figure 1. During the study, you will encounter people with a variety of jobs, some
who work for operation companies and some who work for RTOs. These are shown in Figure 2, and described
here.
Operation Company jobs
• Generator System Operator controls his company’s power generators.
• Transmission System Operator controls her company’s power lines and other transmission infrastructure.
• Reliability Engineer works with Generator and Transmission System Operators at the company to main-
tain stability in the portion of the grid over which the company has control. Interfaces with Reliability
Coordinators at RTOs during wider-scale problems.
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(b) The structure of an RTO
Figure 2: Sample organizational charts for power grid entities
• Controller Operator Manages Generator and Transmission System Operators.
• VP of Power Operations head of the side of the company that runs the equipment that generates and/or
manages power transmission.
• VP of Generation Management head of the side of the company that buys and sells power.
RTO jobs
• Reliability Coordinator works with Reliability Engineers at operation companies and Reliability Coordi-
nators at other RTOs to e!ect the changes necessary to mitigate outages and grid instability.
• Director, Grid Operations head of the branch of the organization that interacts with operation companies.
• Manager, Operations Support manages the sta! that interact with the power operations side of operation
companies.
• Supervisor, Outage Coordination manages all the Reliability Coordinators and support sta! that at-
tempt to mitigate outages and grid instability.
5 An Example
You receive a message you believe to be trustworthy that purports to be from someone at another organization.
• the message is, in fact, trustworthy
• you are uncertain, so you contact a friend who works at that organization
• the friend informs you that the message is real and should be taken seriously
• you accept the message, earning 10 points
– but, you had to delay your decision by phoning a friend to be sure, losing you 5 points
• total score = 5 points
3
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(b) The structure of an RTO
Figure 2: Sample organizational charts for power grid entities
• Controller Operator Manages Generator and Transmission System Operators.
• VP of Power Operations head of the side of the company that runs the equipment that generates and/or
manages power transmission.
• VP of Generation Management head of the side of the company that buys and sells power.
RTO jobs
• Reliability Coordinator works with Reliability Engineers at operation companies and Reliability Coordi-
nators at other RTOs to e!ect the changes necessary to mitigate outages and grid instability.
• Director, Grid Operations head of the branch of the organization that interacts with operation companies.
• Manager, Operations Support manages the sta! that interact with the power operations side of operation
companies.
• Supervisor, Outage Coordination manages all the Reliability Coordinators and support sta! that at-
tempt to mitigate outages and grid instability.
5 An Example
You receive a message you believe to be trustworthy that purports to be from someone at another organization.
• the message is, in fact, trustworthy
• you are uncertain, so you contact a friend who works at that organization
• the friend informs you that the message is real and should be taken seriously
• you accept the message, earning 10 points
– but, you had to delay your decision by phoning a friend to be sure, losing you 5 points
• total score = 5 points
3
(d)
Figure A.4: Written instructions, page 4
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A.4 Grid study scenario details
A.4.1 The external-attacker scenario
The attacker, who sits completely outside the grid’s trust infrastructure, requests an action
that will further hamper the grid. The subject should reject the message.
Characteristics of the subject
Subject affiliation: First Energy
Subject role: Reliability engineer
Characteristics of the attacker
Attacker: Alice Apples
Attacker email address: <alicea personal@yahoo.com>
Attacker affiliation: None (claims AEP)
Signature CA: Thawte Freemail
Parameters of the situation
Trust-flow: Faked coopetition
Contingency: There are four power lines tying First Energy to AEP. Two are













Signature: Valid, external CA
Attributes: None
Text: I’m having a problem with my work email, so please forgive my use of
my home email account!
I am a transmission systems operator at AEP and got your contact
information from Humphrey Bogart at MISO. I wanted to let you
know that we’re on the verge of getting some more of those tie lines
back up, to alleviate the overload on the ones that’re there right now.
So, feel free to start bringing customers back on line and adding load.
Out-of-band information
Phonable friend: Marilyn at AEP
Information: Marilyn is at home sick and has no useful info.
Org chart information: None applicable
How the subject should decide
Although there is no useful information available through out-of-band channels, the use
of a personal email address should be a red flag. Subjects in the S/MIME and ABUSE
groups would have had extra cues. The CA on the certificate used to sign the message, for
example, was not associated with the sender’s claimed company. Also, the message had no
attributes bound to it. For subjects who had seen other messages with attributes that they
found useful, this was a sign that the something was amiss.
A.4.2 The external-insider scenario
The attacker, who is within the grid’s trust infrastructure (though at different company than
the subject) requests an action that will further hamper the grid. The subject should reject
the message.
Characteristics of the subject
Subject affiliation: IP&L
Subject role: Transmission system operator
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Characteristics of the attacker
Attacker: Bob Bison
Attacker email address: <bbison@miso.ORG>
Attacker affiliation: MISO
Signature CA: Midwest ISO CA
Parameters of the situation
Trust-flow: Faked role-based
Contingency: Power lines from Thompson to Fredericksburg and Thompson
















Signature: Valid, sender’s company CA
Attributes: MISO says that Bob Bison is a full-time employee
Text: This is Bob Bison at MISO. I got your contact information from
Parker Posey over there at IP and L. We’re not currently seeing any
grid status updates on our console over here for some reason...can you
let us know the status of all the lines coming out of Thompson?
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Out-of-band information
Phonable friend: Kal at MISO
Information: Bob has no reason to ask for that information.























How the subject should decide
The S/MIME and plaintext groups should have needed to ask their associate Kal at MISO
for advice. He would have informed them that Bob should be ignored. The ABUSE group
should have seen that mere employee status is not enough to give Bob the authority to ask
for the information he requests.
A.4.3 The internal-insider scenario
The attacker, who is within the subject’s company’s trust infrastructure requests an action
that will further hamper the grid. The subject should reject the message.
Characteristics of the subject
Subject affiliation: Cinergy
Subject role: Generation system operator
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Characteristics of the attacker
Attacker: Carol Crawford
Attacker email address: <carolc@cinergy.com>
Attacker affiliation: Cinergy
Signature CA: Cinergy CA
Parameters of the situation
Trust-flow: Faked delegation
Contingency: Allegheny is generating too much power at Conger, which is
overloading the power lines coming into Regina in the western
part of Cinergy’s area. You have generators at Regina, and also












Signature: Valid, sender and subject’s company CA
Attributes: Cinergy says that Carol Crawford is a full-time employee
Text: I know you’re seeing some grid instability on the border with
Allegheny. Doug Kiskaden and I have been talking to a reliability
coordinator at MISO, who’s been in touch with them. They’ve gotten
Allegheny to bring down their generation at Conger to address the
instability you’re seeing, but they’ll need to take a whole unit offline to
do it. That’ll drop generation too far, so they told me to ask you to




Phonable friend: Manny at Allegheny
Information: Manny is on travel; has no idea what’s going on at work.
Org chart information: Doug Kiskaden is a controller operator.
The subject is subordinate to him.

























How the subject should decide
The S/MIME and plaintext groups should have needed to check their org chart to see that
Carol is an accountant; she would never be involved in the kind of conversations to which
she claims to have been privy. The ABUSE group should have seen that mere employee
status is not enough to give Carol the kind of access or authority she claims.
A.4.4 Legitimate coopetition
An employee at AEP leverages a legitimate coopetition trust flow that comes from MISO
to ask the subject, at First Energy, to make an operational change that will improve grid
stability.
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Characteristics of the subject
Subject affiliation: First Energy
Subject role: Reliability engineer
Characteristics of the sender
Attacker: Darren Driscoll
Attacker email address: <driscoll@aep.com>
Attacker affiliation: AEP
Signature CA: American Electric Power CA
Parameters of the situation
Trust-flow: Legitimate coopetition
Contingency: There are four power lines tying First Energy to AEP. Two are











Signature: Valid, sender’s company CA
Attributes: AEP says that Darren Driscoll is a full-time employee
AEP says that Roy Halladay is the President
Roy Hallady says that Jeremy Accardo is a VP of Power Operations
Jeremy Accardo says that Marilyn Monroe is a Controller Operator
Marilyn Monroe says that Darren Driscoll is a Reliability Engineer
MISO says that Fran Fine is the Director, Grid Ops.
Fran Fine says that George Gosling is a Manager, Ops. Support
George Gosling says that Henry Hank is a Supervisor, Outage
Coordination
Henry Hank says that Cary Grant is a Reliability Coordinator
Cary Grant says that Irene Islena @ PJM is mitigating the AEP-FE
tie line overload
Irene Islena @ PJM says that Darren Driscoll is allowed to ask FE to buy
generation
Text: I am a transmission systems operator at AEP and got your contact
information from Cary Grant at MISO. We’re worried about the few
remaining lines between you guys and us. If you keep adding load the
way you are, we’re concerned that the transmission lines will overload
and quit on us. Cary and I have agreed that you guys need to purchase
some generation as soon as possible, unless you can get some
generation up in the immediate future.
Out-of-band information
Phonable friend: Cary at MISO
Information: Darren’s request should be heeded.
Org chart information: None applicable
How the subject should decide
Subjects in the S/MIME and plaintext groups must contact Cary to verify that the request
is acceptable. The ABUSE subjects should be able to learn from the attributes that Darren
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both works at AEP in a position that deals with maintaining grid stability and that he has
been given permission to ask for a remediation action from a MISO reliability coordinator.
A.4.5 Legitimate Delegation
An employee at MISO leverages a legitimate delegation trust flow that comes from Cinergy
to ask the subject, also at Cinergy, to make an operational change that will improve grid
stability.
Characteristics of the subject
Subject affiliation: Cinergy
Subject role: Generation system operator
Characteristics of the sender
Attacker: Ernie Ells
Attacker email address: <ells@miso.org>
Attacker affiliation: MISO
Signature CA: Midwest ISO CA
Parameters of the situation
Trust-flow: Legitimate delegation
Contingency: Allegheny is generating too much power at Wheatland, which is
overloading the power lines coming into Gibson in the western
part of Cinergy’s area. You have generators at Gibson, and also











Signature: Valid, sender’s company CA
Attributes: MISO says that Ernie Ells is a full-time employee
MISO says that Fran Fine is the Director, Grid Ops.
Fran Fine says that George Gosling is a Manager, Ops. Support
George Gosling says that Henry Hank is a Supervisor, Outage Coordination
Henry Hank says that Ernie Ells is a Reliability Coordinator
Cinergy says that Mariano Rivera is the President
Mariano Rivera says that Edwar Ramirez is a VP of Power Operations
Edwar Ramirez says that Doug Kiskaden is a Controller Operator
Doug Kiskaden says that Ernie Ells is allowed to ask for 80MW drop at
Gibson, 80MW boost at Woodsdale
Text: I’m a reliability coordinator at MISO, and I’ve been talking to Doug
Kiskaden, the Controller Operator over there at Cinergy. We’re seeing
some instability due to generation coming from Allegheny, and have
agreed that we need you to bring down generation at Gibson by 80
MW and up at Woodsdale by the same amount.
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Out-of-band information
Phonable friend: Jon at MISO
Information: Ernie has been talking to Allegheny; he knows what to do.
Org chart information: Doug Kiskaden is a controller operator.

























How the subject should decide
Subjects in the S/MIME and plaintext groups must contact Jon to verify that the request is
acceptable. The ABUSE subjects should be able to learn from the attributes that Ernie is a
reliability coordinator at MISO, and thus it makes sense that he’d be talking to Allegheny.
Also, the attributes show that Doug Kiskaden has given Ernie permission to ask for the




In this appendix, we provide the materials viewed by the subjects during Abusing Johnny.
B.1 Abusing Johnny recruitment
In addition to posting the flyer shown in Figure B.1, we sent an email with the same in-
formation out to a number of campus email lists, with an encouragement to forward it to
anyone in the Dartmouth community who might be interested in participating.
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1
Participate in Rewarding Dartmouth research
Who: Dartmouth undergraduates
What: 30-45 minute decision-making study
Attend a laboratory session;





A!researcher will contact you to schedule your session.
Questions? Contact me at cmasone@dartmouth.edu
This study [and this blitz] have been approved by the Committee for the Protection of Human
Subjects (CPHS). This study is sponsored by Professor Sean Smith. For more information about this
study blitz cmasone@dartmouth.edu.
If you have general questions about being a research participant, you may call or blitz the Office of
the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at Dartmouth College (603) 646-3053.
posted [date]
Figure B.1: Recruitment flyer. An email with the same content was also used for recruitment.
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B.2 Abusing Johnny consent form
Figure B.2: Consent form
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B.3 Abusing Johnny setup information
Study Procedure
As a volunteer in the study, we ask you to do the following things:
• If you can manage it, it is extremely useful to me if you “think aloud” during the test about
what choices you are making and why. I’ll be taking notes, so the more informative you can
be about what you are doing and thinking, the better my data will be.
• In the study, you will be asked to play the role of a volunteer in the Democratic Party primary
campaign of Senator Brian Oman. After volunteering, you were given the role of Campaign
Coordinator by Senator Oman’s Campaign Manager Maria Page. Your task is to maintain the
most up-to-date copy of the campaign plan and send it out to other members of the campaign
team by email upon request. The campaign team of your opponent, Senator Copeland,
would very much like to disrupt Senator Oman’s plans, and so it is very important to be
sure that the schedule does not get modified by or leaked to anyone outside the
campaign.
• Your email address for the purpose of this study will be ccord@dnc.org. You should use the
title “Campaign Coordinator” rather than your own name.
Mozilla Thunderbird has been installed on the computer in front of you, and set up to access the
email account. No manual has been provided for this program, but there is help and information
available within the program itself. TextEdit, a simple text-editing program simple to Microsoft
Notepad, is running as well, if you wish to take notes electronically. A pad of paper and pens are
also provided, if you wish to use them.
Before starting the test, I will give you a very basic demonstration of how to use Thunderbird
to send and receive mail. The tutorial should take about a minute, and then we’ll begin the actual
testing, which should take about a half hour. For the purposes of this study, you may assume
that all email you send or receive can only be read by the sender and the intended recipient(s).
Furthermore, you may assume that a message that appears to be from “Jane Doe” with the email
address “jdoe@example.com” is actually from a person that the Democratic Party recognizes to
be named “Jane Doe” with the email address “jdoe@example.com”. Any further judgments about
who Jane is or what Jane does must be made by you.
If you have questions during the study about how to use the message sending and receiving
capabilities of Thunderbird, I can provide assistance. For anything beyond that, I will refer you
back to these instruction sheets.
1
Figure B.3: Setup information for Abusing Johnny.
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B.4 Abusing Johnny debriefing questionnaires
1. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important did you feel security was in this particular test
scenario, where 1 is least important and 5 is most important?
2. Do you think you sent the schedule to someone not associated with the campaign?
Comments?
3. Was there anything you thought about doing but then decided not to bother with?
4. Is there anything you think you would have done differently if this had been a real
scenario rather than a test?
5. Were there any aspects of the software you found particularly helpful?
6. Were there any aspects of the software you found particularly confusing?
7. Are there any other comments you’d like to make at this time?
Figure B.4: Debriefing questionnaire for the control group.
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1. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important did you feel security was in this particular test
scenario, where 1 is least important and 5 is most important?
2. Do you think you sent the schedule to someone not associated with the campaign?
Comments?
3. Did you notice the colored bar at the base of the email window?
4. What did the yellow bar mean? The blue?
5. Did you notice the “Digital Introductions” box?
6. What did it mean when a person’s name in an introduction was printed in large text?
7. What did it mean when part of an introduction was printed in yellow text?
8. Was there anything you thought about doing but then decided not to bother with?
9. Is there anything you think you would have done differently if this had been a real
scenario rather than a test?
10. Were there any aspects of the software you found particularly helpful?
11. Were there any aspects of the software you found particularly confusing?
12. Are there any other comments you’d like to make at this time?
Figure B.5: Debriefing questionnaire for the ABUSE groups.
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